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Prologue
"And it came to pass in those days that terror denied all languages and
frontiers" (Wiesel, Six Days 5). For those were days invaded by night,
the days of the reign of the Kingdom of Night. They are days that haunt
and harrow all subsequent days, words, and deeds, cutting through
the frontiers of language and meaning that might once have divided
light from darkness. Terror has undone time and with it that being that
once inhabited the heart of human being, the being of the word.
"There is no peace for'the darkened valleys," Amos Oz has said,
"something is rising up in the night, something is mounting, gather-
ing, something is silently happening" (144). Something-davar-mah in
the Hebrew text (153)-"some word" that is not a word, a sound that is
not a sound, bursts forth between word and word in a shriek of silence.
From this emerges the Holocaust novel.
"It is true," Elie Wiesel once told me, commenting on the event of
the novel's creation. "I descend ... somewhere." He, like the others
addressed in these pages, beckons us to follow-to a place that is no
place, where the word is swallowed up into words. It is a place where
there is "no connection," to borrow a phrase from Martin Buber,
"rather shriek, shriek, and in between them the abyss" (Daniel 86). By
what method shall we proceed to such a place? How shall we under-
take such an investigation? Buber offers a suggestion: "Imagine that at
some dreadful midnight you lie there, tormented by a waking dream:
the bulwarks have crumbled and the abysses scream, and you realize in
the midst of this agony that life is still there and I must merely get
through to it-but how? how? Thus feels man in the hours when he
collects himself: overcome by horror, pondering, without direction" (1
and Thou llQ). Life is still there; the heart continues to beat when it
should have come to a stop. Holding these novels in our hands attests
to that. Yet in the text that we hold in our hands lurks the horror that
threatens us, the exile that implicates us. The method, therefore, settles
nothing. Indeed, it is unsettling in the extreme, and that is the point: to
speak and break in the effort to respond to the testimony entrusted to
us. For unless we are broken by our response to the voice and the event
of the Holocaust novel, we can never open up to its outcry. Only by
becoming such a wound do we gain even the tiniest access to these
wounded ones.
2 THE SHRIEK OF SILENCE
It is from the midst of a wound that Ka-tzetnik135633, for instance,
writes, "I shoot up from the launch-pile of skeletons into the tempest of
my own cry of Passion" (Shivitti 104)~ The outcry that arises from the
skeletal remains of life and language constitutes the Holocaust novel
and the voices that inhabit it. Aharon Appelfeld, for example, creates a
character in Tzili: The Story of a Life who harbors the very outcry of
which the novel is made. In an endeavor indicative of the author's own
endeavor, the character struggles to articulate to his friends the pros-
pect of redemption. But no one listens to him. And so, "the whole
night he sat and wailed. Through his wailing the history of his life
emerged" (146). In a similar way Mordi bespeaks his author's effort to
speak in The Chocolate Deal by Haim Gouri when he describes the days
and nights that he spent hiding in a cellar: "I thought that periodically
I'd shriek one day-long shriek which would earn me the title of Cham-
pion 5hrieker" (56). The character, however, remains silent; yet it is just
through his silence that the authors shriek makes itself heard.
What, we ask, is the substance of that shriek? One more example,
from Ka-tzetnik's Star of Ashes, will tell us. "Children," he writes,
"push against their mothers belly, as if seeking to get inside once
more. Their scream, embryonic, unuttered, howls out of their mother's
eyes" (53). Thus the author p~shesagainst the belly of life's origin, his
shriek of silence howling through the invisible eyes of his character. We
read the words, but we do not see those eyes; we encounter the silence,
but we do not hear the shriek. The task of this book is to make those
eyes visible, to make that shriek heard. What, then, is curled up in this
shriek that frames and infiltrates the novel? What do we now set out to
hear, if we can find the courage? A passage from Elie Wiesel's Some-
where a Master may offer a response: 1/An appeal, an outcry to God on
behalf of His desperate people and also on His behalf, an offering to
night, to heaven, an offering made by wise old men and quiet children
to mark the end of language-a burning secret buried in silence" (201).
50 we take up the pursuit of the secret and its fire and go in quest of the
silence and its shriek.
1
Theoretical Background
"Let him who wants fervor not seek it on the mountain peaks," the
Maggid of Mezeritch once said. "Rather let him stoop and search
among the ashes" (see Wiesel, Souls 71). Since 1945, however, the world
has lived on a mountain of ashes-the ashes of children, ashes of God's
chosen, ashes of God Himself. The winds of Auschwitz have quite
literally, quite graphically, scattered the people of the Covenant, and
with them the Covenant itself, over the face of the earth. The people
inhabit the soil that yields our bread; they haunt the air we breathe. I
have heard at least one survivor declare that, when the breeze blows
from a certain direction, she can still smell the odor that oozed from the
chimneys of the death camps. As Amost Lustig expressed it in his
novel A Prayer for Katerina Horovitzova,
These ashes would be indestructible and immutable, they would not burn up
into nothingness because they themselves were remnants of fire.... No one
living would ever be able to escape them; these ashes would be contained in the
milk that will be drunk by babies yet unborn and in the breasts their mothers
offer them. . . . These ashes will be contained in the breath and expression of
everyone of us and the next time anybody asks what the air he breathes is made
of, he will have to think about these ashes; they will be contained in books
which haven't yet been written and will be found in the remotest regions of the
earth where no human foot has ever trod; no one will be able to get rid of them,
for they will be the fond, nagging ashes of the dead who died in innocence.
[50-51]
What the translator rendered as the"expression" of everyone ofus is in
the original Czech pohled, which means "look, glance, sight, view"; the
very image of the human being is cast in these ashes. The phrase "have
to think about" bears in the Czech text a stronger moral and existential
injunction in the word povinen, suggesting duty, obligation, compul-
sion (41). Failing to answer to these ashes would mean falling short of
human being.
Hearing such testimony, one cannot help but recall the outcry
raised by Nelly Sachs: "0 the chimneys ... And Israel's body as smoke
through the air!" (3). Thus was the light unto the nations consumed. Or
is it hidden among the ashes? Indeed, it is among the ashes that the
authors before us seek what was lost.
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What, exactly, was lost? Elie Wiesel has one response to this ques-
tion. "At Auschwitz," he asserts, "not only man died, but also the idea
of man. It was its own heart that the world incinerated at Auschwitz"
(Legends 230). Through those forms called Holocaust literature, the
poets seek the lost soul and self of human being. Through words they
seek the lost word that constitutes human being. The concern before
us, therefore, is not primarily historical or aesthetic or even literary, in
the strict sense of those terms; rather, as we shall see, it is existential,
phenomenological, ontological, metaphysical-in short, it is funda-
mentally religious. Alvin Rosenfeld has indicated as much, correctly
arguing that the position of the Holocaust writer is
analogous to that of the man of faith, who is likewise beset by frustration and
anguish and, in just those moments when his spirit may yearn for the fullness
of Presence, is forced to acknowledge the emptiness and silence of an imposed
Absence. The life centers of the self-intelligence, imagination, asser-
tiveness-undergo paralysis in such moments, which, if prolonged, have the
effect of a total detachment or the profoundest despair. Yet to indulge in silence
is to court madness or death. At just those points where, through some abiding
and still operative reflex of language, silence converts once more into words-
even into words about silence-Holocaust literature is born. Its birth must be
seen as a miracle of some sort, not only an overcoming of mute despair but an
assertion and affirmation of faith. [14-15]
In the creation of the Holocaust novel, then, religious concern is
a concern for the word; as Kenneth Burke has put it, "Statements
that great theologians have made about the nature of 'God' might be
adapted mutatis mutandis for use as purely secular observations of the
nature of words" (1-2). Drawing a connection between man, word, and
God, Wiesel cites what he calls "the most beautiful words" of Rebbe
Menahem-Mendl of Vitebsk, saying, "Man is the language of God"
(Souls 86). When man or the idea of man is lost, so is the language of
God, so is the word. Hence Auschwitz represents a profound loss of
the word. As Andre Neher expresses it, IIAuschwitz is, above all,
silence" (141), the silence of the word torn from its place and cast into
exile among the ashes. "If I know that the place of the word is here in
the meaning," Wiesel once said, "it would mean that at least I know the
meaning. That's what I would call faith. The faith is not that one day it
will come but that one day it was there" (see Patterson, In Dialogue 171).
The movement of the word in the Holocaust novel is a turning back, a
teshuvah, a movement of return, response, and redemption. Yet it is
also a movement forward, toward the yet-to-be.
Let it be said, then, at the outset, that the Holocaust novel is not
primarily an attempt to recount the details of a particular occurrence, to
depict a reality that transcends the imagination, or to describe a horror
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inaccessible to a limited language. It is, rather, an event and an en-
deavor to fetch the word from the silence of exile and restore it to its
meaning; it is an attempt to resurrect the dead soul or self of the human
being. Commenling on the relation between silence and the author's
sense of self, Jerzy Kosinski said, "Perhaps this silence is also a meta-
phor for dissociation from the community and from something greater.
This feeling of alienation floats on the surface of the work and manifests
the author's awareness, perhaps unconscious, of his break with the
wholeness of self (Notes 17). In a similar vein Wiesel remarked, "You
write about what you do not have. It is absence that makes literature. It
is what you miss that becomes present" (Against Silence 3:286). The
absence that characterizes this break with the self, the absence that
makes literature, consists of silence; it is the absence of the word.
"Before I write," Wiesel tells us, "I must endure the silence, then the
silence breaks out. In the beginning there was silence-no words. The
word itself is a breaking out.... it breaks the silence. We cannot avoid
the silence, we must not. What we can do is somehow charge words
with silence" (Against Silence 2:119). Charging words with silence, the
novelist struggles to impart a voice to silence-and to hear a voice from
within that silence. In the Holocaust novel silence is always a character,
and the word is always its subject matter.
The Holocaust novel, therefore, is not simply about a historical
event, nor is its interest only in historical memory. Much more than
that, it is about the conflict-it is the conflict-betwen word and
silence in the restoration of presence of all levels: presence between the
self and God, between the self and other, between the self and itself.
"The storyteller," in Wiesel's words, "is no more than a messenger
whose role is to create links between word and being, man and him-
self, shadow and the memory of that shadow" (Against Silence 2:57).
Such links are created through dialogic encounter, so that the Holo-
caust novel is not set in one period or another but in the space between
the voices of encounter, in the dialogue between word and word, word
and silence, silence and silence. The form of the novel is the form of this
between-space as it takes shape in the dialogic relation that ties the
author to character, to reader, and to his own soul. Passing through
these levels of relation, word and meaning may once again find their
intersection and their resurrection-in the shriek of silence.
The Critical Contexts for the Investigation
Considering the vastness of the literature in question, relatively few
book-length studies treat the topic, and all of them can be viewed to
varying degrees as pioneer efforts. To be sure, the literature continues
to be produced, each new work shedding its own light on all the rest.
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The court of scholarship, therefore, is still in session; the chief wit-
nesses-Elie Wiesel, Aharon Appelfeld, Amost Lustig, Ka-tzetnik
135633, and others-continue their literary testimony. Although the
investigation at hand takes issue with all previous attempts to penetrate
the literary response to the Holocaust, it could not have been under-
taken without those attempts, and it owes a great deal to them. The
criticisms that follow, then, are made much more in a spirit of gratitude
and respect than in the complacency of casual dismissal.
Among the earliest books to explore Holocaust literature was Irv-
ing Halperin's Messengers from the Dead: Literature of the Holocaust (1970).
Viewing the authors of Holocaust literature "essentially as moral teach-
ers," Halperin argues that the chief intention of such authors "is to
teach the reader by interrogating him. The messengers, in effect, ask
the reader to rigorously examine his knowledge of and relationship to
the Holocaust" (13-14). In this study of selected fiction, diaries, and
memoirs, Halperin regards the main task of author and reader as the
remembrance of a historical event and the examination of the moral
implications of that event. There is no denying the urgency of bearing
witness and assessing one's relation to history. What remains to be
studied, however, is the more essential matter of the resurrection or
redemption of the soul that arises in the dialogic exchange between
author and reader via character. In responding to the novel, the reader
must gain not so much factual knowledge as self-definition; it is a
matter of declaring, "Here I am," not "Now I know." Thus Halperin
turns to the message without stopping to consider the difficulties
peculiar to the medium, the word wrenched from the void. He hears
the shriek but not the silence.
In Escape into Siege: A Survey of Israeli Literature Today (1974) Leon
Yudkin regards the task of the novelist as an effort to become an
individual, not through dialogic interaction within the text but through
a flight from the crowd. "The individual," he argues, "has to escape
group pressure through flight to establish himself truly as an individ-
ual. Once he has become an individual, he can then begin to ponder in
an uncluttered fashion the truly central issues. And this sort of meta-
physic is the concern not only of the man in his private life or in his
relationship to God, but also of the novelist in his written work" (171).
Yudkin's main shortcoming is that in his discussion of the tension
between group and individual he fails to address language, which is
the novelist's medium ~nd subject matter. The word implies the pres-
ence of three-speaker, listener, and witness-and no life steeped in
language (as all life is) can be lived in isolation. The individual can
"establish himself truly as an individual" only through a dialogical
relationship with others, both before him and above him.
In 1975 Lawrence Langer published his book The Holocaust and the
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Literary Imagination, in which he focuses on the conflict between
"historical fact and imaginative truth" (8). He writes, "I have organized
my study around a number of recurrent themes that illustrate the
aesthetic problem of reconciling normalcy with horror: the displace-
ment of the consciousness of life by the imminence and pervasiveness
of death; the violation of the coherence of childhood; the assault on
physical reality; the disintegration of the rational intelligence; and the
disruption of chronological time" (xii). While the Holocaust novel
indeed addresses all of these themes, Langer never probes the existen-
tial encounters between life and death, word and silence, and self and
other that generate such themes. Focusing on aesthetics, he isolates the
work of art from the human being who speaks it and thus approaches it
as an object for examination rather than an event of human existence.
"Image collides with concept," as he correctly observes (149), but so
does the soul collide with the void, and this deeper collision Langer
tends to overlook.
Edward Alexander's The Resonance of Dust: Essays on Holocaust Liter-
ature and Jewish Fate (1979) is similar to Langer's study but is less
analytical, offering little more than a series of plot descriptions. Like
Langer, Alexander addresses the surface issue of how literature voices
history, without considering the metaphysical problem of the soul's
resurrection to life or the word's restoration to meaning. To his credit,
however, Alexander does understand that the Jewish essence of the
Shoah and of the literary response to it is precisely what takes us to the
core of human being. Quoting Piotr Rawicz, he argues that "the fate
and condition of the Jewish people are the very essence of the human
condition-the furthest borders of human destiny. And the fate of the
'Holocaust Jew,' ... is ... the ontological essence of that ontological
essence" (223-24). Alexander's touchstone is history, however, not the
existential or phenomenological aspects of giving voice to the novel.
In her long essay that appears in Encountering the Holocaust: An
Interdisciplinary Survey (1979) Josephine Knopp, like many others,
makes the merely half-accurate claim that "the Holocaust writer-
virtually alone among writers-faces the difficulty of making a factual
subject believable" (270). Such a difficulty bespeaks a much deeper
problem involving the life-and-death encounter between the author
and the blank page. Addressing the chief difficulty confronting the
critic, Knopp is again only half right, maintaining that the critic faces
the problem of "applying a number of criteria extraneous to the tradi-
tional frame of reference of literary criticism" (267). We shall find that
the Holocaust writer implicates the Holocaust reader, whose task is not
the application of new criteria but the generation of a language of the
self that would establish a responsive dialogic presence in relation to
the textual voice. Adding insight to Knopp's remarks, Amost Lustig, in
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an appendix to Knopp's essay, states, "While history, philosophy,
psychology or sociology each stands alone, literature includes all of
them and re-creates all elements into its own literary amalgam, out
of which comes something that exists nowhere but in literature"
(311). That "something" is the rebirth of the word and, with it, the
soul.
Like Knopp, Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi raises the issue of the critical
approach to Holocaust literature in her book By Words Alone: The
Holocaust in Literature (1980). "Traditional perimeters of mimetic art,"
she asserts, do not apply, "because although Holocaust literature is a
reflection of recent history, it cannot draw upon timeless archetypes of
human experience and human behavior which can render unlived
events familiar through the medium of the imagination.... Precisely
where it is most confined to the unimaginable facts of violence and
horror, the creative literature that has developed is the least consistent
with traditional moral and artistic convention" (2-3). Once she outlines
the difficulties involving conventional generic categories, Ezrahi pro-
poses new labels for the varieties of Holocaust literature and then
discusses works representing those new categories. Although many of
her observations ,are quite astute, her premise is wrongheaded. First of
all, Holocaust literature is not a reflection of history but an interaction
between human being and human nothingness, a dialogic encounter
on all levels. The matter of its confinement, moreover, involves not so
much unimaginable facts as unbreachable silence. Like Langer's the-
matic approach, Ezrahi's formal treatment of Holocaust literature re-
duces it to an object of observation, denying its existence as an event in
the life of a living subject.
Alvin Rosenfeld takes the issues surrounding Holocaust literature
to a more profound philosophical level. In A Double Dying: Reflections on
Holocaust Literature (1980), for example, he shows that "if one can talk
about such a thing as a phenomenology of Holocaust literature, it
would have to be in tenns of this contradiction between the impos-
sibility but also the necessity of writing about the death of the idea of
man in order to sustain that idea" (8). Rosenfeld's "principal interest,"
he explains, "is less in the I art of atrocity' than it is in other issues, most
especially in trying to define the kind of knowledge that we acquire in
reading the literature of the Holocaust and in weighing the consequent
gains and losses that are ours in its aftermath" (8-9). While Rosenfeld
astutely examines these important questions in his analysis of various
works of Holocaust literature, he does not always pursue his phe-
nomenological concern to its existential depths. Before sustaining any
idea of man, the novelist must go through the tribulation of resurrect-
ing a presence of self through an encounter between self and other,
between word and silence. The reader who becomes a witness to this
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interaction comes up against the human voice that speaks through the
text and is implicated by it; Rosenfeld does not address this issue. Here
the truth is not something we know but something we might become
through the process of dialogic response. What is gained or lost is not
simply a concept or idea but the very life of the soul.
The Holocaust in Hebrew Literature: From Genocide to Rebirth (1983), by
Alan Yutler, provides an overview of Israeli literature dealing with the
Shoah. "The striking consistency," Yutler observes, "in all the works of
Israeli literature bearing on the Holocaust and the destruction of the
European Jewish people is their concern for the redemptive pos-
sibilities of the aftermath" (121). Like most treatments of Holocaust
literature, however, Yutlers slips into the shortcoming of what Mikhail
Bakhtin calls impressive aesthetics. Bakhtin says, "The problem with
impressive aesthetics is that here the artistic event as an event between
two consciousnesses does not exist; here art is preceived as a one-sided
act concerned not with another, with a subject, but strictly with an
object, with material" (Estetika 82). Containing little more than sum-
maries of plots and poetry, Yutler's work examines "redemptive pos-
sibilities" only in the literature's theme and content, without regard to
language and meaning or the relationships between author and charac-
ter, character and reader, author and reader. It is precisely within these
relationships and through the word that redemptive possibilities must
be hammered out. More descriptive than analytical, Yutler's study
maintains a safe distance from the real collisions that distinguish
Holocaust literature.
In contrast with scholars such as Ezrahi and Rosenfeld, who per-
ceive generic and epistemological difficulties peculiar to Holocaust
literature, Alan Mintz argues that this literature belongs to a standing
generic tradition in Hebrew literature. "The impetus for this study," he
explains in the preface to Hurban: Responses to Catastrophe in Hebrew
Literature (1984), "was a dissatisfaction with the conception in literary
studies of Holocaust literature as a distinct genre." This literature, he
claims, belongs "to a vertical axis of literary tradition, which extended
back to the Middle Ages and the Bible," and its meaning "depends on
the interpretative tradition of the community or culture seeking that
meaning" (ix). While Mintz's approach is useful from the standpoint of
cultural or literary history, it sheds little light on the existential event
that occurs on the page between author and word, between word and
reader. Just as the strictly thematic approach protects the critic from
self-examination, so the appeal to generic tradition provides an illusion
of explanation that veils human questions of meaning that have no
answers. Mintz does, nonetheless, make a very discerning observation
with respect to an essential difference between those authors who are
survivors and those who are not: "When the survivor writes about the
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Holocaust it has the effect of an evasion- interrupted or curtailed rather
than an experience encountered or investigated; and when he writes of
other things, the Holocaust seems to hover as an ontologial condition"
(259). The evasion curtailed is the evasion of silence in the flight to the
noise of the world. The ontological condition is a'condition of silence-
not just the silence of the infinite spaces that terrified Pascal but the
silence that replaces the word when nothingness displaces being, as it
does when reality allows no place for the word. "The word always
dies," Jean Amery has noted, "where the claim of some reality is
total" (20).
A piece that Mintz regards as a companion to his own work (xii),
David Roskies's Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe in Mod-
ern Jewish Culture (1984), also attempts to make sense of Holocaust
literature by placing it in a generically traditional context. Roskies's
study, therefore, contains the same basic weaknesses as does Mintz's
book. To his credit, however, Roskies recognizes at least one critical
issue in the life of the self with respect to its literary endeavor:
Ever since the first Jew tried to remove himself from the crowd of exiles
mourning by the waters of Babylon, the presence of the one still implied the
presence of the many. For if the self desired to bear witness to the destruction, it
then became the symbolic survivor of the community (and thus, the commu-
nity in miniature); or if, as a result of ideology or devastation, it wished to detail
its willing or unwilling departure from the community, the rejected group
loomed just as large as the self; and if, despite all odds, the self succeeded in
negating the group, the self was invariably lost as well. [133]
What Roskies does not emphasize is that when every distinguishing
feature of the community is reduced to ashes, so is the self. In the
literary response to the Holocaust the self does not negate the group
but rather finds itself negated by reality's negation of the group. When
the group is deemed guilty of being and is swallowed up by noth-
ingness, nothingness invades the self. Tradition is made of language,
but Auschwitz, in its very confusion of tongues, is made of silence, so
that an insurmountable void stands between the novelist and tradition..
Perhaps what Primo Levi said is true: "If the Lagers had lasted longer a
new, harsh language would have been born" (Man 144). But it was not
born. Here tradition and the group are not what is present as context
but what is absent within the text.
Charlotte Wardi makes a similar point about language in her book
Le genocide dans la fiction romanesque (1986) when she says, "The SS who
calls a dog 'man' and a Jew 'dog' latches onto this divided conscious-
ness in order to achieve his goal: the psychological destruction of the
Other" (51). The other who is destroyed in this undermining of lan-
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guage is not only the victim but also anyone-person or God-who is
the victim's other. The word, again, implies the presence of three
(speaker, listener, and witness), and when the word is lost or per-
verted, so are all the parties whom it might join together. It is not
simply the event but the bankruptcy of language itself that robs the
writer and reader of all reference points and of all substance. Wardi
does not pursue this fundamental issue of language and silence, of self
and word. "If, for the survivor," she asserts, "the act of writing answers
an urgent need to speak the truth, a duty to testify, it constitutes for
him, as for every genocide writer, an interrogation of atrocity, a search
for the meaning of a terrible venture, and requires the invention of a
form susceptible to the transmission of an 'unimaginable' reality, a
logic of horror, and to the communication of a message to a reader
incapable of referring to anything known" (39). Rejecting claims (such
as those of Mintz and Roskies) that Holocaust literature refers to
tradition, Wardi makes a valid point, but she stops short of the more
fundamental issue of the exile of the word.
The problem of transmitting experience also forms the basis of
James Young's Writing and ReuJriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the
Consequences of Interpretation (1988). "This study," he writes, "asks pre-
cisely how historical memory, understanding, and meaning are con-
stituted in Holocaust narrative" (vii). Accenting the historical, Young
omits the existential; focusing on what belongs to a faceless collective,
he disregards the collision of the living individual who comes before
the face of the human being. This complaint is basically the same as
Kierkegaard's objection to the Hegelian system in Concluding Unscien-
tific Postscript, where he declares, "It may be seen, from a purely
abstract point of view, that system and existence are incapable of being
thought together, because in order to think existence at all, systematic
thought must think it as abrogated" (107). The system that interests
Young is the system of metaphors by which history is transmitted
through narrative; his concern, therefore, is both thematic and struc-
tural. Yet he is aware of the conflict between the existential and the
systematic, pointing out that "the Holocaust writer faces an especially
powerful quandary: on the one hand, the survivor-scribe would write
both himself and his experience into existence after the fact, giving
them both expression and textual actuality; but on the other hand, in
order to make his testimony seem true, he would simultaneously
efface himself from his text" (10). Young nevertheless makes the error
of identifying what is true with what is factual, claiming that "the
transmission of facts in Holocaust writing still dominates this liter-
ature's function for so many writers" (91). This may be the case for
some, but it is not the case for novelists such as Wiesel, Rawicz, Ka-
tzetnik, Lustig, Appelfeld, and others with whom we are here con-
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cemed. As Wiesel put it, "Some events do take place but are not true;
others are-although they never occured" (Legends viii). The truth that
we shall examine is the truth that the soul struggles to become, not a
fact or occurrence that one can document. When Oedipus answered
the riddle of the Sphinx-what walks on four legs in the morning, two
in the afternoon, and three in the evening-he did not simply cite a fact
about the world. He was himself the answer.
In all fairness, the scholars discussed above merit a more thorough
treatment than space here allows. It is time, however, to penetrate their
critical groundwork and delve deeper into the recesses of human being
from which the literature in question is born. Whether treating Holo-
caust literature from the persepctive of genre, tradition, theme, or
form, the studies we have considered all operate within the framework
of objective thought. "While objective thought," Kierkegaard explains,
"is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective
thinker is as an existing individual essentially interested in his own
thinking, existing as he does in his thought. . . . While objective
thought translates everything into results, ... subjective thought puts
everything into process and omits the result (Postscript 67-68). In the
pages that follow the Holocaust novel is viewed not as a result-that is,
not as an object of critical scrutiny-but as a force or a process in the life
of the living subject. As Bakhtin has shown, "the text as such never
appears as a dead thing; beginning with any text, ... we always arrive,
in the final analysis, at the human voice, which is to say we come up
against the human being" (Dialogic 252-53). Adopting this Bakhtinian
approach, we shall interact with the Holocaust novel from an existen-
tial, phenomenological perspective in an effort to apprehend human
being through the human voice.
The Philosophical Foundations for the Investigation
Franz Rosenzweig and his ideas regarding the conceptual links be-
tween man, God, and world provide the first of our philosophical
reference points. In a letter to Mawrik Kahn dated 18 August 1918,
Rosenzweig wrote, "The world was created as a fact, and it must be
redeemed into personality . . . (see Joel 3:1-2). Therefore each step,
each action-consciously for the knowing, naively for the naive-is a
step toward the personalization of the factual, the humanization of
'things''' (Glatzer 81). In the redemption of fact into personality the
thing, no longer mute, assumes a voice. That which is human is that
which speaks. The process of dehumanization, on the other hand, is a
process of rendering silent by divorcing word from thing, davar from
davar, dividing the self over against itself. The Holocaust novel ad-
dresses this division and struggles to work out some kind of re-
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demption. The man who is called a dog (as in Yoram Kaniuk's Adam
Resurrected) loses not only his form but his voice as well. The lost self is a
self drained of voice, and the process of redemption-what Rosen-
zweig calls personalization or humanization-is a process of regaining
a voice. It is in the voice and through the voice that the word is returned
to its meaning.
The Scrip'ture Rosenzweig cites in parentheses reads, "And it shall
come to pass afterward that I shall pour out my spirit upon all flesh."
The outpouring of the word in the Holocaust novel is an outpouring of
spirit upon flesh, of speech upon silence, of life upon death; it is the
mad struggle of what has been made into an It to be reborn into a Thou.
The author attempts to utter the word of creation in order to receive the
word of revelation, which is, says Rosenzweig, "at once revelation of
creation and of redemption. And language as the organon of revelation
is at the same time the thread running through everything human"
(Star 110). The three things at work in the Holocaust novel, to use
Rosenzweig's terminology, are creation, revelation, and redemption,
and the ties that bind them are those that link man, world, and God. If
language is the thread that runs through everything human, then in
the Holocaust it becomes a broken thread. The word of revelation in the
Holocaust novel is drawn not from language but from silence, so that
redemption is forever relegated to the realm of the afterward, of what
is not yet.
Language forms the basis for what Rosenzweig calls the new
thinking, a concept developed in his supplementary notes to The Star of
Redemption (2d ed., 1930). "In the new thinking," he explains, "the
method of speech replaces the method of thinking maintained in all
earlier philosophies. Thinking is timeless and wants to be timeless. . . .
Speech is bound to time and nourished by time, and it neither can nor
wants to abandon this element. It does not know in advance just where
it will end. It takes its cue from others.· In fact, it lives by virtue of
anothers life" (Glatzer 198-99). He continues, "I use the term 'speaking
thinker for the new thinking.... The difference between the old man
and the new, ~he 'logical' and the'grammatical' thinking, does not lie in
the fact that one is silent while the other is audible, but in the fact that
the latter needs another person and takes time seriously-actually,
these two things are identical" (Glatzer 199-200). Rosenzweig's new
thinking is counterposed to what Kierkegaard calls objective thought,
thought ruled by logic and law of contradiction, the mode of thought
that characterizes speculative philosophy. With the introduction of the
new thinking, Rosenzweig removes the position of truth and meaning
from the intellectual solipsism of speculation and places it in the
dialogic space between an I and a Thou. He situates truth in an ongoing
process rather than in some "logical" outcome. For the "speaking
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thinker," truth is not a dead datum but unfolds in the transformation of
the one who seeks it through the word.
If truth ever emerges in the Holocaust novel, it does so in the
dialogic between-space that Rosenzweig posits. Yet with the Holocaust
novel a third shift occurs; while the method of speech may not be
eliminated, it is at least momentarily eclipsed. Here the method is a
method of silence, or of the shriek of silence, which arises by virtue not
of anothefs life but of anothefs death. Here the "speaking thinker"
bespeaks the silence of what Rosenfeld termed"an imposed Absence"
(see 14-15) in a collapse of both speech and thought. While speech is
bound to time, silence in this instance is bound to eternity as the thing
absent, where the Eternal One is the Silent One. Speech takes time and
takes it seriously; silence addresses eternity and is the address of the
eternal. One thing the two have in common is their need for another. In
the case of the Holocaust novel, this is where the reader enters, and
what Rosenzweig says of man in The Star of Redemption also applies to
the reader: "The word itself must take man to the point of learning how
to share silence. His preparation begins with learning to hear" (309).
It begins with learning how to hear the silence in the word, sharing
with the author both word and silence, as two would share a piece of
bread. The silence of the imposed Absence-absence of God, self, and
other-is in turn imposed upon the reader. All the ideological, fonnal,
thematic, generic, and other critical methods belong to what Rosen-
zweig calls the thinking method and serve only to veil the face of the
one who speaks in a veiling of the critic's own face. Treating the text as
an object of investigation and not as a living voice, these methods
reduce both author and reader to an It.
Rosenzweig's close friend Martin Buber also places his accent on
the dialogic space between two, between an I and a Thou. Since this is
the realm in which that event known as the novel occurs, Buber's ideas
may shed important light on the existential concerns at hand. For our
purposes, one of the most important of Buber's work is I and Thou
(1923), in which, for example, we read, "I require a You to become;
becoming I, I say You" (62). One way to decribe the task of the author is
to say that it is an endeavor to become I; this the author sets out to
accomplish through a relation to the Thou that is the character, which
is, in tum, a relation to the reader. The silence ofan imposed Absence is
felt in the yearning for "the fullness of Presence" (see Rosenfeld 14-15),
and "only as the You becomes present," says Buber, 1/does presence
come into being" (63)-the presence of God, self, and other. Just as
absence is associated ·with silence, so is presence associated with the
word. When the word is in exile, tom from its meaning, the I is tom
from its Thou. The regeneration of presence, the resurrection of the
self, lies in the re-creation of this relation through the word. In the
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Holocaust novel neither author nor character speaks; rather, the rela-
tion speaks from all levels of relationship-author to character, charac-
ter to character, author to reader.
These levels of relationship, moreover, take on significance in the
light of a higher relation, from which every Holocaust novel draws its
life. The Silent One, the one who bears witness to the event of the
novel, is the Eternal One. The Eternal One, in Bubers language, is the
Eternal Thou, who, as Bakhtin puts it, "is invisibly present, standing
above all the participants in the dialogue" (Estetika 306). In Between Man
and Man (1932) Buber explains this presence, which is the substance of
all presence: "In the most powerful moments of dialogic, where in
truth /deep calls unto deep,' it becomes unmistakably clear that it is not
the wand of the individual or of the social, but of a third, which draws
the circle round the happening. On the far side of the subjective, on
this side of the objective, on the narrow ridge, where 1and Thou meet,
there is the realm of 'between' " (204). In that moment-when the point
of the pen descends to the page, when the character is about to speak,
when the reader is ready to answer-deep calls unto deep. In this
meeting of I and Thou we encounter a Third. "Extended," Buber
declares, "the lines of relationships intersect in the eternal You. Every
single You is a glimpse of that. Through every single You the basic word
addresses the eternal You" (1 and Thou 123). The Holocaust novel is just
such an extension of the lines of relationships. The novel may affinn the
Eternal Thou or it may accuse the Eternal Thou, but it cannot ignore
Him. If it did it would be neither a novel nor of the Holocaust.
The extension of the lines of relationships in the Holocaust novel
takes us to the place where the novel begins-to the silence whose
shriek lies at the beginning and at the end of the novel. The novel turns
back on itself like a word received and then returned. Response con-
stitutes both the writing and the reading of the novel. Yet the end is not
precisely the same as the beginning, and there is a difference between
the response of the writer and the response of the reader. When the
word of the author is received-when the novel "works"-silence, in
the end, may itself become a response, the response of spirit. Buber's
assertion in 1and Thou implies this:
Spirit is not in the I but between I and You. It is not like the blood that circulates
in you but like the air in which you breathe. Man lives in the spirit when he is
able to respond to his You. He is able to do that when he enters into this relation
with his whole being. It is solely by virtue of his power to relate that man is able
to live in the spirit. . . . Only silence toward the You, the silence of all tongues,
the taciturn waiting in the unformed, undifferentiated, prelinguistic word
leaves the You free and stands together with it fu reserve where the spirit does
not manifest itself but is. [89]
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Because silence is an issue in the Holocaust novel, spirit is also an issue.
The novel's dialogic dimensi~ns, born out of silence, are its spiritual
dimensions. This makes the existential concern with the novel, on the
part of both author and reader, a matter of life and death. When we fail
to respond to the voice coming from within and from beyond the wit-
ness, not only do we die spiritually, but the children around us also die,
quite literally. For the way of the spirit is the way of the flesh. When the
spirit dies, so does the body. And the children are the first to go.
Central to an existential treatment of the Holocaust novel, then, is
the problem of response, which is a problem of response ability, that is,
responsibility. Here too Buber makes an important point, and where
he writes '!living situation" in the following passage from Between Man
and Man we can read "Holocaust novel." For the novel viewed as an
event, not as an object, is a living situation. "In spite of all similarities
every living situation has, like a new-born child, a new face, that has
never been before and will never come again. It demands of you a
reaction which cannot be prepared beforehand. It demands nothing of
what is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it demands you"
(114). There is a definitive link between subjectivity and responsibility.
The author, in an effort to redeem or resurrect the self, holds no mirror
up to history ~ut engages the other, above and below, in a responsive
interchange. Similarly, the reader must allow no critical isms to eclipse
the author's voice but must answer the text with life, making a re-
sponse into one that calls for a response. Just as the author in relation to
character and to reader is for-the-other, so must the reader become for-
the-other, grounding presence in the capacity for response.
Rosenzweig's "new thinking" and Buber's "dialogic" thus bring us
to a connection between responsibility and subjectivity as the basis of
meaning in the I-Thou relation where human life unfolds. The philo-
sophical insight most helpful in this regard comes from the French-
Lithuanian thinker Emmanuel Levinas, a survivor of the Holocaust. In
Otherwise Than Being; or, Beyond Essence (1980), a work dedicated to the
six million, Levinas makes a statement about "saying" that we can
apply to the Holocaust novel. "Saying," he explains, is "already a sign
made to another, a sign of this giving of signs, that is, of this non-
indifference, a sign of this impossibility of slipping away and being
replaced, of this identity, this uniqueness: here I am" (145). Inasmuch
as the task of the Holocaust novelist is to re-create presence through
response, the author becomes, in the novel and through the novel, a
sign of this giving of signs. This is how the novel turns back on itself;
this is how the novel implicates the reader. The sign of the giving of
signs is a sign of responsibility. The novelist, becoming accountable for
presence or absence before the truth, makes the reader accountable.
The assertion "Here I am" is therefore transformed into a question put
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to the reader: Where are you? Before the text, the absolute difference
between I and Thou-between author and character, author and
reader-becomes an absolute nonindifference that cannot be abro-
gated. The self is redeemed and resurrected through responsibility
couched in an absolute nonindifference.
To engage in dialogue, then, is to assume responsibility to and for
the other, going out to the other in order to return with a self. This is
what leads Levinas to assert, "Subjectivity is the other in the same. . . .
The other in the same determinative of subjectivity is the restlessness of
the same disturbed by the other" (Otherwise 25). Holocaust novels
disturb not simply because they deal with horror and atrocity or even
because such heinous events actually took place; it is rather because
they draw the reader into a position of responsibility, a position of
vulnerability. "The other calls upon that sensitivity with a vocation that
wounds," says Levinas, "calls upon an irrevocable responsibility, and
thus the very identity of the subject" (Otherwise 77-78). In more graphic
terms, he explains,
There is a non-coinciding of the ego with itself, restlessness, insomnia, beyond
what is found again in the present. There is the pain which confounds the ego
or in vertigo draws it like an abyss, and prevents it from assuming the other that
wounds it in an intentional movement when it posits itself in itself and for
itself. Then there is produced in this vulnerability the reversal whereby the
other inspires the same, pain, an overflowing of meaning by nonsense. Then
sense bypasses nonsense-that sense which is the same-for-the-other. The
passivity or patience of vulnerability has to go that far! In it sensibility is sense;
it is by the other and for the other, for another. Not in elevated feelings, in
"belles lettres," but as in a tearing away of bread from the mouth that tastes it,
to give it to the other. [Othenvise 64]
The character puts a question to the author; the author puts a question
to the reader; the other asks, "Where are you?" And we must answer
with our wounds, out of which we are reborn. This is what it means
when we say that a novel is written in blood.
Levinas imparts an unsettling depth to Rosenzweig's insistence on
the need for another; he brings out an aspect of the I-Thou relation that
is often veiled in Buber's poetic language. The other is the one who
summons our presence, the Thou before whom the I becomes I. The
author becomes author in the face of the character; as the character is
born from the wounds of the creator, the author is reborn. Similarly, the
reader becomes reader in the face of the voice encountered in the
novel, and the dialogic penetration of the text is also a penetration of
self on the part of the reader. "I must experience-must see and
discover-what he experiences," Bakhtin contends. "I must take up
his position as though I were coincident with him" (Estetika 24-25).
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Such is the imperative of responsibility, the noncoinciding of the ego
with itself. The self is the opposite of its identity, if identity is rendered
as those marks of distinction that isolate the self from the other. Regard-
ing the relation between author and reader, Wiesel says, III write to
explore my own self as much as I write in order to help you explore
yourself. I believe that basically, and ontologically, there is only one
person in the world. That is the beauty, really, of our teaching: there is
only one person. That means the 'I' in me and the 'I' in you is the same
'I.' Between our deepest zones there is a bridge" (Against Silence
3:230-31). That bridge is reponsibility. In the realm of responsibility, the
realm of the Holocaust novel, the other distinguishes the self.
The thing at stake in the Holocaust novel, therefore, is the life of the
self or soul. "The soul," Levinas writes, "would live only for the
disclosure of being which arouses it or provokes it; it would be a
moment in the life of the Spirit, that is, of Being-totality, leaving
nothing outside of itself, the same finding again the same" (Otherwise
28). The effort in the Holocaust novel to re-create a world or a totality is
an effort to become a moment in the life of that which is the source of
life. Any meaning, any truth, that may give substance to the relation
between author and character or author and reader lies in this relation
to a Third, to the Spirit. Levinas suggests this when he says that
responsibility "is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party
enters" (Otherwise 157). The soul is the event that occurs when, in
answering for the other, I answer to the Spirit. Buber asserts, IIRespon-
sibility presupposes one who addresses me primarily, that is, from a
realm independent of myself, and to whom I am answerable. He
addresses me about something that he has entrusted to me that I am
bound to take care of loyally" (Between 45). I am entrusted with a soul,
and I care for it through my responsibility to another and for another.
Such is the nature of the witness born in the novel and the one born in
response to the novel. The insomnia of the soul in its movement toward
the other underscores a higher relation; the Infinite, the Eyn Sof, bursts
forth in the offering of the self to and for the other. In the wake of the
offering the waters of the self are once again disturbed. In the Holo-
caust novel nothing is settled; rather everything is unsettled and called
into question, so that the debt to the dead and to the living, the need to
respond, increases in the measure that it is paid. For we hear inasmuch
as we answer; in the literary response to the Holocaust the answer to
the summons to respond deepens the urgency to answer. Always one
response behind, I am forever faced with one responsibility more,
implicated and accused.
Thus to say "Hinehni, here I am" is to say "I hear." Levinas writes,
"When in the presence of the Other I say 'Here I am!', this 'Here I am!'
is the place through which the Infinite enters into language" (Ethics
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106). He goes on to explain, liThe witness testifies to what was said by
himself. For he has said 'Here I am!' before the Other, and from the fact
that before the Other he recognizes the responsibility which is incum-
bent on himself, he has manifested what the face of the Other signified
for him. The glory of the Infinite reveals itself through what it is
capable of doing in the witness" (109). The Holocaust novel is just such
a saying of IIHere I am" on the part of the author in relation to character,
to reader, and to Hashem. Because the Infinite reveals itself through its
disturbance of the witness, the Infinite speaks-not through author,
character, or reader but through the dialogic interaction between them.
It speaks silently, between the words, in the margins, on the breath
about to bear the next utterance. What is beyond speech and imagina-
tion is not simply the horridness of the horror but, above all, this
invisible, ineffable presence of the divine Third Party.
Hence, face to face with the other, we encounter that which is
beyond representation: in the confinement of the name that calls forth
the character, we confront the silent murmuring of the Nameless, of
the invisible One. liThe 'invisible God,''' Levinas points out, "is not
to be understood as God invisible to the senses, but as God non-
thematizable in thought, and nonetheless as non-indifferent to the
thought which is not thematization" (Ethics 106). In the Holocaust novel
the invisibility of the nonthematizable God takes the form of silence. To
the extent that the novel deals with silence, it deals with God. The
nonindifference to the thought that is not thematization is the shriek of
silence. We discover once again that those studies couched in standard
concerns of criticism cannot help but ignore this definitive feature of
the event we refer to here as the Holocaust novel. "If I use words," says
Wiesel, "it is not to change silence but to complete it" (Against Silence
3:267). Thus authors like Wiesel make heard that which is beyond
representation.
Preeminent among those philosophers who address the meta-
physics of silence is Andre Neher. In his book The Exile of the Word: From
the Silence of the Bible to the Silence of Auschwitz (1970), Neher identifies
Auschwitz with silence (141) and argues, "The first step after Ausch-
witz then seems to be the one which would place us at the exact
moment when nothing any longer exists but when all may be again. It
is the moment of Silence, of that Silence which once, at the beginning of
the world, held back the Word while also being its womb; of that
Silence which at Auschwitz but a short while ago was identified with
the history of the world" (143). Thus we can see that to view the
Holocaust novel within the framework of history or tradition is to miss
an essential feature of the novel, namely that it comes into being when
all has been turned over to nothingness. The IImoment of Silence" that
Neher invokes is the moment of the Holocaust novel, when the author
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becomes author, becomes the midwife to the word through which the
self may be reborn. Any rebirth that may take place in and through the
Holocaust novel occurs from the womb of silence. In Levinas's terms
this silence is the utter indifference-the Hhorrible neutrality of the
there is" ("Signature" 181)-against which the nonindifference essential
to the self arises. The self confronted with the project of rebirth,
moreover, is not so much a dead self as one that has been made into
nothing, into a silenced self. In the Holocaust novel, "Silence-the
'inert' silence, great and solemn-comes forward not as a temporary
suspension of the Word but as a spokesman for the invincible Noth-
ingness. Thus Silence replaces the Word because Nothingness takes
the place of Being" (Neher 63). The process of rebirth in the novel, then,
is a process of reversal, a process of return. From the muted rumbling
of the there is arises the utterance of "Here I am." For the author this
occurs in an "inverse movement," as Tzvetan Todorov describes it
in his book on Bakhtin, "whereby the novelist reintegrates his own
position." Bakhtin refers to this movement, Todorov explains, as
vnenakhodimost', Hor finding oneself within" (153).
Neher draws a connection between the act of reversal and the
rebirth of the self out of silence in his discussion of silence in the works
of Elie Wiesel. There, he argues, silence has three functions. First, it is
"phenomenological: the silence serves as a kind of counterpoint to the
thought which it clarifies, explains, criticizes, and challenges." Sec-
ond, it is "scenic: the silence is a backdrop, an indispensable accom-
paniment to the action." Finally, it is "theological: bringing the silence
of God into the general domain of silence has the effect of reversing all
religiously established values. Now it is no longer the words of men
which are submitted to the test of truth, but the Word of God" (211).
What Neher ascribes specifically to Wiesel's novels definitively charac-
terizes the Holocaust novel. Here silence is a counterpoint to thought
because the word that shapes thought is drawn from silence. Silence
is a backdrop to the action because Auschwitz pervades the Holocaust
novel regardless of the peculiarities of its time and place. Silence in the
novel has certain theological aspects because the one who is silent is
God; or rather, God is silence, present by His absence, the truth of
His Word measured by the withdrawal of His Word. Truth in this
instance, again, lies not in the facts that constitute an event but in
what the self is in the process of becoming in relation to the silence
that is God.
Hence, Neher insists, "a man's true self can be discovered only in
one or another of these silences, and the revelation of this ontological
potential of silence is undoubtedly the major achievement of the phe-
nomenology of silence in Elie Wiesel" (212). Once more, Neher's as-
sertion extends to the Holocaust novel, and our interest in the
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phenomenological aspects of the novel concerns the phenomenology
of silence. It is an interest in what occurs when the novel-and with it
the self-is born from silence into a word that creates a relation be-
tween I and Thou. Neher explains the "revelation of this ontological
potential of silence": "At the beginning, God is silence, night, death.
He is no less so at the end, for 'God himself has not changed,' but what
has changed is men, the ontological vibration of their silence which has
ceased to be solitary and egotistical. The chord of human silence sets
another chord vibrating, and men suddenly learn that 'the silence of
two people is deeper than the silence of one'" (221). The act of utter-
ance, the writing and reading of the novel change the human being. We
see changes occur between characters in the novel, yet they also
transpire between author and character, between author and reader.
The author cannot write, nor can the reader read, without undergoing
transformation. The thing that summons the reader's response is not
just the word but the silence conveyed by the word. Here it may help to
recall Bakhtin's distinction between stillness (tishina) and silence (mol-
chanie): "In stillness there is no sound (or nothing makes a sound); in
silence no one says anything (no one speaks). Silence is possible only
in the human realm" (Estetika 338). Silence is possible only when
something must be said, when a witness must be born-else the soul
would die.
Thus, if the soul is to live, it must voice its yes "from within the
void," as Neher puts it, "from the depths of absence, from the heart of
I no'" (207). The yea-saying that distinguishes the Holocaust novel
comes about when there is every reason that one should say no; such is
the "overflowing of meaning by nonsense," as Levinas expresses it.
The dialogic interaction within the novel and beyond the novel affirms
what there is to hold dear, to love, when one has been robbed of what is
most precious. "Every dialogue," Neher tells us, "implies an aggres-
sion, a renunciation, a death to oneself, and an absolute silence, which
are attitudes preliminary to opening up, to communication, to life-
within-dialogue, and to love" (48). The shriek of silence by which the
soul comes to life in the Holocaust novel is a cry of love, a cry uttered
"despite-me, for-another." Levinas writes, "It is the very fact of finding
oneself while losing oneself" (Othenoise 11). Elsewhere he explains, "To
escape the 'there is' one must not be posed but deposed. . . . The
responsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other, seemed to me, . . . to
stop the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being" (Ethics 52). The
author's task in writing the novel, as well as the reader's task in reading
it, is not simply to be reborn but to die and be reborn in dialogue, to die
away from isolation and be reborn into relation-through love. For love
redeems and reestablishes the presence of the one who is absent, the
one who is the kol demamah dakah, the "thin voice of silence" (1 Kings
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19:12; cf. Neher 84-85). Love is the stuff of presence and the essence of
the Holocaust novel.
Introducing these philosophical considerations in order to identify
the premises of an existential, phenomenological treatment of the
novel, we bring to the investigation a dimension generally absent from
the other studies. Rosenzweig's counterposition of speech to thought,
Buber's relation between I and Thou, Levinas's connection between
subjectivity and responsibility, Nehers phenomenology of silence-all
combine to take us from the periphery of the novel as object to the
inside of the novel as event. It is as though we no longer sit and
describe the nature of Jacob's injury but rather join him (to the extent
that it is possible) in his wrestling match at Peniel, coming face to face
with the one whose name he seeks and by whom his name is changed.
The Theoretical Basis for the Investigation
Mikhail Bakhtin provides the primary source for our theoretical ap-
proach. Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist have said, "Bakhtin's
distinctiveness consists in his invention of a philosophy of language
that has immediate application not only to linguistics and stylistics but
also to the most urgent concerns of everyday life. It is, in effect, an
Existentialist philology" (9). Unsurprisingly, then, several connections
exist between the philosophical background for this study and the
theoretical approach behind it. The neo-Kantian thinker Hermann
Cohen, for example, greatly influenced both Rosenzweig and Bakhtin.
Bakhtin's emphasis on the dialogic relation between self and other has
led to studies comparing his ideas with those of Buber (see Nina
Perlina), and his concern for the definitive links between responsibility
and spiritual life has suggested comparison with Levinas (see Patter-
son, Literature and Spirit 98-127). These philosophical overtones in
Bakhtin's literary theory lie behind his view of the novel as a force of
discourse rather than a particular genre or form. The novel, as Bakhtin
regards it, is a process of dialogic interaction, an event of creation, a
process of seeking truth. Wiesel has said about the Holocaustnovel that
"a novel about Treblinka is either not a novel or nor about Treblinka"
(Dimensions 7). As Bakhtin might point out, a novel is not subject to
generic classification, and it is always about itself, that is, about the life
and the world that bring it into being.
The word, or discourse, in the novel (both terms are couched in the
Russian word slovo) is inextricably linked to the life that it utters and
that gives it utterance. "Discourse in the novel," Bakhtin argues, "is
structured on an uninterupted mutual interaction with the discourse of
life" (Dialogic 383). Novelistic discourse emerges from meeting and
encounter, from coexistence and dialogic exchange; in the novel being
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there means being with. The idea at work in the novel, Bakhtin ex-
plains, "begins to live only when it enters into genuine dialogic rela-
tionships with other ideas.... The idea is a live event, played out at the
point of dialogic meeting between two or more consciousnesses" (Prob-
lems 88). This meeting of ideas is a meeting of voices, and it begins in the
encounter between author and character throughout what Bakhtin
calls the "aesthetic event." He says, "In the aesthetic event we have an
encounter between two consciousnesses, . . . where the conscious-
ness of the author stands in a relation to the consciousness of the
hero-not from the standpoint of his thematic composition or the-
matically objective significance but from the standpoint of his living
subjectivity" (Estetika 79-80). Assuming a name, the character assumes
the task of becoming a self; becoming a self, the character generates a
word, a voice with which the author can interact..Hence, says Bakhtin,
"the novel always includes in itself the activity of coming to know
another's word" (Dialogic 353). This is true of the self-to-other relation
not only between author and character but between character and
character and between author and reader as well. If discourse in the
novel is dialogic, then it entails the transformation of discourse-and
of the self, since the self lives, dies, and is reborn through the word it
offers or withholds.
Because encounter in the novel is encounter between discourses,
"language in the novel," Bakhtin points out, "not only represents, but
itself serves as the object of representation" (Dialogic 49). This insight
may help us to see why the subject of the Holocaust novel is the word,
particularly as it interacts with an alien word or discourse. In this
connection Bakhtin introduces his notion of polyglossia or the multi-
plicity of languages, which, he argues, is essential to the novel's
examination of language (see Dialogic 50-51), since it is the multiplicity
of languages that makes possible the encounter between the familiar
and the foreign. Polyglossia draws language into a self-reflective proc-
ess of speaking and response and makes the discourse of one respon-
sive to the discourse of another. This interaction especially applies to
the Holocaust novel, for the concentrationary universe from which its
authors arise comprises a multiplicity of languages. Primo Levi expres-
ses this point quite well in describing the concentration camp: "The
confusion of languages is a fundamental component of the manner of
living here: one is surrounded by a perpetual Babel" (Man 36). He
bitterly describes the Carbide Tower at Buna as the Tower of Babel,
exclaiming, "Its bricks were called Ziegel, briques, tegula, cegli, kamenny,
mattoni, teglak" (Man 81). Indeed, many authors of Holocaust novels-
Wiesel, Rawicz, Appelfeld, and Ka-tzetnik, for example-write in
languages other than their native tongues.
A person tom from a native tongue is also tom from the self, and
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this linguistic division indicates the existential division addressed in
the Holocaust novel, both in its content and in its creation. Yet this
multiplicity and conflict of languages may, in Bakhtin's words, "open
up the possibility of never having to define oneself in language, the
possibility of translating one's own intentions from one linguistic sys-
tem to another, of fusing 'the language of truth' with 'the language of
the everyday,' of saying 'I am me' in someone else's language, and in
my own language, 'I am other''' (Dialogic 315). Thus the collision
between languages, with all its existential difficulties, assists the au-
thor in the effort to become other, in order to create character. The
author, Bakhtin asserts, "must become other to himself, must look upon
himself through the eyes of another" (Estetika 16). To be sure, the
interaction of languages that places one in a position of being other to
oneself often arises in the Holocaust novel through encounters be-
tween Gennan and Pole, Czech and Hungarian, Russian and Italian,
and so on. The reader also comes before the novels of the Holocaust in
a multitude of languages, including Hebrew, French, English, Ger-
man, Czech, Italian, Yiddish, and Russian. The frustrations of com-
munication and translation underscore the urgency to speak and fuel
the struggle for a voice.
Thus polyglossia accentuates the need for dialogic interchange and
promotes the novel's endeavor to create meaning. Bakhtin points out
that "creation is always accompanied by new meaning" (Estetika 342);
the novel constitutes a movement toward meaning undertaken as a
result of a loss of meaning in the breakdown of the word. In the initial
silence of this breakdown, one discovers a certain freedom, for, as
Neher noted, freedom "is dialectically connected with silence" (168).
For the author, this is a freedom to be other, born from the encounter or
collision of one discourse with another. New meaning is always alien
meaning, and the confrontation with an alien discourse launches the
author into the creative act. Those who open up such freedom, accord-
ing to Bakhtin, are the rogue, the clown, and the fool (see Dialogic 159).
These figures, to be sure, are found in Holocaust literature-Gauthier
Bachmann, for example, in Jakov Lind's Landscape in Concrete and the
title character in Romain Gary's The Dance ofGenghis Cohn. Such charac-
ters, in Bakhtin's view, introduce laughter to discourse and thus free
"consciousness from the power of the direct word" and destroy "the
thick walls that had imprisoned consciousness within its own dis-
course" (Dialogic 60). Further, Bakhtin argues in Rabelais and His World,
"laughter has a deep philosophical meaning, it is one of the essential
fonns of the truth concerning the world as a whole, concerning history
and man; it is a peculiar point of view relative to the world; the world is
seen anew, no less (and perhaps more) profoundly than when seen
from the serious standpoint" (66). Wiesel suggests the importance of
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laughter in the Holocaust novel when he says, "Revolt is net a solution,
neither is submission. Remains laughter, metaphysical laughter"
(Souls 199).
In the Holocaust novel, however, the one who most often seizes
the freedom to be other is not the clown but the madman; it is he who
"lifts the barriers and opens the way to freedom" (Bakhtin, Estetika
339). His is the most alien of discourses and the most disturbing of
silences, since, as Michel Foucault points out, "madness begins where
the relation of man to truth is disturbed and darkened" (Madness 104).
Bakhtin similarly notes that "the theme of madness is inherent to all
grotesque forms, because madness makes men look at the world with
different eyes, not dimmed by 'normal,' that is by commonplace ideas
and judgments" (Rabelais 39). The dying away of the self in its effort to
be reborn requires this collision with madness, for in this collision with
the radical otherness of madness the author perceives the self as
radically other. The result is the creation of a character through whom
the author may regain a self. As Foucault has indicated, the discourse of
the madman is "credited with strange powers, with revealing some
hidden truth" (Archaeology 217). Since, from an existential viewpoint,
truth lies in what one is and not in what one knows, the creation of self
and the generation of truth are of a piece. "For this theme," says Wiesel,
"I need the madman" (see Patterson, In Dialogue 48), because the
madman is an essential mediator in the rejoining of word to meaning,
of the self to itself.
Because the author arrives at the self by way of the character,
Bakhtin insists that "the artist's struggle for a stable, well-defined
image of the hero is largely his struggle with himself" (Estetika 8). In
this view, consciousness of self is achieved in the movement toward the
discourse of the other, whereby the author lends ·an ear to his own
discourse through the resonance of the other's discourse. Yet as soon as
this shift occurs, the image of the self as other, says Bakhtin, "imme-
diately becomes a feature of the inwardness (experienced) of my own
life" (Estetika 77). This is how the author approaches the "man in man"
within the self as well as within the character (see Bakhtin, Problems
57-58). Because "every understanding of living speech, of living ex-
pression, is of an actively responsive nature" (Bakhtin, Estetika 247), the
readers who would make the novel part of their own inner lives face a
similar task of becoming other to themselves. The relation between
reader and text, like the relation between self and world, Clark and
Holquist explain, is grounded in this act of response, "where the
responding aspect of the word, the otvet of otvetstvennost', is given its
fullest weight. Responsibility is conceived as the action of responding
to the world's need, and is accomplished through the activity of the
self's responding to its own need for an other" (77). The dialogic event,
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the voicing of a world, that the reader encounters in the text summons
response, so that the reader too may be reborn by bearing witness. This
capacity to respond, this responsibility, draws the reader into a relation
to truth.
Bakhtin describes the novel's concept of truth: "At the base of this
genre lies the Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of truth, and the
dialogic nature of human thinking about truth. The dialogic means of
seeking truth is counterposed to official monologism, which pretends
to possess a ready-made truth. ... Truth is not born nor is it to be found
inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people
collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interac-
tion" (Problems 110). This understanding of truth takes it out of the
realm of fact and places it in a third position between an I and a Thou.
The truth of what happened in the Holocaust is not buried in the past
but remains in an open-ended, unfinished future, in the silence har-
bored by the dialogic word. Neher points out, "The radiations of the
future are totally silent. Indeed, of the three dimensions of time-past,
present, and future-the future alone is completely identified with
silence, and its plenitude but also in its remarkable ambivalence"
(168-69). The Holocaust novel's concern with silence is a concern with a
truth that belongs to the yet-to-be. Always situated in a third position
between the participants in the dialogic exchange, truth is that which is
yet to be revealed, the name yet to be uttered, the meaning yet to be
rejoined with the word.
Hence Bakhtin maintains that "every dialogue proceeds ...
against the background of a third who is invisibly present, standing
above all the participants in the dialogue.... The third referred to
here has nothing to do with metaphysics;. . . it is a constitutive feature
of the whole expression" (Estetika 306). We recall Levinas's remarks on
the invisibility of God (Ethics 106); the one invisibly present is present
by a silence that, in Neher's words, is the "supreme experience of the
possible" (40). The Third represents the silent horizon of possibility for
response within the dialogue. As possibility-or the one for whom all
things are possible-the Third sustains the movement of dialogue,
witnessing and judging its truth. Thus the Third introduces to dia-
logue what Bakhtin calls a special responsibility. He writes, "When-
ever alibi becomes a prerequisite for creation and expression there can
be no responsibility, no seriousness, no meaning. A special respon-
sibility is required. . . . But this responsibility can be founded only on a
profound belief in a higher truth, . . . the belief that another, higher
being respnds to my special responsibility, that I do not act in an utter
void. Apart from this belief there can be only empty pretense" (Estetika
179). The Holocaust author has a reader, but the dialogic interaction
with the reader, as well as with the character, has its higher witness.
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Wiesel remarks: "The writer must think for himself; he must be alone.
In my case, he must be alone always. Yet when I write I have a distinct
feeling of a presence" (Against Silence 1:187). Here Wiesel invokes,
perhaps, what Bakhtin calls the "over-I": "The overman, the over-I-
that is, the witness and judge of every man (of every I)-is not a person
but the other" (Estetika 342). Without this other, this higher witness, this
presence present by its absence, any issues involving word and si-
lence, word and meaning, word and self are empty pretense.
The silence of this witness, again, places everything in an open-
ended future. Neher says, "Abraham's 'Yes, me!' [hinehnil is the accep-
tance of the silence which Abraham faces at the moment of the Akedah:
the silence of the future, what I shall call the 'horizon-silence.'... The
horizon-silence is the meeting point between the relative and the
absolute, between the immanent and the transcendent" (176). The
silence that shrieks in the Holocaust novel is not the silence of the
inability to describe events that elude language; nor is it the silence of
the gap beween the familiar and the absolutely alien. Rather, it is the
silence of meaning lost and yet to be regained, the silence of a soul lost
and yet to be reborn in a future forever yet to be. Bakhtin observes,
"The definition given to me lies not in the categories of temporal being
but in the categories of the not-yet-existing, in the meaningful future,
which is at odds with anything I have at hand in the past or present. To
be myself for myself means yet becoming myself (to cease becoming
myself . . . means spiritual death)" (Estetika 109). He goes on to assert,
"For the 'I,' memory is memory of the future" (Estetika 110). This
memory of the future is a mindfulness of what I shall have been, in the
light of what I am in the process of becoming through my relation to the
other. It is an orientation toward the horizon-silence, where, Neher
says, God "reveals Himself in His entirety, ... in the features of His
unknowble Face" (176). Like all Holocaust witnesses, those summoned
to remember are summoned toward the silence of the future.
Steeped in the not-yet-existing, the life sought through the Holo-
caust novel is a life made of questions, of the yet-to-be-resolved. As
Wiesel expresses it in The Town beyond the Wall, "The essence of man is
to be a question, and the essence of the question to be without answer.
. . . The depth, the meaning, the very salt of man is his constant desire
to ask the question ever deeper within himself, to feel ever more
intimately the existence of an unknowable answer" (187). What is
rendered here as /I desire" is much more actively expressed in the
French text by the word chercher, which is "to seek, to search," forever
sustaining the movement of penetration inward, toujours plus interieure-
ment, ... toujours plus intimement (202). The question that resounds in
the increasing depths of the soul comes both from within and from
beyond the human being: Where are you? Author, character, and
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reader are faced with the task of responding, "Hinehni, here I am." In
the shriek of silence, at the threshold of response, question and re-
sponse collide. The dialogic event known as the Holocaust novel occurs
in this collision and opens up the dialogic dimensions of life in the post-
Holocaust era. As a reader of the novel, "I must respond with my life
for what I have experienced and understood in the art," to borrow a
statement from Bakhtin. "Art and life are not one and the same, but
they must become one within me, in the wholeness of my responsibil-
ity" (Estetika 5-6). The Holocaust novel, far more than other novels,
transforms me into a witness and a messenger, calling me forth from a
position of death and indifference into an absolute nonindifference by
which I may live. There is no slipping away. If the Holocaust novel is
about the word, if it is an endeavor to fetch the word from silence and
rejoin it with its meaning, if it is about the desperate struggle for the
redemption and the resurrection of the soul-then it is about me.
"Listening creatively," Wiesel points out, "is in French comprendre or
prendre avec. This means to be part of, to be taken with the teller of the
tale, to become part of the tale" (Against Silence 1:187). To listen cre-
atively is to engage in response; to become part of the tale is to become
who I am. There is no slipping away. Those of us who were not there
can never cross over into the Kingdom of Night, but, through the event
of the Holocaust novel, it crosses over into us.
2
The Word in Exile
"At grief so deep the tongue must wag in vain; / the language of our
sense and memory / lacks the vocabulary of such pain." Thus wrote
Dante in his Inferno (235). But, as we shall see, the problem of language
in the Holocaust novel is not a matter of insufficient vocabulary. Those
who pursue the word in exile enter realms undreamt of even by Dante.
Casting the word into exile inaugurates the reign of silence and
initiates the human struggle for presence through redemption. Yet
within the silence that occludes the voice is hidden a remnant, a seed,
of what was lost. This is indeed the Jewish condition, ever the human
condition. "In Judaism," says Franz Rosenzweig, "man is always
somehow a remnant. He is always somehow a survivor, an inner
something, whose exterior was seized by the current of the world and
carried off while he himself, what is left of him, remains standing on
the shore. Something within him is waiting. And he has something
within himself.... And this is just that feeling of the 'remnant' which
has the revelation and awaits the salvation" (405). In silence the surviv-
ing shred of what was swallowed up intensifies, until it bursts forth
into words that seek to bring the living word out of exile. When the
word is in exile, therefore, words need the very silence they would
overcome. For when the word realizes the fulfillment of its utterance, it
is uttered silently, heard through the flux and flow of silence, on "the
other side of speaking," as Paul Tillich put it, where silence "becomes
itself a kind of speaking" (Eternal 99)-like the "thin voice of silence,"
the kol demamah dakah, of1 Kings 19:12. "They faded into the night, like a
slim double shadow," we read of Danny and Manny in a work by
Amost Lustig. Yet "the stillness was not silenced," for it broke through
the silence in a novel called Darkness Casts No Shadow (173).
What exactly, then, does the author of the Holocaust novel attempt
to hear and thus make heard? Whose voice, whose silence, impels one
to speak or to bespeak the word in exile? In A Jew Today Elie Wiesel
relates a brief tale that suggests one approach to these questions,
bringing out not only what is exiled but also the place of exile. It is the
story of a child named Joel the Redhead. A mere five years of age, little
Joel was forced to hide with his family in the silence and darkness of a
cave, lest the enemy should find them and cast them into a more
terrible darkness. Hidden in the cave, he never knew whether it was
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day or night; thus are distinctions erased or overturned when the word
goes into exile. He also had to learn to communicate silently; thus is the
voice paralyzed. One day his father ventured out of the cave and was
killed. "And in the shelter," we read, "Joel succeeded in crying without
crying." Then his mother went out, never to return, and his Uncle
Zanvel had to clasp his hand over the little one's mouth. "Zanvel, too,
disappeared," Wiesel goes on. "And Joel was left alone in the dark-
ness. His hand covering his mouth, he began to sob without a sound,
scream without a sound, survive without a sound" (132). So the Holo-
caust author moves one hand across the silence of the blank page,
leaving a trail of words on the track of the word. And the other hand
he holds over his mouth.
To the extent that a figure such as Joel the Redhead can become a
character in a tale or novel, silence can also become a character in a
novel that deals with the word in exile. Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall
conveys this point explicitly: "'The hero of my story,' Michael began,
'is neither fear nor hatred; it is silence. The silence of a five-year-old
Jew'" (119). Silence is the hero not only of the tale Michael relates but
also of his own tale. The Silent One ultimately enables Michael to work
out some form of salvation by bringing salvation to another, to the Silent
One. "Later," Michael says to the Silent One, "in another prison,
someone will ask your name and you'll say, 'I'm Michael.' And then
you will know the taste of the most genuine of victories" (188-89). The
most genuine of victories is the victory of the self over itself in the
offering of itself to and for another both in word and in deed. This
offering brings the word out of exile, if only for a moment. In The Town
beyond the Wall the character's task is the same as the author's: to impart
a voice and with it a name to another. Michael seeks the name of the
Silent One because, in the words of Miguel de Unamuno, "Tell me thy
name! is essentially the same as Save my soul!" (181). Conferring a
name upon the character, the author offers up his voice for the sake of
the character, until he himself becomes the "silent one." Here we recall
a curious incident related by Wiesel. "I had a psychosomatic experi-
ence," he tells us, "while writing A Beggar in Jerusalem: I lost my voice.
Everything had gone into the boo~" (Against Silence 3:281). Losing his
voice, he perhaps found himself or regenerated a self that had been lost
in the exile of the wor~. For a moment, perhaps, the word was drawn
out of exile as the voice was drawn out of the author.
The exile of the word is revealed through the novelist's attempt to
bring the word out of exile; what is lost is felt in the effort to regain it.
Michel Foucault suggests such a view of language in general: "Lan-
guage always seems to be inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the
distant; it is hollowed by absence. Is it not the locus in which some-
thing other than itself appears?" (Archaeology 111). The Holocaust novel,
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however, is not hollowed by absence but is instilled with it. Something
other than itself indeed appears, for the Holocaust novel includes what
precedes it, not just the historical circumstances from which it arises,
but, more essentially, the phenomenological and existential condition
out of which it is born. The work moves forward by turning back on
itself, so that the thematic features of the novel reveal the phenomeno-
logical encounters and collisions that create it. Written in a time of exile,
the novel addresses and summons the word in exile. Words invoke this
loss of the word, this primal event, that launches the human being into
authorship, into the collision with silence that announces the exile of
the word.
The Collision with Silence
The silence of the word in exile is not a blank emptiness but an
oppressive, stifling substance, a "rumbling," as Levinas characterizes
it (Ethics 48), that rattles the soul and seizes the breath. Here silence
emerges "as a spokesman for the invincible Nothingness. Thus Silence
replaces the Word because Nothingness takes the place of Being"
(Neher 63). Because nothingness overtakes being, the collision with
silence belongs to no specific time; the Holocaust novel erases the
distinctions of before, during, and after. Aharon Appelfeld's Badenheim
1939, for instance, is set outside the Kingdom of Night; yet Appelfeld
writes, "The silence was dense, and from day to day it grew denser"
(70). The word here translated as "dense" is the Hebrew word samikh
(40), which also means "thick" or "clogged," as if the silence were
impenetrable. The measure of time is not the passing of days but the
thickening of silence. The word in exile is isolated not in time or space
but in silence.
This point is made even more strikingly in Ka-tzetnik's Sunrise over
Hell, in which darkness descends over the town of Metropoli and the
Jews are gathered into a stadium to await deportation. "Gripped by the
fear of death, a cry arose from the multitude.... The outcry engulfed
the stadium and split the heavens, but Heaven remained lofty and
silent as though God had deserted its temples.... Time didn't exist.
Only darkness" (78-79). Once again, the author's tongue voices much
more than its translation and reveals far more about the inner event of
the novel. Where the English translation reads "heavens," for example,
the Hebrew text has the word shmei-hashamayim (78); full of biblical
overtones (see Psalms 148:4), this term means "the Heaven of heavens"
or "the Most High," God's Holy Name as heaven itself. When these
heavens split, so does God. The phrase "as though God had deserted
its temples," moreover, is k'mo nitrokanu v'eyn Elohim b'm'romim, liter-
ally "as though they were emptied and there were no God in the
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heights" (78). From within the human outcry resounds God's silence,
distant and elsewhere. When the word is in its place, joined with its
meaning, man is the language of God; when the word is in exile and
language is lost, man is the shriek of silence, filled with the emptiness
of the emptied heavens and forever in collision with the silence of God.
Thus the collision continues, as we see in I.B. Singer's Enemies: A Love
Story, set in New York years after the Shoah: "They were all silent: God,
the stars, the dead" '(115).
Among the best descriptions of the tangibility and substantiality of
silence is the following passage from The Terezin Requiem by Josef Bor:
The silence had penetrated here, Schachter realized, from outside, from above,
from everywhere, and now it spread throughout the room, strident and
imperative, it overwhelmed everything, froze the walls into dumbness,
maimed the people; not even a quiver of air moved here now. The murmur is
silenced, the hum of everyday life, which at other times flows everywhere, in
the streets, in the house, even in you yourself, though solitary. The walls
receive it and return an echo, the air is tremulous and warm with it, there is so
much of it everywhere, and yet you never notice it. As you never feel the air you
breathe. And suddenly the hum has ceased. At first you don't even realize that
something has happened. There is only a chill somewhere in the marrow of
your bones, as though the coldness of the dark night had touched you. As
though the breath of death itself had wafted over you. . . . Then suddenly you
are aware of the silence. [41-42]
Where the translation reads "strident," we find in Bor's Czech text the
word kficf, which means "screaming" or "shrieking," a shriek of si-
lence raining down from above and cutting through the solitude of the
self, tobe samotnem (27-28). The word translated as "overwhelmed" is
zmocnilo, meaning "seized" or "took possession"; when the word takes
leave of the world, silence becomes the place of the world. The silence
with which the author collides-and by which character and reader are
drawn into collision-is both inert and dynamic, within and without,
something and nothing. As Bor suggests, it has the existential features
of a death that not only befalls the man but also lays claim to him. When
the word is in exile, the reign of silence is inaugurated. Its emblem is
the death's head emblazoned as a frontlet between the eyes of the SSe
The collision with silence, as Bor implies, is a collision with death;
the struggle with the word in exile is a struggle with death, which is as
palpable as silence. "Death is truly not what it seenls," Rosenzweig
points out, "not nothing but an inexorable something that can't be got rid
of. Its harsh cry sounds unabated even out of the fog with which
philosophy surrounds it" (Glatzer 182). Neher notes that "death is
silence-abrupt at first, in the silent plunge which immediately follows
the last word of life, and then afterward deep, in the irrevocable
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expanse of silence which death weaves, as it slips further away, be-
tween itself and life. The moment of death is silence overtaking life.
The duration of death is silence becoming infinitely removed from life"
(37). What is made "real" in the Holocaust novel is not just the death
camp but death itself; words that transmit silence transmit death.
Death is not only, however, a force that overtakes life but also the thing
that life struggles to overtake through the return of the word from its
exile. The harsh cry of death that splits the heavens pours from the
mouth of life. The author cries out to make heard the outcry of those
who have been silenced. In that hearing he finds his own voice, and
through that voice he regains life.
Elie Wiesel explores the inimical aspects of silence in its relation to
death. He most thoroughly pursues that relation in The Testament.
There his main character, Paltiel Kossover, an author, is locked into the
solitary confinement of a Soviet jail, where he writes his testament. In
his cell he discovers that "silence acts on both the senses and the
nerves; it unsettles them. It acts on the imagination and sets it on fire. It
acts on the soul and fills it with night and death. The philosophers are
wrong: it is not words that kill, it is silence. It kills impulse and passion,
it kills desire and the memory of desire. It invades, dominates and
reduces man to slavery. And once a slave of silence, you are no longer a
man" (209). The phrase "it invades ... man" is a translation of il envahit
l'etre (173), where the term l'etre or "being" places a greater existential
accent on the problem of silence. Wiesel posits silence, death, and
slavery against word, life, and freedom, underscoring the dialectical
connection between silence and freedom. Situating his character in this
dialectic, the author reveals his own life-and-death, word-and-silence,
freedom-and-slavery situation, which, of course, has existential im-
plications for the reader's position. Freedom-for author, character,
and reader-is born from a response capacity, from responsibility, the
one thing that can bring the word out of exile and overcome the silence
that kills. One recalls that for Levinas, only responsibility could "stop
the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being" (Ethics 52). In re-
sponse ability the human being is no longer enslaved by silence or
threatened by death; rather, the person becomes free for death through
a responsibility for the other, like a mother liberated in her readiness
to die for her child.
In the collision with silence, however, it is the silence of the other
with which one collides. In its association with death, the silence of the
other finds its expression in the silence of the victims, as Wiesel
suggests in Somewhere aMaster. "More than the hunger of the hungry,"
he writes, "more than the agony of the tormented, more than the
flames over the mass graves, it is the silence of the victims that is
haunting us-and will haunt us forever" (201). What do we hear
34 THE SHRIEK OF SILENCE
through the silence of the victims? In The Six Days of Destruction Wiesel
tells us: "And there was darkness and there was light, a light filled with
darkness. A cry tore through the silence. No one asked who had called
out. They knew: it was Death" (33). The word in.exile reverberates in
the howl of death; the Holocaust novelist confronts the task of trans-
forming that howl, that shriek of silence, into words and tales. The
author is haunted by stifled voices that eclipse the voice. In stillness, as
Bakhtin has said, there is no noise, while in silence there is a voice that
does not speak (Estetika 338). In the silence of a Holocaust novel, it is a
murdered voice. This silence is quite different from the silence of
infinite spaces that frightened Pascal or the silence of a cosmic refusal
in Kafka's works. "Silence," Bakh~n asserts, "is possible only in the
human realm" (Estetika 338), because death in the fonn of murder
belongs only to the human realm; indeed, human death began with
Cain's act of murder. While death may eliminate the victim, it cannot
eliminate the silence of the victim. This silence both informs and
implicates the author, as well as the character and the reader.
"Why are we silent?" the victims ask in Wiesel's Dawn. "Because
silence is not only our dwellingplace but our very being as well. We are
silence. And your silence is us. You carry us with you. Occasionally
you may see us, but most of the time we are invisible to you. When you
see us you imagine that we are sitting in judgment upon you. You are
wrong. Your silence is your judge" (68-69). Thus confronting his char-
acter with the address of the victims, Wiesel himself confronts the
silence of the victims, which he makes heard through his character's
collision with that silence. As the man-both character and author-
collides with silence, he is invaded with silence; those who were
robbed of their cemeteries, reduced to smoke and ash, make the
survivor into the cemetery of their silence. The more that silence is
articulated, the deeper it runs; the more the author bespeaks the silence
of the word in exile, the greater becomes his need to speak. The debt
increases in the measure that it is paid; thus the silence of the other that
cuts into me becomes the judgment I pronounce upon myself. The
Holocaust novelist, therefore, lives in an "accusative that derives from
no nominative" (Levinas, Otherwise 11). The author is accused not of
survival but of silence; the author's responsibility for the exile of the
word demands response. The sentence for the failure to respond is the
death that lurks in the silence.
In Jakov Lind's Landscape in Concrete, Bachmann, the hero, cries
out, "If you don't talk, you die.... The dead are speechless, doesn't
that prove it?" (141). 1st das kein Beweis, reads the German text, "is that
not proof." Yet Beweis also means "mark" or "sign"; death is the sign of
silence, the sign that engages the author in the struggle with signs.
Once again, the character's outcry belies the author's existential con-
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cern. The author who dies as an author dies of silence, as Paltiel dis-
covers in Wiesel's The Testament: "I didn't know that it was possible to
die of silence, as one dies of pain, of sorrow, or hunger, of fatigue, of
illness or of love. And I understand why God created heaven and
earth, why He fashioned man in His image by conferring on him the
right and the ability to speak his joy, to express his anguish. God too,
God Himself was afraid of silence" (210). The voice lives by the word,
and the self lives by its voice. To live is to be present, and to be present
is to have a voice. The word calls forth the voice, and the self comes to
life through its response of "Here I am." When the word goes into
exile, the self goes with it, so that the Holocaust novelist who strives
to transform the sign of death into an affirmation of life struggles also to
regain the voice that might restore life. The author brings the character
to life by imparting a voice to that character, a voice by which the
author's own voice may be regained. If God fashions man in His image
because He is afraid of silence, so does the author fashion the character,
laboring to regenerate the word lost in the wake of the collision with
silence.
The sign of death thus proclaims the collision with silence and
snatches away the sign of life, the voice of the self. The survivor is
rendered voiceless by the voicelessness of the victims. The years of
silence that followed the Shoah reflected this. One also sees the loss of
voice that signals the exile of the word among many characters in
Holocaust novels, especially those written by Elie Wiesel. The silence
of the Silent One, who shares Michael's cell in The Town beyond the Wall,
for example, not only reveals to Michael a silence within himself but
also offers him the opportunity of redemption, whereby he imparts his
own voice, and with it his own name, to the Silent One. Offering his
name to the Silent One, Michael receives the Silent One's name. "The
other bore the Biblical name of Eliezer, which means God has granted my
prayer" (189). It is also the name of Michael's author. Here we see quite
clearly how the interaction between characters expresses the interac-
tion between author and character. The articulation of the loss of voice
in the collision with silence lies in the effort to get the Silent One to
speak. Just as the Silent One is positioned opposite Michael, so is
Michael positioned opposite his author.
In Wiesel's The Gates ofthe Forest, Maria endeavors to save Gregor by
making him pose as a mute. /IAnd so by the grace and will of Maria,
Gregor gave up speech. This was no sacrifice at all. Already in the cave
he had become used to silence and loved it" (63). Yet in the cave of
isolation Gregor's self splits in two, into Gregor and Gavriel. The
silence that at first appears to be a refuge, the silence of the cave, turns
out to be the silence of a tomb in which the voice and the self are lost.
Outside the forest GavriellGregor ultimately discovers that "too many
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roads are open, too many voices call and your own is so easily lost. The
self crumbles" (221). In the end the self that was lost with the loss of the
voice is redeemed when the voice is regained through the utterance of
the Kaddish, the prayer for the dead. "He recited it slowly," Wiesel
relates, "concentrating on every sentence, every word, every syllable
of praise. His voice trembled, timid, like that of the orphan suddenly
made aware of the relationship between death and eternity, between
eternity and the word" (225-26). The word that restores the voice, the
word drawn out of exile, is a prayer. "Both prayer and literature,"
Wiesel notes, "take everyday words and confer upon them another
sense; both appeal to the most personal and most elevated needs of a
man" (Paroles 166). The Town beyond the Wall is divided into four prayers;
Amost Lustig's novel A Prayer for Katerina Horovitzova itself constitutes
the prayer alluded to in its title. These novels confer upon ordinary
words not only a new sense but also a lost meaning, in which sense and
sensibility merge.
For Grisha, the son of Paltiel in Wiesel's The Testament, the exiled
word takes the form of his imprisoned father, the poet whose word
Grisha feels he must protect-even to the point of biting off his own
tongue. "I tried to show the muteness," Wiesel remarked about the
novel. "And the fact that the child, the son of Paltiel Kossover, cannot
talk ... and he is the one who can save his father's writing-that to me
was the ultimate tragedy" (Patterson, In Dialogue 39). Grisha is himself a
poet, "not like his father" but "in place of his father" (Wiesel, Testament
17). The author likewise ·must become a voice in the place of the victims
whose silence invades him; again, the character-to-character relation
expresses the author-to-character relation. In the collision with the
silence that seizes him, the author loses his own voice, so that the
character speaks for him-as Grisha must be a poet for his father-
thus enabling him to regenerate a voice via his character. Commenting
on Dr. Mozliak, who visits his mother in his father's absence, Grisha
notes, "At last I understood: it is me he has come to see, not Mother.
His purpose? To steal my father from me. To take him away a second
time" (303). This is why Grisha fills his own mouth with blood; this is
why he must speak and yet cannot speak. This is also the dilemma
facing the author. Similarly, when the first-person narrator of Wiesel's
Dawn asserts, "I wanted to transfer the lifeblood of my body into my
voice" (66), we hear the authors own longing to regain his voice. For in
his voice lies not only his own life but also the lives of those who were
swallowed up in silence; through his voice these lives penetrate the life
of the reader.
Other novelists, of course, pursue their own variations of the loss
of voice. In Jerzy Kosinski's The Painted Bird, for example, the boy who
is the main character loses his voice just past the novel's halfway point
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upon being baptized, as it were, in a pit of excrement. "Suddenly," he
relates, "I realized that something had happened to my voice. I tried to
cry out, but my tongue flapped helplessly in my open mouth. I had no
voice.... The last cry I had uttered under the falling missal still
echoed in my ears. Was it the last cry I would ever utter? Was my voice
escaping with it like a solitary duck call straying over a huge pond?
Where was it now? . . There must have been some cause for the loss of
my speech. Some greater force, with which I had not yet managed to
communicate, commanded my destiny" (146-47). Not until the end of
the novel does the boy regain his voice-or rather, the voice regains the
boy. "The voice lost in a faraway village church," he says, "had found
me again and filled the whole room. I spoke loudly and incessantly like
the peasants and then like the city folk, as fast as I could, enraptured by
the sounds that were heavy with meaning" (250-51). Lawrence Langer
has observed that "The Painted Bird is literally a speechless novel, totally
lacking in dialogue and containing less than half a dozen fragments of
language presented through direct quotation" (168). This formal aspect
of the novel clearly has conceptual significance. The word in exile is the
word tom from its meaning, like a tongue tom from a mouth; the
collision with silence is a collision with meaninglessness. When the
boy is "baptized" in that which defiles, we see meaning overturned,
and the voice is lost. When the voice returns, so does meaning, heavy
and filled with substance.
Nowhere is the loss of meaning, and with it the loss of voice,
more concentrated than in the concentrationary universe itself. Aus-
chwitz is silence, as Neher insists (141), because Auschwitz is voice-
lessness. Ka-tzetnik's Atrocity, for instance, underscored this mute
condition. When the boy Moni, the novel's hero, enters the Ausch-
witz barracks, the prisoners "received him the way the pile behind the
block receives a skeleton just dumped by the block orderlies. Here no
one utters a word. Here speech is extinct" (92). Not simply speech is
extinct but, in the Hebrew, leal lashon (67), "every language," every
tongue that might give utterance to speech. Death wordlessly receives
death; death is precisely this wordlessness. Professor Raphael, the
French scholar, knows ten languages, yet "only three words ever
break from Professor Raphael's mouth: the names of his wife and two
children" (138). Once again the silence of the victim assails and impli-
cates the survivor; the fate that befalls the character is the fate that
threatens the author. In an effort to speak silently and thus bespeak
the silence with which he collides, Ka-tzetnik relates an episode
concerning the inmates Bergson and Hayim-Idl, two singers who go
to offer their voices for a play being produced in the camp. The
director of the production informs them, however, that the play is to
be a mime (154). Like five-year-old Joel the Redhead, and like their
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author, these characters confront a silence in which they must scream
and sob without a sound.
The loss of voice in the collision with silence belongs to the Holo-
caust novel, not just to the concentration camp. Consider the fate of the
child singer, the yanuka, in Appelfeld's Badenheim 1939. Living amid a
silence that daily grows more dense, the yanuka in the end "had grown
fat, his cheeks had grown pink, and he had learned to understand
German. His voice had apparently been lost altogether, and the few
things he remembered about his home, his parents, and the orphan-
age in Vienna were quite gone" (162). One recalls a statement Wiesel
makes in The Gates ofthe Forest: "Everything that remains of the past is in
your voice, is your voice" (54). The silence of the word in exile threatens
not only the voice but time and memory as well, casting the human
being into a position or a nonposition that is neither here nor there,
neither now nor then. When the word goes into exile, it takes time and
place-the stuff of memory-with it, fleeing to a realm prior to any
beginning and beyond every horizon. In this nonposition the author
encounters an inversion of "the arche into anarchy," where "there is
forsakenness of the other, obsession by him," out of which the author
must generate "responsibility and a self" (Levinas, Otherwise 117). The
silence within which the author undertakes the Holocaust novel, there-
fore, is anarchic; not only chaotic, the anarchic silence also precedes
any arche or beginning.
This feature of the silence that is Auschwitz places the Holocaust
novel outside the lines of tradition and generic distinction. Elie Wiesel
and Albert Friedlander, for example, give their book The Six Days of
Destruction its title to suggest this "uncreation" of the world. In A Beggar
in Jerusalem Wiesel's character Katriel explains the difference between
two main categories of silence: "There is the silence which preceded
the creation; and the one which accompanied the revelation on Mount
Sinai. The first contains chaos and solitude, the second suggests pres-
ence, fervor, plentitude" (108). Because the loss of voice indicates a loss
of presence and plentitude, the silence with which one collides in and
through the Holocaust novel is the silence of chaos and solitude; this is
one feature that distinguishes it from other novels.
The visual metaphor most commonly used to express this silence
before beginnings is, of course, darkness, the darkness over the face of
the deep. Ka-tzetnik expresses it eloquently, terrifyingly, in one of his
visions from Shivitti: "I can touch darkness. Darkness is in my mouth. I
can taste it. I sense darkness on my palate as if it were a thing I put in
my mouth" (4). Here the metaphors connection to what it signifies is
all too apparent. The light of life draws its brilliance from the utterance
of the word; where the word fails, darkness enters. Looking further,
we recall the darkness of the night that gives Wiesel's first book its title.
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It is akin to the night that llse Aichinger personifies in Herod's Children:
"Night shook with laughter, but she laughed silently, pressing both
hands to her eyes and mouth. . . . Under her coat she carried her
masters most powerful lamp: darkness" (141). The term "silently" here
is translated from the German word stumm (136), meaning "mute" or
"dumb": the laughter of the night is the laughter of the muted word
struck dumb with darkness. When the word flees the world it takes
with it the light created by the Word. The master of night is silence, and
the Holocaust novelist works by the lamp of this darkness. Cast into an
anarchic condition, the novelist works in a nonposition that precedes
the cycles of light and darkness that constitute time. The distinctions
collapse; time is lost. Yet, like the light that answers the summons to
come into being before it exists, the novelist in collision with silence
must answer before being called (cf. Isaiah 65:24).
The English title of Ka-tzetnik's Sunrise over Hell reveals the inver-
sion of the arche into anarchy, for the sunrise that would be a beginning
is the descent of darkness that occludes the light of all beginning. This
novel portrays the original night and its dreadful silence: "The Site of
Silence. Soundlessness was all around, engulfing the outflow of hu-
manity from the cattle trucks. The different laws governing here were
instantly tangible; the air was different; the platform lights here shed a
different glow. Night here had an essence all its own. Night here was at
the beck and call of an omnipotent sovereign, a sovereign supreme
over the Planet. Night muffled, stealing inaudibly on tip toes to en-
velop you, inaudibly, so as to keep from trespassing upon the terrify-
ing silence reigning supreme" (158). Ka-tzetnik enables us to see the
anarchic nature of this silence more clearly still in Atrocity. In this novel
the mime performed by Hayim-Idl, Bergson, and others is acted out
in the "primordial space" that constitutes the position of the author:
"Two actors emerge, heads facing each other, their eyes conducting a
horror-dialogue as their feet climb a staircase of air. Queer, mute
gesticulations. Speaking shut-mouthed. Towards them come floating
two others, announcing something in an esoteric eye-dialect, not mov-
ing lips or hands. Their feet really do not seem to be touching the
ground. Everything here is happening as though not in the world of
man, and not even in the world of Auschwitz, but somewhere in
primordial space between Chaos and Creation" (158). The mime is an
effort to articulate Auschwitz, "shut-mouthed." Mirroring the condi-
tion of the prisoners, the players are suspended in a void between
heaven and earth, in a nothingness between worlds and words, their
feet out of touch with the earth just as the exiled word is out of touch
with its meaning. This point is even more evident in the Hebrew text,
in which the actors climb not a "staircase of air," but b'halal, "in the
void" (119). The force of this word is then accentuated in the phrase
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b'halal-y'kum, which is translated as "in primordial space" but literally
means "in the void universe" or "in a universe of the void"-the con-
centrationary universe of the author.
When the word goes into exile, time and space, the gannents of the
world, thus go with it; for the word is not in time or space, but rather
time and space are in ,the word. Timelessness and spacelessness, then,
make up the nothingness of which Neher speaks: "Silence replaces the
Word because Nothingness takes the place of Being" (63). The collision
with silence is a collision with nothingness. As Ka-tzetnik expresses it
in Shivitti, "Time There, on Planet Auschwitz, was not the same as
here. Each moment There revolved around the cogwheels of a different
time-sphere" (xi). In the Holocust novel, therefore, the confusion of
time and space constitutes not only an experimentation with structure
but also an expression of the silence of the word in exile.
The Permutation of Time and Space
"Speech is bound to time and nourished by time," Rosenzweig said
(Glatzer 199), but when the word is in exile, detached from time, time
itself loses the speech that sustains it. Divorced from the word, time
tells nothing, and there is no telling time. The title of Yehuda Amichai's
novel Not of This Time, Not of This Place might serve as the title of every
Holocaust novel. The breakdown of time and place lies not in the length
of time passed or in spatial distances; rather, it is an existential break-
down that concerns the self. "This diachrony of time," Levinas ex-
plains, "is not due to the length of the interval, which representation
would not be able to take in. It is a disjunction of identity where the
same does not rejoin the same: there is non-synthesis, lassitude"
(Otherwise 52). To be sure, Levinas's words quite accurately describe the
situation of Amichai's main character, Joel. For him time is so twisted
that the self is wrenched from itself to form two Joels. Elie Wiesel makes
a similar point concerning time in the chapter titled liThe Watch" in One
Generation After (whose French title, significantly, is Entre deux soleils,
Between two suns). Wiesel relates the tale of his return to Sighet and
his effort to dig up a watch he had buried just before his deportation. "I
was laboring to exhum~ not an object," he writes, "but time itself, the
soul and memory of that time" (83). He retrieves the watch from its
twenty-year-old grave, yet he is unable to take it with him and returns
it to its resting place. The time told by that watch was not of this time.
"Since that day," he continues, "the town of my childhood has ceased
being just another town. It has become the face of a watch" (86). The
lost time belongs to the lost place, and both belie the lost self who is left
to the struggle to regain itself by fetching the word from exile.
At the beginning of Primo Levi's If Not Now, When? we find that
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Mendel, the novel's main character, is a mender of watches who comes
from a town known for the broken clock on its church steeple; this
image, of course, implies a link between a loss of the word embodied
by the church and a breakdown of time. Leonid, a double figure to
Mendel, remirids the latter of "some other watches that they had
brought to him to mend: perhaps they had had a blow, the coils of the
springs had become tangled, they ran a bit slow, then were wildly fast
for a bit, and all of them in the end were broken beyond repair" (206).
Like his character, Levi, the author on the track of the exiled word, is on
the track of time. A kind of mender of time, he seeks something like a
tikun of word and time. Through his character, he sets out to rejoin the
word with its meaning, the time with its place. Those for whom the
time is out of joint have no place, no home: "A man enters his house
and hangs up his clothes and his memories; where do you hang your
memories, Mendel, son of Nachman?" (271.). Similarly, in Haim Gouri's
The Chocolate Deal, Mordi, who "hath not where to lay his head" (61),
learns that "just as there are earthquakes, so there are, among men,
timequakes" (52). Gouri's novel also has its watchmaker, Mr. Shechter,
who in fact owns no watch and is left in the end with the impossible
task of locating Rubi, a double figure and companion to Mordi. Rubi
also bears the fate of surviving his friend. As always, the characters
loss of the other reflects the author's loss of self; like the watchmaker
who owns no watch, the author sets out to find the character and thus
to attempt to set right the time out of joint, the word out of place, the
self out of sync with itself.
The permutation of time entails the undermining of the present
and therefore the loss of presence; as the word is cast into exile,
presence is thrown into a formless elsewhere or a nameless nowhere.
Thus in Aharon Appelfeld's Badenheim 1939 we read, "The words did
not seem to belong to the present. They were the words of the spring
which had somehow lingered on, suspended in the void" (117). In the
Hebrew text a word omitted in the English translation begins this
passge. It is dumah, "silence" (67); Dumah is the name of the Guardian
Angel of the Dead, as well. The term rendered as "void," b'liymah, also
has powerful connotations, meaning "nothingness" or "abyss." The
exile of the word and the reign of nothingness are announced by such
words out of place and out of season. To recall an insight from Elie
Wiesel, one must "learn to say the right word at the right time and in
the right place" (Beggar 84); this dictum sums up the task of the
novelist. The author must re-create presence in the face of a terrible
absence, striving to emerge from the oblivion of what Anna Langfus
calls a "zone of silence." In The Whole Land Brimstone, for example, she
describes the invasion of silence and the loss of presence that occur
when her characters Polish hometown comes under attack: "Then the
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first bomb fell on the ghetto. It hit me simultaneously and silence and
oblivion engulfed me" (117). Langfus's French reads, je descends dans Ie
silence, l'oubli, for "silence and oblivion engulfed me," suggesting a
movement elsewhere, to a nowhere: "I descend into sil~nce, into
oblivion" (119). Loubli is also "forgetfulness"; the function of memory
in the Holocaust novel is to reestablish presence. The zone of silence
and forgetfulness is the zone of absence, of twisted time and perverted
space, the phenomenological zone from which the novel arises and to
which the novel bears witness. It enters the Holocust novel as part of its
setting because the author sets out to reconstitute or re-member human
presence precisely in the realm that is hostile to human presence. The
mutated time and place of the novel is the time and place of its creation,
and what threatens the character also threatens the author and, ul-
timately, the reader.
In Touch the Wat~ Touch the Wind by Amos Oz, Elisha Pomeranz
closes "himselfup in his room and his silence" (77), but he endeavors to
penetrate the zone of silence in which he has lost himself. Because the
word has gone into exile, Pomeranz attempts to traverse his emptiness
through the mute mathematics of infinity. Yet "no one could ever cross
this final line without collapsing into contradiction, absurdity, mys-
ticism, ecstasy, or madness. This line marked the final1imit of reason
and the threshold of silence" (81). The danger is even greater than the
translation suggests, since the Hebrew word for "contradiction,"
stiyrah (88), also means "destruction." Working out his dangerous
theorem, Pomeranz crosses one threshold of silence only to lose him-
self in another silence: "Alert man A said to alert man B: 'He's set the
whole world buzzing and now he's lost somewhere in this goddam
silence.' Alert man B displayed a cautious smile, replaced it and an-
swered: 'As soon as you said silence, goddam silence, I could hear the
sound of an animal, barking perhaps, and there's a rhythmic throbbing
noise on the other side of this hill'" (82). One recalls Levinas's com-
ments on the silent rumbling of the "there is," a "noise returning after
every negation of this noise" (Ethics 48). The sound of the animal, who
is speechless, robs the man of human presence. Losing the order and
structure, the time and space, of reason, he is cast into a place of exile
here described as "goddam silence," which in the Hebrew text is
dumiyat Elohim (89), the silence of God. The loss of presence is the loss
of God; the silence of God is the absence of God. It is not the mathe-
matics of infinity but the word uttered in its fullness, at the right time
and in the right place, that restores the presence of God and of the self.
"What I lack is words," says Bachmann in Jakov Lind's Landscape in
Concrete. "I'm afraid of the words I lack" (140). He is afraid because,
lacking words, he lacks presence; lacking words, he, like Pomeranz, is
left to the "goddam silence" of a God who has followed the word into
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exile. The Eternal One who is revealed in the word is revealed in time;
speech is bound to time, and "what is not to come save in eternity,"
Rosenzweig has rightly said, "will not come in all eternity" (Glatzer
358). The time and place that are lost upon the loss of the word belong
to the here, not the hereafter, for it is here that the eternal is revealed, if
it is to be revealed at all. With the loss of presence that results from the
permutation of time and space, the present becomes a void, a black
hole, that consumes all that was and is yet to be. Herman, the main
character in I.B. Singer's Enemies: A Love Story, collides with this realiza-
tion when it strikes him that "everything has already happened....
The creation, the flood, Sodom, the giving of the Torah, the Hitler
holocaust. Like the lean cows of Pharaoh's dream, the present had
swallowed up eternity, leaving no trace" (143). It leaves no space for the
word, for the self, for God. God dwells where He is allowed to enter, as
Menahem-Mendl of Kotzk once said (see Wiesel, Souls 248), and He
enters into time and space through the word spoken at the right time
and in the right place, through the presence generated by the capacity
for response. Presence, the time and space of the self, is rooted in the
voice.
Anything that would obfuscate the voice, such as Pomeranz's
mathematical theorem, displaces the self, removing it from the time
and space that constitute its here. Such is the fate that befalls the title
character in Mr. Theodore Mundstock by Ladislav Fuks. Attempting to
calculate every contingency with which the Nazis might confront him,
Mr. Mundstock has "every sentence ... carefully arranged and every
word accounted for" to such an extent that he cannot respond to a
simple "good evening" (147); indeed, the Czech word translated as
"accounted for," vypoteno, means "calculated" (124). Mr. Mundstock
thus makes himself into an exile in his own home, transforming it into
an elsewhere in which he has no place. The formula is the opposite of
the word; it is the expression of the silence that signals the exile of the
word. The artifice of the formula and its mutation of time and space
come out in the false and flimsy structures imposed on the lives of
characters in the novels of Aharon Appelfeld as well; Badenheim 1939,
The Retreat, and The Age ofWonders readily come to mind. In all of these
novels, characters cling to the mirage of a time and place that have no
existence in the world. Clutching their fantasy, they ultimately lose
themselves to the reality-or the unreality-that invades their lives.
"It still seemed," we read in Badenheim 1939, "that some other time,
from some other place, had invaded the town and was silently estab-
lishing itself" (54). Once again the translation omits a critical word that
appears in the Hebrew text: it is dumah, "silence." What invades the
town is the "silence of another time, a time not of this place" (31). In
Appelfeld's novels the reader is privy to the lie by which the characters
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fool themselves, so that the author seeks the truth under the inverted
sign of the lie. The truth sought is not so much a particular "reality" as a
place in which the word may once more find its meaning. The unity of
life, Bakhtin has argued, is "primarily defined by the unity of place"
(Dialogic 225); it lies in a space where the relation of adam l'makom, of
man to the place, may be reestablished through the relation of adam
l'adam, of man to man.
Appelfeld's Tzili: The Story of a Life treats the loss of place as an
absence from home. Because the loss of place is definitively linked to
the exile of the word, homelessness is bound to wordlessness. Tzili, for
example, lives for a while in the muted space that comprises the small
dwelling of an old peasant couple. "Here there were only cows, cows
and speechlessness. The man and his wife communicated in grunts"
(50). The Hebrew word elem is rendered as "speechlessness" (28), but
IIdumbness" or "muteness" is closer to its meaning, as if the word were
snatched from the mouth. The cows and grunts bring to mind the
barking of the animal in Oz's novel; when the word is in exile, man
loses his likeness to God and takes on the image of the beast, the image
of dumbness. The permutation of time and space brings with it the
perversion of the human image, a perversion of inner space. Appelfeld
accentuates the connection between Tzili's loss of the word and her loss
of place when he writes, "She was no longer accustomed to the old
words, the words from home. She had never possessed an abundance
of words, and the months she spent in the company of the old peasants
cut them off at the roots" (62). The original text phrases "no longer
accustomed" much more strongly, saying that "she no longer had" the
old words, 10 hayu lah 'od (33). Further, in the Hebrew we see that not
only are the words cut off "at the roots," but the roots of words,
shoreshyi ha-miliym, are themselves cut off (33); the root or shoresh of the
Hebrew word is the very stuff of its meaning. When the word is in
exile, the human being is exiled from the makom, from the place, here
expressed as home-and so is the word exiled from its home, from it
roots. To be sure, exile is by definition exile from home. Nearly all of the
authors of the Holocaust novel live in lands other than their homelands
and write in languages other than the languages of their homes.
The loss of the word in its association with an exile from home is a
major theme in two of Wiesel's novels, The Town beyond the Wall and The
Testament. In the former the town beyond the wall is Michael's home-
town, which lies beyond the wall of silence left by the exiled word, the
wall at which he struggles to regain a voice through the "prayers" that
make up the four sections of the novel itself. The place of the character
is tied as much to the novel's structure as to any geographic setting.
Once the place of prayer, of the word in its fullness, the town is
transformed into a place of indifference inhabited by the spectator
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who, in his failure to respond, represents the wordlessness of the It
(171). Like Michael, Paltiel in The Testament is a man cut off from his
home and imprisoned in a cell; his condition underscores the loss of
place.. Any attempt Paltiel makes to return to his home only results in
an increased awareness that he is himself out of place. Serving as a
medic in the Russian army, for instance, he enters his childhood
·hometown of Liyanov and finds the house where he and his parents
had lived. "A mad idea shoots through me," he relates. "The house is
my house, but I ... I am not I" (288). The loss of place upon the exile of
the word entails a loss or split of self. "Some people define themselves
in relation to what they do," Paltiel explains. "I define myself in relation
to the place where I happen to be" (205). But when the word is in exile,
the place is lost and the self is no self: I am not I. Like the self, the word
takes on its definition, its meaning, in relation to its time and place. The
permutation of time and space, therefore, brings a divorce of the word
from meaning.
In Blood from the Sky Piotr Rawicz writes, "One by one, words-all
the words of the human language-wilt and grow too weak to bear a
meaning" (132). The French verb translated as "wilt" is se fanent (118),
which means "fade," suggesting a waning of presence attached to the
loss of meaning. The context for this statement is the flight of Yuri, who
has changed his name to Boris, to escape death at the hands of the
Nazis. Once the man cannot bear the name-once Boris can no longer
be Yuri-the contact between word and meaning breaks down. The
condition of the fugitive Boris in this novel reflects the flight of the word
from its meaning, bound in tum to the fugitive's loss of place. Like
many figures in the Holocaust novel, he lives in the "chronotope," as
Bakhtin calls it, of the open road, which is distinguished "by the
reversibility of moments in a temporal sequence, and by their inter-
changeability in space" (Dialogic 100). The character's movement of flight
thus may become the author's movement of return; through the word
that constitutes the novel, the author articulates the divorce from
meaning in an effort to restore meaning. For meaning is to be restored
only in a dialectical manner, in a transformation of the silence of its loss
into an utterance of its loss. Amost Lustig voices this inversion in
Darkness Casts No Shadow through his character Manny, who is also a
fugitive and for whom "looking backward was a way of looking for-
ward" (89). He explains, "They stole away the meaning words used to
have. It's like learning a whole new language in a strange new world"
(90). The new world is the permutated world from which the word has
fled; the new language is the language of the divorce from meaning,
the language from which the author must free the word. The word is
liberated from language when it is no longer a noise that breaks the
silence but a response that contains the silence and transforms it into
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eloquence. The word drawn out of exile does not fill the silence but
rather is instilled with silence.
The divorce from meaning is a divorce from life. True to Heinrich
Heine's prophecy that when books are burned people follow, when the
word goes into exile people go to their deaths. The permutation of time
and space in the Holocaust novel, then, expresses life turned into death
upon the word's divorce from meaning. In A Prayer for Katerina Horo-
vitzova, Lustig writes, IIShe couldn't get rid of the persistent impres-
sion that the smoke wasn't coming from the chimneys over the camp
but from Mr. Brenske's mouth" (62). Brenske is the Nazi, the symbol of
the mutation of the word, who uses words that promise life to lead
Katerina and her company to death. The image of smoke coming from
his mouth points up the death that comes with the lie of the word
divorced from meaning. Brenske leads the party of victims on a train
that goes nowhere, suggesting the mutation of space; he promises an
imminent salvation that never comes, underscoring the perversion of
time. Both manifest the author's own phenomenological difficulty;
proceeding from a space that has no place in the world, he must rejoin
the word to its meaning and thus open up time and space for life.
Lustig takes up this issue in IIWhite Rabbit," a tale in his book Diamonds
of the Night, in which the main character, Thomas, maintains a silent
relation to a woman locked inside a mental hospital. She is the word in
exile, whom he addresses from the outside, through a closed window,
even though she cannot hear him. One day he finds that she is gone.
When Thomas asks where she is, he is told, IIElsewhere" (74). The
Czech word is jinde (44), just a letter away from jindy, meaning lIat
another time." This IIelsewhere" is the nowhere that inserts itself into
life when the word and the life it engenders are divorced from mean-
ing. Through the tale the author reconstructs a place and a time for this
lIelsewhere," making it here and now. The woman, the word, who has
been lost is here, silently and invisibly before us.
The word, Unamuno has said, "gives us reality, and not as a mere
vehicle of reality, but as its true flesh" (311). The word is the place of the
world, the vessel of time and space in the novel; its divorce from
meaning is reflected in the character's divorce from reality, from life.
The title character in Lustig's Dita Saxova, with the faith of a novelist,
clings to the conviction that the word may be returned from exile: "'I
can't agree when people who weren't there say it's impossible to put
into words, to give it meaning.' Dita said. She could not give up the
hope that everything people have done-even the most perverse
things-could be described. 'The sense of a word may shift, but I'm not
afraid that reality will evaporate like mist. Every reality-fortunately
and unfortunately, as Mr. Goldblat says-can be put into words. And
one day not only will words get their meaning back, but things will
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too' " (129). Reality may not evaporate with the shifting of the word, but
it shifts as the word shifts, in earthquakes and timequakes. In Dita's
case, it shifts as irrevocably as the time past, shoving her over its edge
in that wordless malediction we call suicide. Immediately before taking
her own life, Dita has a perverse physical encounter with two brothers,
which accentuates the collapse of human relation that accompanies the
exile of the word. When reality shifts and space and time twist out of
shape, there remains no place for the between realm that joins human to
human. Once this relation to the other is lost, so is the relation to and
the life of the self.
If, as Bakhtin claims, "the author-creator is a constitutive element
of the artistic form" (Esthetique 70), then so too is the artistic form a
constitutive element for the author. The character writes the author as
the author writes the character, and the reader's 'effort to respond is a
similar ordeal of authorship. One need only recall the suicides of
Tadeusz Borowski, Piotr Rawicz, Jean Amery, and Primo Levi to see
that the character's struggle reveals the author's. "For most writers,"
Wiesel has noted, "their work is a commentary on their life"; for the
authors of the Holocaust novels, however, "it is opposite; their lives are
commentaries on their work" (Against Silence 2:255). Like Dita Saxova,
these authors live or die according to the success or failure of the word
to overcome its divorce from meaning. The divorce from meaning, in
turn, is linked to the divorce of one human being from another; instead
of the one-for-the-other relation of signification and meaning, we have
the one-from-the-other divorce of meaninglessness.
The Collapse of Relation
Speech, Franz Rosenzweig explains, "does not know in advance just
where it will end. It takes its cue from others. In fact, it lives by virtue of
another's life" (Glatzer 199). He goes on to add that the "method of
speech" or the"speaking thinker. . . needs another person, and takes
time seriously-actually, these two are identical" (Glatzer 200). When
the parole (word or speech) goes into exile, time and space are thrown
out of joint; similarly, the exile of the word brings about a collapse of
interhuman relation, since the word is 'the substance of that relation.
This collapse underlies not only the author's development of the rela-
tion between characters but also the development of the author's
relation to a given character. "One has to write," as Piotr Rawicz has
said (134), because fetching the word from exile is the only way to
restore the interhuman relation that sustains human life. In Wiesel's
The Town beyond the Wall Pedro declares to Michael: "To say II suffer,
therefore I am' is to become the enemy of man. What you must say is II
suffer, therefore you are.' Camus wrote somewhere that to protest
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against a universe of unhappiness you had to create happiness. That's
an arrow pointing the way: it leads to another human being" (127). This
"I am" that Wiesel invokes through his character is the "I am" of
paralysis and isolation; it is mute and unmoved. The "you are" of
relation, on the other hand, brings the I into a genuine presence
through the word. Buber's lines again come to mind: "I require a You to
become; becoming ~' I say You" (1 and Thou 62). Saying You, I move
freely into the open.
Wiesel also addresses this point in The Gates of the Forest, where
Yehuda says to Gregor, "The Talmud tells us that God suffers with
man. Why? In order to strengthen the bonds between creation and
the creator; God chooses to suffer in order to better understand man
and be better understood by him. But you, you insist upon suffering
alone. Such suffering shrinks you, diminishes you" (178-79). In these
examples from Wiesel's novels we see that the collapse of relation is
articulated from within the framework of relation (Pedro-to-Michael,
Yehuda-to-Gregor), much as the exile of the word is voiced from within
the framework of the novel, where the word might again find a voice. If
only for an instant, what is lost is regained. As ever, the task confront-
ing the character-to say "I suffer, therefore you are"-is the task
confronting author and reader. The struggle to restore meaning to the
word is an effort to recover the relation of an I to a Thou, of one-for-the-
other, of "despite-me, for-another" (Levinas, Otherwise11). The restora-
tion of the word has certain messianic aspects, since, in the words of
one of Wiesel's characters, "the Messiah is that which makes man more
human, ... which stretches his soul toward others" (Gates 33). This
idea may lie behind Aboulesia's remark in The Testament when he says
to Paltiel, "The story of the Messiah is the story of a quest, of a name in
search of being" (160). When the I utters the name of the Thou with its
whole being, being is restored to the name; the word comes out of
exile, and eternity enters time, undoing all mutations of time. "One of
the characters who has been present in all my writings," Wiesel has
said, "is the character of the Messiah; what is the Messiah, if not the
embodiment of eternity in the present, the embodiment of eternity in
the future. He is waiting for us as long as we are waiting for him"
(Against Silence 3:288). For the author, then, the character serves the
messianic function of restoring the relation between word and mean-
ing, time and eternity, I and Thou.
Inasmuch as the Holocaust novel deals with the collapse of rela-
tion, it deals with the collapse of language, with an overturning of
sense, which takes the form of a breakdown in the boundaries of
distinction. The word in exile is not the word that has crossed some
frontier; rather it is the word that has lost its frontiers. The relation of
an I to a Thou is rooted in a difference that is a nonindifference. In the
The Word in Exile 49
exile of the word, on the other hand, all differences are overturned.
"Children were old," Wiesel said, "and old men were as helpless as
children, so that there was a confusion, a total confusion, of concepts
and virtues and powers. And when the Messiah will come, one of the
symptoms that should announce his coming, we are told, will be the
restoration of frontiers around some of the confusion that took place.
Good will be good, evil evil; children will be children, and old men old
men" (Patterson, In Dialogue 19). Here too we see some aspects of the
messianic elements in the Holocaust novel, insofar as it attempts to
redefine the lost distinctions by addressing and responding to them.
The author's I-Thou relation to the character, moreover, is the analogue
for the character's struggle to restore the differences that make human
relation a relation of nonindifference. The substance of the I is
grounded in this relation, since, as Levinas has shown, "the self is non-
indifference to the others, a sign given to the others" (Otherwise 171).
The collapse of relation is a collapse of self.
An image in Ka-tzetnik's House of Dolls hauntingly echoes Wiesel's
statement. Two children, a boy and girl, pull an old man through a
Polish ghetto in a baby carriage (44); children are old, and old men are
as helpless as children. Soon after, Harry bemoans the overturning of
sense, remarking to Daniella, "These days a man has no way of know-
ing if he's already in the hereafter, or if he still has to wait for death.
Everything is mixed up. Life and death in one brew. A hereafter that's
not here, not after. Fraud and hoax" (63). For "hereafter" Ka-tzetnik
does not use the common olam-habah, but olam-haemet, literally "the
world of truth." "A hereafter that's not here, not after" is a translation
of olam-emet sh'b'sheker, which means"a world of truth that is a lie" (65).
Thus placing the Hebrew original alongside the English translation, we
hear echoes of the permutation of time and place brought into a
connection with the collapse of distinctions, of truth. The confusion of
boundaries that comes with the exile of the word is a confusion of life
and death, of truth and lie. "The moment I really exist," Kierkegaard
said, "the separation between 'here' and 'hereafter' is there, and the
existential consequence of annulling the distinctions is suicide" (Post-
script 310). The consequence of existential suicide is murder.
Hence we find a group of rabbinical students engaged in prayer
and study in Ka-tzetnik's Sunrise over Hell, searching for "the bor-
derline separating life from death" (143). As they pray, so their author
writes. "I have no fear of dying-nor of living," says Moshe in Wiesel's
The Oath. "What frightens me is not to be able to distinguish between
life and death" (196). In the silence of the exiled word, in the silence that
is Auschwitz, life is indistinguishable from death. "Everything is nor-
mal here," Ka-tzetnik writes of the death camp in House of Dolls. "The
wildest absurdity-the soberest reality. Anything goes here, anything
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is possible, the way anything goes and is possible in insanity. Death
and life dwell together here. Blood and wine are drunk from the same
flask. "The Carrion Shed and the SS rooms are one. Borders erased.
Boundaries lost" (212). As words are lost or mutated, spaces merge,
leaving no between-space for human relation. This erasure of the
borders, this mixing of life and death, constitutes the true enslavement
of the soul. Life and death dwell together not just "here," as the
translation reads, but b'kfiyfah ehat, "in one cage" (218).
"Proximity," Levinas has shown, "is difference which is non-
indifference, is responsibility" (Otherwise 39). In the loss of relation that
occurs upon the exile of the word, the ability to respond is lost. Hence,
writes Amost Lustig, "a new system of human relationships operated
in the camp; a different scale of sensibilities and obligations had been
established, different from the one in the Five Books of Moses or in the
writings of socialist scholars or even in sociology textbooks" (Prayer 19).
"Human relationships," however, does not appear in the Czech text; it
reads noveho lidskeho fddu, a "new human order" (19), which is here
antithetical to relation. This order leads Katerina to realize that "causes
and effects were all mixed up.... She mustn't hang onto a word like
'right' or 'wrong'-such words were beside the point now" (15). This is
where she begins, and this is where she ends-"a lot of words had
been kneaded into different shapes" (151)-in a blurring of distinctions
between beginning and ending. Yet to hang onto a word is to hang
onto life, for the word joins the human being to life through a relation
to the life of another. The shifting in the scale of human sensibilities
results from the shifting in the order of sense. The author's task of
drawing the word out of exile, therefore, entails the creation of sense
out of nonsense through the regeneration of the I-Thou relation, so
that the reversal is itself reversed. "Then sense bypasses nonsense,"
Levinas writes, "that sense which is the same-for-the-other.... In it
sensibility is sense; it is by the other for the other, for another" (Other-
wise 64). The character's words articulate the author's difficulty, and
from a phenomenological and dialectical standpoint, the articulation of
the difficulty is the initial movement toward its resolution, even though
that resolution may never be realized. Creating the character, the
author becomes for another; through the character's word the author
may regain the relation in which sensibility is sense.
In Dita Saxova, Lustig, through his narrative voice, explains that the
survivors "had their own particular yardstick and rules, but the mean-
ing of words had shifted. They forgave the past for nothing. And there
was always someone around who personified the past for them. They
spoke one language and heard another beneath it" (117). Here Lustig
writes as a survivor about a survivor, using words to give utterance to
the shifting of words. His character Dita Saxova, who is made of shifted
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words, personifies the past for him. This personification distinguishes
character from type; as Bakhtin has put it, "character is in the past, type
in the present; a character's surroundings are to some extent symbolic,
... while the type's surroundings are more like an inventory" (Estetika
159). Not only through the character but also in the creation of the
character, the author invokes one language-the language of exile-so
that another-the language of redemption or the longing for redemp-
tion-can be heard in the silence that lurks beneath it. Through the
creation of the character the author is able to overcome, for however
long, the overturning of sense that the character often cannot sur-
mount. "With a smile on her lips, she wondered, Who can feel more
alone than children without parents, than parents without children,
husbands without wives, and wives without husbands? She continued
to smile. She would never be able to say it to anyone" (Lustig, Dita 179).
Dita loses the human relation by which she might have lived, loses the
distinction between here and hereafter, and takes her own life-so that
her author does not have to take his. For through the character Lustig
has said what the character could not say; in saying it, he restores or at
least posits that relation that is needful to life-a relation to a listener, to
a reader-via a character who could not speak.
It is possible, therefore, to die of silence, inasmuch as silence leads
to isolation and the collapse of relation. The silence of the exiled word is
at once paralyzing and isolating, revealing the loss of contact with the
word and therefore with others. One character expresses the linkage
between silence and paralysis in A. Anatoli's Babi Yar: "The utter
silence made my head swim. It was like being tied up in a black sack or
buried alive deep under the ground, where you couldn't budge and it
was no use wriggling about because there was no way out" (356). The
Russian word translated as "utter" is in fact glukhoi, which renders the
silence"deaf" (429), a silence in which there is no appeal and therefore
no way out. Having a way out entails not only having a place to go but
also having someone with whom to speak, having a dialogic relation
that might breach the silence and return the human being to life. "Two
voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence" (Bakhtin,
Problems 252). The silence that descends on Kiev in Babi Yar is the silence
that rises up from the author's blank page; those who write can under-
stand how a page may become a cage, an isolation cell like the one
Paltiel describes in Wiesel's The Testament: "No master had ever told me
that silence could become a prison. You taught me more than my
masters, Citizen Magistrate. In this 'isolator'-the word is well chosen:
in it one becomes isolated not only from mankind but from oneself-I
have attained a level of knowledge I had despaired of reaching" (207).
The isolation from the other and the isolation from oneself are of a
piece; both are features of a single exile, of the word in exile. "Why does
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one write," Wiesel asks, "if it is not to break out of this solitude?"
(Against Silence 3:197).
A distinctive feature of the Holocaust novel, therefore, is its con-
cern with the breakdown of interhuman relation. In a way that be-
speaks the condition of the Holocaust novelist, the Holocaust novel
consistently includes a character in· isolation. The author who is not
personally a survivor must move into a realm of isolation similar to that
of the survivor, through the character. Thus inMr. Sammler's Planet, for
example, Saul Bellow writes, "He was not sorry to have met the facts,
however saddening, regrettable the facts. But the effect was that Mr.
Sammler did feel somewhat separated from the rest ofhis species, if not
in some fashion severed-severed not so much by age as by preoc-
cupations too different and remote, disproportionate on the side of the
spiritual" (43). The Holocaust novel operates on the side of the spir-
itual, the side of silence and exiled word; in the age of the exiled word,
the spirit is always elsewhere. Mr. Sammler has literally risen from a
mass grave, and the world into which he rises is not the world from
which he fell. His movement was not so much a fall and a return as a
crossing of a threshold from one planet to another. His is not the planet
Earth but the planet Hell, the planet of isolation that Yoram Kaniuk
describes in Adam Resurrected: "That's Hell: one man shouts in the ear
of another, but nobody hears" (308). It is the planet over which a
darkened sun rises in Ka-tzetnik's Sunrise over Hell, a novel in which
the poet Eliezer loses his voice as he is taken away in a death van (66).
Isolated from human life, he is isolated from the word.
In other novels and other contexts the issue of isolation reoccurs.
I.B. Singers character Tamara, for instance, voices her terrible isolation
in Enemies: A Love Story when she says to Hennan, "It used to be that
when someone told me something, I knew exactly what he was talking
about. Now I hear the words clearly, but they don't seem to get
through to me" (126). Once husband and wife, Hennan and Tamara
have lost the word that made them so; having lost sensibility, they have
lost the highest expression of the I-Thou relation, the relation of mar-
riage. When the word is divorced from meaning, human is divorced
from human. In Marksizm i filosofiya yazyka (Marxism and the philoso-
phy of language), a work attributed to V.N. Voloshinov but probably
written by Bakhtin, the author points out that we do not actually "hear
the word; rather, we hear truth or lie, good or evil, important or
unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, and so on" (Voloshinov 71). Yet
Tamara cannot hear these things, since they are heard only within the
realm of human relation. In her isolation sense has been torn from
sensibility, and she hears not the word but merely the noise of words,
words, words. The most telling indication that ours is the age of
silence, the age of the exiled word, is that ours is the age of noise. "I
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cannot imagine a century noisier than ours," Wiesel once remarked to
me. "Conscientiously and consciously for noise." Locked into our
noise, we are locked out of relation, left to the silence of isolation. "In
our age," writes Wiesel, "man is obsessed by a feeling of failure and
isolation.... one feels empty, trapped, hopeless, a stranger to the
world and to oneself: between the ego and consciousness there is a
rupture and lack of communication" (Paroles 138). From this collapse
and collision, this perversion and silence, the author must summon the
word.
A moment of reflection, however, will show that this isolation is
more than an isolation from one another or from oneself. In Aharon
Appelfeld's The Age of Wonders, the first-person narrator, Bruno, de-
scribes the conditions in his Austrian home during the Nazis' rise to
power: "Father tried to encourage us with old, familiar words but they
had no power to lift the covering of futility from the empty silence"
(141-42). The exile of the word thus brings about an isolation from the
father as the bearer of the word; for it is his task, as we are told in the
Shma, to impart the word to his children.
3
The Death of the Father
The line ofJewish ancestry is matrilineal, since it is from the body of the
mother that the human being is born into life. The mouth of the father,
however, transmits the word that sustains life-transmits it from
mouth to mouth, not from mouth to ear. When handed down through
tales, the word "belongs as much to the listener as to the teller," Elie
Wiesel has written. "You listen to a tale and all of a sudden it is no
longer the same tale" (Beggar 107). The telling of the tale becomes part
of the tale itself; or, as Bakhtin expresses it, "thought, drawn into an
event, becomes itself part of the event" (Problems 10). The one who
receives the word is transformed into a messenger who must in tum
become the bearer of life through the utterance of the word. "I'll
transmit my experience to him," Azriel says in Wiesel's The Oath, "and
he, in tum, will be compelled to do the same. He in tum will become a
messenger. And once a messenger, he has no alternative. He must stay
alive until he has transmitted his message" (42). For the Holocaust
novelist, the effort to fetch the word from exile is just such an endeavor
to draw life out of death. The poet who engages in that struggle does so
in the capacity of a son who receives and passes on the word of the
father-but with this difference: the son in this case proceeds in the
imposed absence of the father. He is orphaned by silence, and his path
of return to life, in one way or another, leads him toward the father. For
the father represents a "metatext," to borrow a term from Todorov, that
"is actually an intertext" (40). What is beyond inevitably finds its way
into what is within.
Operating in the absence of the father, of course, may breed not
only a longing for the father but also a rebellion against the father. As
the bearer of the word, the father bears a promise; when the word is
emptied of its meaning, the promise goes unfulfilled. The effort to
regain the word of the father, who harbors the seminal seed of life, may
take the form of a struggle with the father, to wrestle from him what
death has swallowed up. Yet death has claimed the father and all he
signifies, so the writer-wrestler is continually thrown back to the zero
point. From there he proceeds once again to affirm what he rejects,
opposing the word to the silence that instills it with substance, oppos-
ing the father to the death that threatens his seed. Like Isaac, the
survivor descends from the altar to become a poet, whose task is to
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transform suffering "into prayer and love rather than rancor and
malediction" (Wiesel, Messengers 97). This he undertakes despite and
because of the death of the father. Neher has astutely noted, "For the
man of the Promise, God suddenly vanishes to the rear; but there is no
purpose in seeking Him in that rear, . . . for God is already waiting out
there in front, on the horizon-edge of a Promise which only restores
what it has taken, without ever being fulfilled" (123). The Holocaust
author is just such a man of the Promise.
The Bearer of the Legacy of Life
The father transmits the legacy of life by becoming· a link not only
between one generation and another, between the past and the future,
but also between the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. "I do not
know what life is," writes Paltiel Kossover to his son in Wiesel's The
Testament, "and I shall die without knowing. My father, whose name
you bear, knew. But he is dead. That is why I can only say to you-
remember that he knew what his son does· not" (20). The novelist
writes not because he knows but because he has been charged with the
task of remembering the one who knew. In If This Is a Man Primo Levi
invokes the one who knows, referring to him as "Another"; this Other
emerges through the lines of a text by Dante as Levi is walking one day
with his friend Pibolo:
IIAnd three times round she went in roaring smother
With all the waters; at the fourth the poop
Rose, and the prow went down, as pleased Another."
I keep Pibolo back, it is vitally necessary and urgent that he listen, that he
understand this IIas pleased Another" before it is too late; tomorrow he or I
might be dead, or we might never see each other again, I must tell him, I must
explain to him about the Middle Ages, about the so human and so necessary
and yet unexpected anachronism, but still more, something gigantic that I
myself have only just seen, in a flash of intuition, perhaps the reason for our
fate, for our being here today. [134]
Such is the moment of revelation that the novelist must make into a link
between creation and redemption.
Because the father is a link even-or especially-in his absence, he
becomes a symbol, a silence that draws the human being elsewhere;
indeed, "to let the silence in," Norman O. Brown has observed, "is
symbolism" (190), and the symbol is the sustainer of life. Says Paltiel in
Wiesel's The Testament, "The words you strangle, the words you
murder, produce a kind of primary, impenetrable silence. And you will
never succeed in killing a silence such as this" (30). This silence follows
56 THE SHRIEK OF SILENCE
in the wake of the death of the father. In Rachmil Bryks's Kiddush
Hashem Dvora Leah cries, "Fools! They think they can bum these
words which are more precious than gold. Those are words of flaming
fire-how can fire consume them?" (95). The words she speaks are the
words of her father, passed on from mouth to mouth; though silenced,
yet they return, symbols of life risen from the grave. In Saul Bellow's
Mr. Sammler's Planet, we are told quite explicitly that "Mr. Sammler had
a symbolic character. He, personally, was a symbol. His friends and
family had made him a judge and a priest" (86). As a priest, the father is
a bridge between what is above and what is below. He is the one who,
for example, presides over the seder at the altar of the table; he is the
one who engenders life by bringing order and structure to life (indeed,
the word seder means "order").
In the days of the Tent of Meeting the priest had a rope tied around
himself when he entered the Holy of Holies, so that if he should die in
his service to God, his body could be retrieved without violating the
Sanctuary. Yet this rope also signified his function as a link between
God and man, as did his breastplate, which bore the names of the
twelve tribes of Israel. The priest is not only a man but represents man
as such, who stands before God and preserves what is holy, what is
essential to life. In The Dynamics ofFaith Paul Tillich observed, "The holy
is the judgment over everything that is. It demands personal and social
holiness in the sense of justice and love. Our ultimate concern repre-
sents what we essentially are and-therefore-ought to be. It stands as
the law of our being, against us and for us" (56). So stands the father, as
he hands down the holy word to the children of Israel. Thus Dvora
Leah receives the word in Kiddush Hashem; there the words of the father
are words of fire, for they are entrusted to him by the God who is a
consuming fire. Similarly, in Applefeld's Tzili: The Story ofa Life we find
that the father figure, an old man, is the one who teaches Tzili to pray:
"At night she would recite 'Hear 0 Israel' aloud, as he had instructed
her, covering her face. And thus she grew" (6). Thus she "learned,"
lamdah, as the Hebrew text reads (9); thus she lived, receiving life
through the prayer. For the word of the father that is the legacy of life is
the word of prayer. We have seen that the language of the novel has cer-
tain features of the language of prayer; here we can see that this aspect
of the novel's discourse draws the father into the novel's content.
The father who knows what life is, however, is not only a priest but
also a judge. In this capacity the father represents what Bakhtin calls
the authoritative word: "The authoritative word is located in a dis-
tanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be hier-
archically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers" (Dialogic
342). Because he is the one who knows, the father is the one who judges
from on high, in a IIdistanced zone," his knowing eye forever cast upon
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the son. Since the son who lives in the exile of the word lives in the
absence of the father, he is forever in error. In Enemies: A Love Story by
I.B. Singer, Herman finds himself in this position: "It seemed to him
that he heard his father's voice saying, IWell, I ask you, what have you
accomplished? You've made yourself and everyone else wretched.
We're ashamed of you here in heaven' " (189). Thus we have an illustra-
tion of Sartre's statement that"shame is shame ofoneselfbefore the Other"
(Being 303); we also realize why he insists that "the Other is not only the
one whom I see but the one who sees me" (310). The function of the father
as both priest and judge is even more evident in Wiesel's The Testament,
particularly when Paltiel is on his way to Palestine, the Land of the
Patriarchs. "From beginning to end," he relates, "my father's eyes
never left me" (185). These eyes put to him the question put to the first
man: Where are you? As he approaches Palestine and catches sight of
Mount Carmel, Paltiel hears his father's voice calling upon him to say a
prayer (187). For in saying the prayer, the son receives the word and the
life that the father would bequeath to him. Saying the prayer, he affirms
the responsibility, the response capacity, that Buber refers to when he
declares, "Responsibility presupposes one who addresses me pri-
marily, that is, from a realm independent of myself, and to whom I am
answerable. He addresses me about something that he has entrusted
to me and that I am bound to take care of loyally" (Between 45). In his
role as judge the father does not simply"judge the son's failures or
transgressions, as the citation from Singer's novel might imply; rather,
he judges whether or not the son lives in the fullness of the word that
links heaven and earth, taking care of his trust.
This point becomes clear in Wiesel's The Testament when Paltiel
relates a "lyrical, mystical vision" in which he sees his father leading a
funeral procession. "I ask him where he is going," Paltiel explains,
"and he does not answer; I ask him whence he comes, he does not
answer" (321). The father is dead, yet he soon motions to Paltiel and
asks him, "'What have you made of me?' And my collection of poems,".
says Paltiel, "is my answer" (322). Significantly, in the French text the
father's question is preceded by the phrase il me fait signe et me demande,
that is, "he makes a sign unto me and demands of me" (269). The father
is the giver of signs and demands the return of a sign from the son. In
this case the sign returned is the collection of signs that PaltieI's poetry
comprises. His poetry, then, becomes the prayer his father would
summon from him. It is a literary response in a remembrance of the
words with which his father has entrusted him: "Remember this,
Paltiel: with God, everything is possible; without Him nothing has
value" (70). In his capacity as a link between heaven and earth, the
father is the bearer of life; his is the word that invokes the Creator of life,
through whom life takes on meaning. The father, therefore, is not only
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priest and judge; he is also savior. This function of the father comes out
in Paltiel's account of his experience as a medic in the Second World
War. "I felt lost," he writes. "Abandoned. Was there anyone left to tum
to?'1 was climbing a mountain of ashes. On the other side an old man
was waiting. And he was saying, 'Come, my son. Come'" (285). Thus
the dead father may summon the son from death, calling him from the
past and leading him into the future. Just as the father calls forth his
son, so does the father figure call forth the novelist. To write a Holo-
caust novel is to respond to one who summons from the other side of
a mountain of ashes, one who asks, "What have you made of me?"
The voice that calls forth the creative process inevitably appears in the
work created.
The motif of the beckoning father (or father figure) appears in
Wiesel's earlier words as well. Recall, for instance, David's dream-
similar to Paltiel's vision-of the old Hasid in A Beggar in Jerusalem.
David describes him as "the beggar, the preacher of my childhood. He
recognizes me and beckons me" (199). What is translated here as
"beckons me" is me fait signe in the original French text (178). In his
symbolic function, the father bears life and meaning to the extent that
he gives signs. The sign given by the father "signifies an order," to use
an expression from Levinas; "it orders me as one orders someone one
commands, as when one says: 'Someone's asking for you'" (Ethics 98).
Asking for me, the father asks for the fullness of my word, as in my
prayer. Because it is the sign that summons one to prayer and thus to
salvation, the word of the father is not simply the authoritative word
but is what Bakhtin calls "the hagiographic word" (see Problems 248),
which sanctifies life by becoming a sign of life and transforming its heir
into such a sign. The destiny of the son is to become a father, just as the
author must father the character. The father confers a name upon the
son, and the author confers a name upon the character. Yet the creative
process invariably reverses itself, so that the one whom the father
names finds salvation in the name of the father. "It was my father who
saved me," says a sanatorium patient in Wiesel's Twilight. "His face
appeared before me.... I was sure that he had not forgotten his name.
His name, his name: if only I could remember it, I would be saved'"
(141-42). Once again the line from Unamuno comes to mind: "Tell me
thy name! is essentially the same as Save my soul!" (181). The words
from Wiesel's novel might well be uttered by the author himself with
respect to his character, given the double movement of creation. He is
the offspring of what he creates, born of what he seeks.
In Twilight Wiesel introduces a character from an earlier work, The
Town beyond the Wall, who describes what he seeks in the image of the
father. His name is Pedro, and he says, "Like the question, the answer
needs freedom. But while the question never changes, the answer is
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ever-changing: What is important for man is to know that there is an
answer. What is important for man is to feel not only the existence of an
answer, but the presence of one who knows the answer. When I seek
that presence, I am seeking God" (197-98). In the French edition Uwhat
is important for man" is put much more strongly: Ia profondeur, Ie sens, Ia
verite de l'homme, Uthe depth, the meaning, the truth of man" (247)-all
the things that one is to inherit from the father. As one who bears the
legacy of life-as priest, judge, and savior-the father does not pre-
cisely symbolize God, but his presence signifies the presence of God,
of one who knows the ever-changing answer. So we begin to have an
inkling of what is lost in the death of the father. Amost Lustig has said,
uI think there were many times when I was really mad. When they
killed my father [for instance], who was a beautiful man, who never did
anyone any wrong" (unpublished interview with Harry James Car-
gas). It is from such a loss that the Holocaust novelist proceeds, work-
ing under the gaze of the dead father, a gaze like the one Wiesel
describes in Legends ofOur Time: UIn dying, my father looked at me, and
in his eyes where night was gathering, there was nothing but animal
terror, the demented terror of one who, because he wished to under-
stand too much, no longer understands anything. His gaze fixed on
me, empty of meaning. I do not know if he saw me, if it was me he
saw" (18).
The presence of the father lies in his recognition of the son; and the
presence of the son rests on being thus recognized. The struggle to
restore the dead father, then, is a struggle to restore the self. "Father,
save me!" cries Arele in Singer's Shosha when his late father appears to
him in a dream on the Day of Atonement (158). The Holocaust novel is
just such an outcry. To understand what occurs in the death of the
father is to understand, at least in part, what gives rise to the novel.
The Designification of the Other
The bearer of the legacy of life, the father is the giver of signs. With the
death of the father comes not only the death of the sign but also the end
of the giving of signs. Just as life emerges not only from the breath but
also from breathing, so are meaning and truth born not only from the
sign but also from the offering and receiving of the sign. As the giver of
signs, therefore, the father signifies truth, which is not what we know
but what we are, or what we are in the process of becoming. Assuming
the role of priest, judge, and savior, the father takes on this signifying
function with respect to the son; hence the father is the measure of the
self and soul of the son. To borrow a term from Jacques Lacan, he is the
Other, with a capital O. In words echoing the phenomenological stance
of the Holocaust author, Lacan asks, "Who is this other to whom I am
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more attached than to myself, since, at the heart of my assent to my
own identity, it is still he who agitates me? ... This other is the Other
that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which it subsists.
By which we can also see that is with the appearance of language that
the dimension of truth emerges" (Ecrits 172). With the help of Lacan's
insight, we realize that the exile of the word is definitively linked to the
death of the father as the Other. Just as Adam, the father of all, is
distinguished by his naming function, so is the father as the Other
"distinguished as the locus of Speech" (Lacan, Ecrits 305). The signifier
of truth, he is signification itself; the bearer of the word, he instills
words with meaning. The problem of language so often cited in regard
to Holocaust literature, then, is a problem concerning the designifica-
tion of the Other that comes with the death of the father. The death of
the father is the death of language. The struggle of the Holocaust
novelist to summon creation from language is an effort to wrestle life
from language; the writer cannot engage in that effort without engag-
ing the father.
In The Fifth Son, Elie Wiesel reveals something about his own
situation through the situation of his character, who describes his
father's gaze as "the gaze of a living man, a serious, dignified, austere
consciousness; a gaze turned inward, a consciousness thoroughly
cognizant of itself. Then the gaze went dark and I told myself: this is
where the mystery begins. I also told myself: this is how he is. Nothing
I can do about it. Out of reach" (20-21). The passage is even more
revealing when we examine the French text, where the gaze that "went
dark" is the gaze that s'eteignit (21), "burned out, extinguished, died
away." The father here is alive, a survivor of the Shoah, but there is an
air of death about him. No longer a giver of signs, he is "out of reach,"
hors d'atteinte, somewhere "beyond." As Levinas has shown, proximity
underlies both signification and subjectivity; "Proximity," he says, "as
the 'closer and closer,' becomes the subject. It attains its superlative as
my incessant restlessness, becomes unique, then one" (Otherwise 82).
The remoteness of the father thus comes to indicate his designification,
which in turn renders the self of the son problematic. In LB. Singer's
Shosha, Arele asserts, "From the day I left my father's house, I had
existed in a state of perpetual despair" (183). From an existential stand-
point, despair is a condition of disrelationship within a selfwho lives by
its relation to the Other (cf. Kierkegaard, Sickness 147-48). "I come to
know myself through others," Bakhtin has noted (Estetika 342), and the
father as the Other is the primary avenue toward my determination of
my self. The distance from the father thus belongs to the designifica-
tion of the Other, and from the designification of the Other issues the
loss of the self.
That the death of the father carries such an implication can be seen
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in a tale called "The Lemon" from Amost Lustig's Diamonds of the Night.
It is the story of a boy named Ervin who must somehow survive in a
ghetto after the death of his father. If there is an afterlife, Ervin thinks,
then his "father must be able to see him. Where do you suppose he really is,
Ervin wondered, and where am I?" (28). The two questions are of a
piece. The longing to be seen by the father is a longing for a sign from
the father, a sign that will establish both the presence of the father and
the identity of the son. The designification of the Other, therefore,
brings about not only a loss of the significance of the father but also a
loss of the sign by which the self can know itself. Understanding this,
we may better understand what lies behind Manny's vision in Lustig's
Darkness Casts No Shadow: "Before his eyes, the second boy could see a
door with a brass nameplate. The plate was bare. He placed his finger
on the doorbell and pushed it. This was the place he always came back
to, fearful that nobody would be there" (163). The nameplate would
bear the name of the father, the sign by which the son recognizes
himself. With the designification of the Other the plate goes blank, and
the emptiness of the dwelling is the self's own emptiness. "Glowing
and awesome," Singer has written, the father sheds "his own light"
(Shosha 158), and by the light of the father the son perceives himself. But
darkness sheds no light and casts no shadow; when the sign is lost, so
is the light. So is the self.
Thus the labor of the novelist to emerge from the Kingdom of
Night and into the light is an endeavor to give birth to the father by
whom he himself is born. For he labors to generate the word, and the
word that restores him to life is the word of the father. Studying the
poetry of Paltiel Kossover, we find that it expresses both the theme of
Wiesel's novel and the events underlying its creation:
In my dream
my father
asked me
if he is still
my father.
I hold his hand
and I ache.
I talk to him
and I ache.
I tell him:
call me,
hold me back,
try to understand.
I tell him
of my escapes
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into the future
into the past.
I tell him
of the ashes
and the scars
on my forehead.
I tell him
to stay with me
watch over me
and never leave me.
And so I see my father
in my dream
and fail to see
myself.
[Testament 294-95]
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Since the father knows what life is, Paltiel summons him to determine
what his own life is. But the father is dead-or exiled. His name is
Gershon, from Gershom, meaning "exiled," recalling the word exiled
by Paltiel's embrace of the false word of communism, of a messianism
without God. Paltiel sees his father but fails to see himself because he
has abandoned the word of the father; Karl Marx, he says, is his "new
Rabbi" (298), one who would abolish family, father, and self (see Marx
and Engles 37-38). Paltiel invokes the ashes and scars on his forehead to
seek the recognition of the father, but this is not the sign by which the
father knows him.
The sign by which the man is known, the sign of the Fathers, is
circumcision. With the designification of the Other that occurs in the
death of the father, however, the sign of the Covenant is perverted.
Instead of marking the man for a life in relation to the Holy Father, it
marks him for death. Hence in Yoram Kaniuk's Adam Resurrected Wolf-
ovitz the Circumciser laments, "That number engraved on your arm is
God!" (326). The Hebrew word for "engraved" here is harut (281),
which also means "inscribed"; the name to be inscribed in the Book of
Life is blotted out by the number registered in the ledger of death. The
mute cipher eclipses the word bound as a sign upon the arm, engraved
as a sign upon the phallus. In Blood from the Sky Piotr Rawicz explores
the ramifications of the perversion of the circumcised "tool," as he
pointedly calls i~, since the "tool" here indicated by the phallus is the
pen, which spills its words over the page like seeds over the ground,
seeking an ear in which to grow. Commenting on Rawicz's main
character, Edward Alexander noted that "the Sign brings Boris to the
recognition that the Covenant, which has come to him, like life itself,
from his ancestors, is exactly the Word become flesh" (229). Yet, as
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Voloshinov/Bakhtin has argued, "there is no outer sign without an
inner sign" (43). Thus in his investigation of the outer sign, Rawicz
explores the inner act of writing itself, when that act is undertaken in
the shadow of the death of the father, who embodies one's an-
cestors. "Is it not the act of writing," he asks, "of wielding the pen in
pursuit of dispersing images, that most closely relates man to in-
sect?" (311). The dispersion of images is the outcome of the de-
signification of the Other, however, since the truth of the image rests
on its relation to the Other. When the sign is lost in the death of the
father, man is, indeed, little more than an insect marked for exter-
mination.
In the novels of Aharon Appelfeld the father is often explicitly
associated with writing or with books. In The Retreat, for example,
Lotte Schloss is the first character we see, .one whose father is de-
scribed as "a man of books": "This simple woman spoke about her
father as if he were a saint, cut off from his origins due to some
terrible mistake" (46). The image of the father as saint places him in
the role of the Other; cut off from his origins, however, he is de-
signified. As Alan Mintz has observed, in Appelfeld's works "it is as if
the ancestral order, as a world suffused with despair, entropy, and
disintegration, was already under the star of the Holocaust" (215).
Lotte's movement into the retreat, then, is a movement away from the
father, guided by a different star, a different sign; it is, again, a dis-
tancing from the father and all he signifies. Hence, when she speaks at
the funeral of the suicide Isadora, "all her experience on the stage
seemed to drop away from her. The words scratched jarringly on the
silent air. Lotte covered her face, as if she had failed shamefully" (85).
The words are there, but they are without meaning, as dead as the
father. Nurit Govrin asserts that for Appelfeld "the spiritual solution is
in the quest for a father-image" (1593); the state of the soul is rooted in
the relation to the father.
The shame over the miscarriage of the word is a shame over the
death of the father, for which the son feels somehow accountable.
Appelfeld demonstrates this in The Age of Wonders, in which Bruno
views his father as a source of disgrace. After the war, he receives two
letters concerning his father's writings: "The two letters suddenly
coming from far away had stirred the old scar into a new pain: his
father. His father. The disgrace he had not dared to touch, seething
silently all these years like pus inside a wound. They said he had died
half-mad in Theresienstadt, and that before he died he had tried to
convert to Christianity" (209). In the Hebrew text the phrase "convert
to Christianity" does not appear; rather it is l'hemir et date, "change his
religion." What is rendered as "half-mad" is bilbul da'at, literally "a
confusion of knowledge" (135). In this confusion the father loses the
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order of signs that make up his religion, which bespeaks his word. The
"confusion of knowledge" emerges in the confused attempt to reorder
the signs that come into collision with a reality that they cannot accom-
modate. The word crumbles in a failed effort to seek a new word, a new
sign. The loss of the sign in the designification of the Other, moreover,
does not result simply in a blank emptiness; it leaves behind a bleeding
wound, in which the dead father lies buried and from which the self is
poured out. It is a wound that not only "seethes" through the years but
pi'fa kol hashaniym, "permeates all the years" (135), permeates the very
lifetime of the self. The wounded I thus becomes other to itself, a point
indicated in The Age of Wonders by the shift from the first person to the
third person after the disappearance of the father. Just before the shift
takes place we read, "Father was no longer with us. He was in the grip
of a darkness that seemed about to overwhelm him" (154-55). Once
again, darkness casts no shadow, so that the void that engulfs the father
robs the son of his shadow, his tzelem, his image of himself.
What was referred to above as the "signifying function" Lacan calls
the "Symbolic function" when he points out, "It is in the name of the
father that we must recognize the support of the Symbolic function
which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the
figure of the law" (Language 41). Lacan's observation confirms what has
been said about the figure of the father as judge. The Torah or the Law,
indeed, begins with the father of all, followed by the Patriarchs; Moses
the Lawgiver-priest, judge, savior-is the paradigm of the father, the
one who wields the tables of the Law; his children are the children of
Israel. Thus in the Holocaust novel the designification of the father may
take the fonn of the crumbling of the law. Consider, for instance, these
words uttered by Josek the partisan fighter in If Not Now, When? by
Primo Levi: "If Moses was here with us, in this mill, he wouldn't think
twice about changing the laws. He'd smash the tablets, the way he did
that time he got mad about the golden calf, and he'd make new ones.
Especially if he had seen the things we have" (185). In the Italian text
the verb "smash," spaccherebbe (133), suggests a play on the noun
spacchino, "stone breaker," implying an overturning of the father image
itself; instead of tablet maker, he is posited as tablet breaker. Yet with
the death of the father, the tablets have already been smashed, and
there is no one, other than the son, to write new ones. This existential
condition is reflected in the novelist's phenomenological situation, one
in which he must do his work amid the rubble of a crumbled canon.
"The crisis of the author," Bakhtin has said, lies in his having "to
examine the position of his art within the whole of culture, in the event
of being" (Estetika 176). In the case of the Holocaust novelist, however,
culture has collapsed, and the event of being is overtaken by noth-
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ingness. With the designification of the Other there are no signs, no
laws, to show the way.
The crumbling of the law is the crumbling of the Other, which is
more than the breakdown of rules and regulations; it is the undoing of
what is dear to human life and of what is higher than human being.
Anna Langfus conveys this idea in The Whole Land Brimstone through
the image of an angel atop a Polish church: "The angel facing south had
a small bit of wing missing: nothing to speak of, yet the fact of being
slightly chipped in this way was sufficient to give it a touch of human-
ity, to tum it into something fragile, perishable, arousing sympathy.
There are times when one needs to have one's heart wrung by the sight
of a piece of stone crumbling away" (32). Just as the wing makes the
angel, so the law makes the man. The angel who loses its wing parallels
the man who loses his father; orphaned by the death of the father, he is
"fragile, perishable," left without the law from which he draws his life,
like the boy Ervin in Lustig's Diamonds of the Night. His father dead, he
collides with the realization that"there is no limit to what's 'worse.' The
limit was in his father. And now Ervin had to find it, just like his father"
(18). As the figure of the law, the father is the figure of the limit, the one
who establishes the difference between good and evil, holy and pro-
fane, life and death. The law defines the differences that determined
what matters in life; the law makes life itself something that matters.
When the father dies and the law crumbles, the human being is left to
the limitless hell of indifference.
We can see, then, why Mr. Sammler in Saul Bellow's novel de-
scribes hell as indifference-not simply the indifference of the father
but the indifference of God the Father (215). We can sense what crum-
bles away in Joel's heart-wringing cry of "My God, my God, why have
You forsaken me?" in Yehuda Amichai's Not of This Time, Not of This
Place (308). And we can hear the void of what is worse when in Ka-
tzetnik's Atrocity Moni laments, "Oh, Pa, why did you leave me?" (26).
The death of the father as the designification of the Other makes for a
condition not in which the father means nothing but in which the father
can mean anything. The differences have not just fallen apart-they
have been mutated, as shown in Ka-tzetnik's description of Piotr in
Atrocity: "No forehead, no chin, a toothless, insucked mouth like a
knife scar, and in the center a nose like a wrinkled old potato. But most
important of all-his two long hands. The famous Piotr hands, with
which he does his work silently, conscientiousy, solemnly, as he turns
unctuous eyes on his victim. That is why he was titled Holy Dad" (35).
In the original Hebrew what is translated as "unctuous" is b'adiykut
datiyt, "devout godliness" (24), a phrase that makes more clear not only
the epithet Holy Dad but the perversion of the father as well. With the
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death of the father, who has given the law "Thou shalt not kill," there
arises a mutated father with an inverted law, a father who is himself a
killer. When the father dies, death invaribly rules in his place. Signifi-
cantly, Piotr, Peter, bears the name of the Father of the Church, the
Keeper of the Keys, who introduced a new, inverted law that locks out
the Jews and who ended by being crucified upside down.
When the law crumbles, therefore, meaning collapses. With the
dying of the father, the word bleeds to death. In Ka-tzetnik's House of
Dolls Shlamek's father is branded on the forehead with the word Jude:
"Blood gave from the seared word. And the word was as clear as the
blood oozing from it. As though it were quite natural that the word Jude
should give blood" (125). In the original text, the word rendered as
"clear" is muvenet (131), "meaningful" or "comprehensible." Here the
distinction between word and meaning is especially pronounced, and
the draining of meaning from the word is especially graphic. The
frontlet between the eyes, the holy word that signifies who the father
is, transfonns into a bleeding word that designifies the father in its
identification of him. Once the sign of life's meaning, he has imposed
upon him the sign of meaningless death. Perhaps Tamara speaks of
such a torture when she commets on the ordeal of her father in Singers
Enemies: A Love Story, declaring, "Anyone who did not see my father at
that moment doesn't know what it means to be a Jew" (72). Being a Jew
means witnessing the life of the father poured out through the bleed-
ing wound. As the father is emptied of life, the word is emptied of
meaning. A seemingly detached, academic phrase like "the de-
signification of the Other," therefore, has its ties with life and death. For
the Other, who in Bakhtin's words is "invisibly present" (see Estetika
306), has its reality in the flesh that bleeds.
From the blood of the bleeding word stamped on the brow of the
father, the Holocaust novelist attempts to restore life both to himself
and to the father from whom the word issues. Thus struggling with the
word, he writes of the fathers struggle with the word. Bruno's father in
Appelfeld's The Age ofWonders is a man of letters, one who lives by the
words he writes; as soon as death begins to steal over him, he loses his
command of the word. "Father stopped writing," we are told early in
the novel (25), and the point is later repeated: "Ugly, tonnented spirits
settled on the house. Father did not write, correct proofs, or reply to
the many letters piling up on his desk" (83). Yet seeing his self, his
meaning, about to collapse under the weight of the ugly spirits, the
father suddenly clambers to regain what would inevitably be lost. IIAs
for father," the child narrator relates, "he was driven by a different
devil, a terrible devil: his writing" (107). He was driven, rodah, that is,
"subjugated" or "tyrannized" (72). The word that would free the man
now becomes a maze of words by which he is entangled and enslaved.
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Meaning breaks down into inversion, subversion, and perversion,
until the word that had engendered life takes the father on a twisted
spiral toward death. The deeper he plunges, the more he clings to the
serpent that takes him down. His son explains, "Fathers determination
to remain in Austria was even stronger than before. To leave at at time
like this, with evil spirits raging, meant admitting that reason had lost
out, that literature was to no avail" (140). It would mean the designifica-
tion of the Other; if reason and literature are to no avail, then the father
himself is of no significance.
It turns out, of course, that reason and literature are indeed to no
avail. With respect to the former, Jean Amery notes, "Not only was
rational-analytic thinking in the camp, and particularly in Auschwitz,
of no help, but it led straight into a tragic dialectic of self-destruction"
(10). Amery goes on to explain, "For it was not the case that the
intellectual-if he had not already been destroyed physically-had
now become unintellectual or incapable of thinking. On the contrary,
only rarely did thinking grant itself a respite. But it nullified itself when
at almost every step it ran into its uncrossable borders. The axes of its
traditional frames of reference then shattered" (19). So it happens with
Bruno's father.
Regarding literature, one readily recalls the words of Piotr Rawicz:
"Literature: anti-dignity exalted to a system, to a single code of be-
havior. The art, occasionally remunerative, of rummaging in vomit.
And yet, it would appear, navigare necesse est: one has to write" (134).
One writes for the sake of the father, despite the fate of the father, and
in atonement for the death of the father. Because when death means
designification, when it means the collapse of meaning, the task of
redefining the limits outlined by the sign of the father falls to the
surviving child. We have seen an example of this in the case of Ervin in
Lustig's Diamonds of the Night. It also turns up in The Whole Land
Brimstone; in this novel Langfus's character leaves her adamant father
behind in a Polish ghetto and confesses, "I was sacrificing my father,
with all the vigour of my selfishness. Shamefully. Ignominiously" (67).
And who can forget the dark confession of the boy Eliezer upon the
death of his father in Wiesel's Night? "His last word was my name," he
says. "A summons, to which I did not respond. I did not weep, and it
pained me that I could not weep. But I had no more tears. And, in the
depths of my being, in the recesses of my weakened conscience, could
I have searched it, I might perhaps have found something like-free at
last!" (112-13). The son, of course, can know no freedom apart from his
response to the father who summons him. The novelist writes in an
endeavor to answer the father who in death calls his name.
As it often happens among the bereaved, however, death breeds
rebellion, and none more so than the death of the father. "I've de-
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throned Frank Brody long ago," says Danny, for instance, in Lustig's
Darkness Casts No Shadow. "Like I did with my father when the Germans
came" (123). Rebellion that begins over the death of the father soon
becomes a rebellion against God the Father, as Wiesel demonstrates in
the argument between Gregor and the rebbe in The Gates of the Forest.
Addressing the old man, a representative of God, Gregor cries, "He
[God] turned the sentence against the judges and accusers. They, too,
were taken off to the slaughter. And I tell you this: if their death has no
meaning, then it's an insult, and if it does have a meaning, it's even
more so" (197). With the loss of the sign comes the crumbling of the law;
with the crumbling of the law comes the collapse of meaning. In the
midst of this wilderness the novelist assaults the heavens in an effort to
return to the earth. If his object is rebirth, he can be reborn only from
the hand of the Creator. Thus, pen in hand, he does battle with God.
Wrestling in the Wilderness
And Jacob remained alone. And a strange man appeared and wrestled with
him until justbefore dawn. And when the stranger saw that he could not defeat
him, he touched the hollow of his thigh. And the hollow of Jacob's thigh was
out of joint as he wrestled with him. And the stranger said, "Let me leave, for
the dawn breaks." And he said, "I shall not let you leave unless you bless me."
And the stranger said, "What is your name?" And he said, "Jacob." And the
stranger said, "No more will you be called Jacob but Israel; for you have become
like a prince before God and men, and you have prevailed." And Jacob asked
and said, "Tell me your name." And he said, "Why do you ask my name?" And
there he blessed Jacob. And Jacob named the place Peniel: "for I have seen God
face to face and have withstood it."
-Genesis 32:24-30
Phenomenologically, the Holocaust novel is set at Peniel. The author
wrestles a name from the Other, a name for his character, whereby he
the author may be known as Israel. In his commentary on Jacob's
encounter Wiesel writes, "No man before him had revealed to other
men the battle God wages against them; no man before him had
compelled God into open contest with man; and no man before him
had ever established relations of provocation with God" (Messengers
129). The Holocaust novelist can perhaps have no other relation with
God. But there is an important difference between Jacob and the
Holocaust writer: in the case of the latter the man takes the battle to
God. He does not receive the blessings of the father but rather survives
the death of the father and the withdrawal of the word, which he
struggles to extract from the Other. Once the father is dead, the writer
has only God with whom to contend.
In The Rebel Albert Camus argues, "Human insurrection, in its
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exalted and tragic forms, is only, and can only be, a prolonged protest
against death" (100). Yet the Holocaust novelist's protest is not only
against death but also against the death of the father; because it is the
death of the father-the death of the guarantor of meaning-there is
nothing of the exalted or tragic about it. If we must speak of tragedy in
this connection, we should recall Lev Shestov's description in Afiny i
Ierusalim: "Tragedy is having no way out, and there is nothing great or
beautiful in having no way out; there is only nothingness and formless-
ness" (141). To nothingness and formlessness we can add death. For
death here is precisely the death of the exalted. It is the death we see,
for example, in Night, when Wiesel describes Eliezer's father in the
camp: "He was weeping. His body was shaken convulsively. Around
us, everyone was weeping. Someone began to recite the Kaddish, the
prayer for the dead. I do not know if it has ever happened before, in
the long history of the Jews, that people have ever recited the prayer for
the dead for themselves" (42). The Holocaust novel is a Kaddish said
for the death of the self that transpires upon the death of the father, but
it is said in a spirit of rebellion. Wiesel relates a remark made by one of
his friends: "Here and now th only way to accuse Him is by praising
Him" (Legends 61). The Holocaust novel is just such a dialectical combi-
nation of praise and accusation of God the Father. The prayer receives
its dialectical utterance-yitgadal veyitkadach shme raba, may His name
be magnified and blessed-despite and because of the death of the
father, the death of the self.
Thus in remembrance and observance the novelist takes up re-
bellion with a cry not only of "never again" but also of "never shall I
forget." Wiesel expresses it most elegantly, most hauntingly in Night:
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in the camp, which has turned my
life into one long night, seven times cursed and seven times sealed. Never shall
I forget that smoke. Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose
bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky. Never shall
I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever. Never shall I forget that
noctural silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to live. Never
shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my soul and turned
my dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I am condemned to
live a long as God Himself. Never. [43-44]
For"silent blue sky" the French text reads azur muet (60), "mute azure,"
suggesting a sky that does not speak, a realm robbed of the word. The
French term makes more visible the link between the exile of the word
and the death of the· father in the conjunction of the nocturnal silence
with the murdered God, with the murdered soul. In this never, the
open wound of the self, the seeds of rebellion are planted. From that
wound the Holocaust novel is born.
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As the rebellion against God takes shape, however, the self be-
comes increasingly estranged from itself. Orphaned by the death of the
father-whether physical or metaphysical-the son refuses those ob-
servances made meaningful by the father, those moments when the
relation to God the Father substantiates the life of the self. In Wiesel's
Night Eliezers rebellion is quite pronounced on Rosh Hashanah: "This
day I ceased to plead.. I was no longer capable of lamentation. On the
contrary, I felt very strong. I was the accuser, God the accused. My eyes
were open and I was alone-terribly alone in a world without God and
without man. Without love or mercy. I had ceased to be anything but
ashes, yet I felt myself to be stronger than the Almighty, to whom my
life had been tied for so long. I stood amid that praying congregation
observing it like a stranger" (73-74). On Yom Kippur, a day of fasting,
he is even more explicit: "I no longer accepted God's silence. As I
swallowed my bowl of soup, I saw in the gesture an act of rebellion and
protest against Him. And I nibbled my crust of bread. In the depths of
my heart, I felt a great void" (75). A world without the father-the
world from which the Holocaust novel emerges-is a world without
God and man. Like one who nibbles bread on a day of fasting, the
novelist pursues the task of re-creation in a protest against creation,
implicating the Creator Himself as one who must atone-or at least
listen. Hence in Wiesel's Twilight, when an old man, clearly a father
figure, is about to be murdered by the Nazis, his last cry is "God of
Israel: Listen to the people of Israel." We read, "He had not recited the
traditional Shma after all, he had not said, 'Listen, Israel, God is one God.'
He had said something else, not the opposite but something else" (34).
Thus the novelist says something else-not the opposite perhaps but a
rebellious something else.
Like the prayer, the novel too becomes something else. The two
rebelliously merge at the end of The Last of the Just by Andre Schwartz-
Bart: "And praised. Auschwitz. Be. Maidanek. The Lord. Treblinka. And
praised. Buchenwald. Be. Mauthausen. The Lord. Belzec. And praised.
Sobibor. Be. Chelmno. The Lord. Ponary. And Praised. Theresienstadt. Be.
Warsaw. The Lord. Vilna. And praised. Sharzysko. Be. Bergen-Belsen. The
Lord. Janow. And praised. Dora. Be. Neuengamme. The Lord. Pustkow.
And praised" (422). In this prayer-if it can be called a prayer-we
have an example of what Lawrence Langer calls "the cacophony of fact"
that the writer must transform into an "antiphony of art" (264). We can
also see that polyphony, which is a great concern to Bakhtin (see
Problems 40), is a structural feature of the novel with profound spiritual
implications. The rebellion implied in such a prayer is made clear
earlier in Schwarz-Bart's novel through the words of a young man
named Yanke!. He is the sole surviving son of a village wiped out by the
Nazis, a man known for his prayers.
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I buried them all, you know, the whole village without exception-didn't miss
a fingernail. And for each one of them, even for the dirty little liar Moshele-he
lived next door-for each o~e of them, I swear it, I said all the prayers from A to
Z, because in those days I was a famous praying man before the Eternal, ai-i-i-i!
It lasted eight days. And nobody came. The peasants were afraid. And when it
was done, I felt queer all over, you know? It was in the cemetery, I woke up and I
grabbed a handful of rocks and began to throw them at the sky. And at a certain
moment the sky shattered. You understand? ... Then I said to myself, "Yankel,
ifGod is in little pieces, what can it mean to be a Jew?" Let's take a closer look at
that, my friend. But then, as closely as I could look I couldn't see anything but
blood, and more blood, and blood again. But meaning?-none. [101]
The French word translated as "meaning" is signification (124), whose
root, like that of the English word, is sign: meaning is lost as the blood
washes away the sign. The blood that remains is the blood of the father,
the blood of the word stamped on the brow of the father, oozing from
the shattered sign of the shattered sky. For the death of a community
signifies the death of the father and brings on the rebellion of the son.
The combination of prayer and rebellion underlying the Holocaust
novel can also be found in Not of This Time, Not of This Place, where
Amichai writes, "For Thine is the error, and Thou shalt reign forever.
God rules only by means of an error" (310-11). If the rebellion in these
words is not strong enough, then the words of Morris Feitelzohn in
Singer's Shosha are quite unambiguous. He declares: "Mark, of all the
errors Jews have made, our greatest was to delude ourselves-and
later other peoples-that God is merciful, loves His creatures, hates
malefactors, and all the rest of it" (142-43). Although Feitelzohn's
words bear nothing of a dialectical affirmation, nothing of a prayer, in
their rebellion, Singer offers us another look at this character whose
rebellion is in fact an expression of what is at work in the creation and
content of the novel itself. It is said that he raised an outcry against God
ablaze "with religious fire"; he "castigated Him for all His sins since the
Creation. He still maintained that the whole universe was a game, but
he elevated this game until it became divine. That was probably how
the Seer of Lublin, Rabbi Bunim, and the Kotzker spoke" (271). Like
the prayer that is itself a part of the divinity, so rebellion, as we see it in
the Holocaust novel, takes on an aspect of the divine. The death of the
father draws its significance from the longing for the father. Since
the death of the father is what gives rise to the rebellion against God the
Father, that rebellion against God reveals a profound need for Him.
Wrestling in the wilderness, then, the novelist is pitted against
himself in an affirmation of his need for the Other. His novel, his art,
voices affirmation and need. In The Town beyond the Wall Wiesel's charac-
ter Pedro declares: "The dialogue-or duel, if you like-between man
and his God doesn't end in nothingness. Man may not have the last
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word, but he has the last cry. That moment marks the birth of art" (103).
The words of Michael from the same novel, moreover, express what
happens when the outcry is transformed into art: "The shout becomes
a prayer in spite of me" (123). Written in the aftermath of the death of
the father, the novel is a search for a prayer, an effort to wrestle a prayer
from the wilderness. Thus in The Town beyond the Wall Wiesel reveals his
own struggle as a novelist through his character's struggle to speak his
prayer. Michael speaks the prayer in an utterance of his rebellion and
his longing: "Oh God, be with me when I have need of you, but above
all do not leave me when I deny you" (49). When asked about the
division of this novel into prayers, Wiesel once explained, "To me,
prayers are very dear. I tried to invent something new, a new approach.
. . . Maybe it's no longer a prayer for but against. Usually prayers are
meant as an approach to God; someone is asking for something from
God. Maybe our prayers will be against God." Are they still affir-
mative? he was asked. "Existentially and dialectically affirmative," he
answered. "For the fact that I pray means someone is there to listen,
that what I am saying is not uttered to a great void. But what I do say, I
say with anger" (Patterson, In Dialogue 78). In Paroles d'etranger he adds,
"Heaven sends back the prayer that does not reflect the human condi-
tion in its agony and its pain; it is a dead prayer" (171). Said with anger,
the prayer, the novel, joins rebellion with need. Said with anger, the
prayer against is rebellion for.
The need to write reflects the need for God the Father, a need that
arises upon the death of the father. The novelist writes despite himself,
for another, just as the child Eliezer prays upon entering the camp in
Wiesel's Night. "In spite of myself," he says, "the words formed them-
selves and issued in a whisper from my lips: Yitgadal veyitkadach shme
raba. ... May His name be blessed and magnified.... My heart was
bursting. The moment had come. I was face to face with the Angel of
Death" (43). The Angel of Death comes to claim the father, who had
been the support of life, the priest, judge, and savior of life. The Angel
of Death is the Angel with a Thousand Eyes, who comes to leave
Eliezer with new eyes. After the death of the father, the novel closes
with Eliezer's gazing into a mirror: "From the depths of the mirror, a
corpse gazed back at me. The look in his eyes, as they stared into mine,
has never left me" (116). Once again, the French text harbors revelations
that elude the translation; for "gazed back at me" the original has me
contemplait (178), "contemplated me," studied me, judged me. The
image of the dead father is thus implied in the contemplative corpse of
the dead self. As Bakhtin has said, the character is aghast at "his own
face, because in it he senses the power of another person over him, the
power of that other's evaluations and opinions. He himself looks on his
face with another's eyes, with the eyes of the other" (Problems 235). If
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the Holocaust novelist holds up a mirror, it is not to nature but to
himself, and he enconters the corpse that he must wrestle into a
character. Yet what the mirror cuts in half the look of the father recon-
stitutes; he is the Other to whom Todorov refers: "Only the look of the
Other can provide me with the feeling that I am a totality" (147). The
look that never leaves the man thus becomes the look of the father;
Paltiel asserts, "From beginning to end, my fathers eyes never left me"
(Wiesel, Testament 185). Fathering his character, the novelist reaffirms
the significance of the father and of the fathers death for his own life-
and-death encounter at Peniel, where he struggles to come before the
countenance. The significance of the father, then, lies above all in his
connection with the longing for God couched in the rebellion against
God.
Thus in Wiesel's The Gates of the Forest we read, "God's final victory,
my son, lies in man's inability to reject Him. You think you're cursing
Him, but your curse is praise; you think you're fighting Him, but all
you do is open yourself to Him; you think you're crying out your hatred
and rebellion, but all you're doing is telling Him how much you need
His support and forgiveness" (33). These words shed much light on the
rebellion of Eliezer in Night and of Michael in The Town beyond the Wall;
they help us to see what underlies the rebellion of characters created by
other novelists as well-Vevke in Ka-tzetnik's Atrocity, for example.
Unlike Eliezer, Vevke chooses to fast on Yom Kippur, but the reasons
for his response are the same. He cries out, "I will show You that even
in Auschwitz Vevke the cobbler is equal to fasting on Yom Kippur! But
You-You are to sit on Your throne in Truth! Do You hear me? In Truth!"
(209). The Holocaust novelist cannot deal with the truth of the Shoah
without first dealing with the truth of himself, and for this he needs the
figure of the father. The I insist of his rebellion is an insistence on truth
when truth has died. Yet something still glows in the embers of his
longing. Levinas, in Ethics and Infinity, says, "The witness testifies to
what was said by himself. For he has said 'Here I am!' before the Other;
and from the fact that before the Other he recognizes the responsibility
which is incumbent on himself, he has manifested what the face of the
Other signified for him. The glory of the Infinite reveals itself through
what it is capable of doing in the witness" (109). Freely translated,
Levinas's words come to a simple statement made by Nadav in Wiesel's
Twilight, for whom "the meaning of God was the yearning for God"
(115). God is felt through the need for Him, so that, in Buber's words,
"whoever knows God also knows God's remoteness and the agony of
drought upon a frightened heart" (1 and Thou 147). Unlike other yearn-
ings, this longing reflects the human being's need for answerability to
another, for another; and the presence of the Other is revealed through
this need within the self.
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"The yearning from below," it is written in the Zohar, "brings
about the completion above" (33). Although we yearn for what we do
not have, the presence of what we need is sensed in the yearning, just
as the significance of the father is most deeply felt upon his death. In
Touch the Wat~ Touch the Wind, Amos Oz writes, "Dying parents, Yotam
thought, exercise a power over you that they never had before. And
when your father dies you will pick him up and carry him inside you all
your life like an unborn child or a malignant growth, he will accom-
pany you through all your rebellions" (163). The Hebrew term ren-
dered as "inside you" bears much stronger connotations than the
English phrase. It is b'hovkha, meaning "in your guilt" or "in your debt"
(172); it suggests a breakdown of relation, a distancing from the self
within the self upon the death of the father. Thus an absence is made
into a presence, like a wound. "His father, his father," reads the line in
Appelfeld's The Age of Wonders, "the wound that never healed" (266).
The wound spurs the rebellion that is a longing to be healed and the
wrestling with God that is born from a need for God.
Obviously, then, the Holocaust novel connects the death of the
father with the death of God. If the father is a Thou to whom the I
responds in its effort to become I, then we can see that "extended, the
lines of relationships intersect in the eternal You. Every single You is a
glimpse of that. Through every single You the basic word addresses the
eternal You" (Buber, I and Thou 123). Buber also points out that people
address the eternal You by different names (123). Among the Jews a
chief form of address is avinu, Our Father. As dreadful as it may sound,
in the Holocaust novel, or in the course of its creation, the address
becomes Our Dead Father. Yet through the address of the novel and
despite the death of the father, there arises a response from the one
who has died. The dead struggle to move inside the main character: In
The Whole Land Brimstone by Anna Langfus, "A whole murmuring
chorus was imploring me. Then another isolated voice spoke and I
recognized it. 'We are all here and we are cold. Let us in,' said my
father" (285). What is translated as "spoke" is s'eleve, "rose up," in the
French text (280), as if the voice were an animate entity. As these words
come out of the author via her character, the voice that conveys them
enters her via the character. Thus the voice speaks from beyond to
reveal itself through what it is capable of doing from within.
The writing of the Holocaust novel represents a response, which is
the hearing of such a voice. Creating the character, the novelist posits a
face from which the one who had died may yet speak, sometimes
through the image of the face itself. In Ka-tzetnik's Sunrise over Hell
Harry Preleshnik encounters the dead face of his friend Marcel
Shafran: "Prone before his eyes, he saw the values of all humanity's
teachings, ethics and beliefs, from the dawn of mankind to this day.
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Marcel's carcase-face revealed to him the true face of man in the image
of God. He bent, stretched out his hand and caressed the head of the
Twentieth Century" (111). Humanity's teachings and ethics are the
teachings and ethics of the fathers, the piT/rei avot by which human life is
instilled with the presence of the living God. The God who before
Ezekiel's eyes brought dead bones to life now lies among the bones of
the dead. Ka-tzetnik suggests this image in Star ofAshes: "Admit now,
Rabbi of Shilev, God of the Diaspora Himself flounders here in this
snarl ofbones-a Mussulman!" (179). In the Hebrew text the phrase for
"Himself," etsmo hoo, is a play on the word meaning "bones," etsmot
(179): the self and soul of God become the dead matter of man.
In Ka-tzetnik's images we see what becomes of the personal God
when He is linked with the person of the father; indeed, that linkage,
conveyed by the address Our Father, is what makes Him a personal
God. As soon as rebellion becomes a personal matter, it becomes a
matter of murder. "Men don't reject death, but they do immortality,"
says the rebel Varady in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall. "Even God,
they only desire Him insofar as He's mortal: they kill Him often to
prove that the themselves" (33). They also kill him to prove, like
Absalom did in his rebellion against his father David, that if God will
not bring justice to the world, then man will have either his own justice
or chaos. In The Rebel, Camus observes, "Only a personal god can be
asked by the rebel for a personal accounting. When the personal god
begins his reign, rebellion assumes its most resolutely ferocious aspect
and pronounces a definitive no. With Cain, the first act of rebellion
coincides with the first crime" (31-32). The first crime is murder-
murder of one's brother, one's God, and oneself. "Cain killed Cain in
Abel," Wiesel notes in Messengers of God (61). As Wiesel also shows,
Cain killed more: "Like God, he thought to offer himself a human
sacrifice in holocaust. He wanted to be cruel like Him, a stranger like
Him, an avenger like Him. And like Him, present and absent at the
same time, absent by his presence, present in his absence. Cain killed
to become God. To kill God" (Messengers 58). Just as the death of the
father comes by murder, so arises the death of God.
The position of the novelist here assumes a terrifying aspect. In a
life-and-death struggle the novelist is faced with becoming either Cain
or Abel, one who would make the death of the father into either a
murder of God or a surrender to God. In the process of writing the
novel he makes a choice, and from the valley of this decision the
characters emerge. Indeed, through the characters we discover the
author's dangerous options. In Twilight Wiesel's main character,
Raphael, encounters Cain, who takes Raphael for his brother. "When I
killed my brother," Cain tells him, "it was really Him I wanted to kill.
And he knows it. Any fool knows that whoever kills, kills God" (58).
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What Cain here utters in a moment of confession a father elsewhere
declares in a movement of faith, just before he and his son are about to
be shot in Wiesel's A Beggar in Jerusalem: "Whoever kills, becomes God.
Whoever kills, kills God. Each murder is a suicide, with the Eternal
eternally the victim" (208). Wiesel adds, "And the survivor in all this?
He will end· up writing his request, which he will slip between the
cracks of the Wall" (208). Thus the novelist writes a novel, a word
slipped between the cracks in the wall of silence, an affirmation of life
inserted into the wall of death, a cry of Our Father implanted in the wall
of the fallen father. In the words of Andre Neher, "It is from within
the void, from the depths of absence, from the heart of 'no' that there
arises a 'yes.' Faith is a genesis; it appears ex nihilo" (207).
Commenting on his writing, Wiesel has said, "Each word corre-
sponds to a face, a prayer, the one needing the other so as not to sink
into oblivion" (Legends 25). In the process of its creation the novel
happens at Peniel, where the wrestler encounters the face. Levinas
says, "The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of
violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill" (Ethics 86).
Wrestling in the wilderness, the novelist is confronted with these
options upon the death of the father, the one whose murder amounts to
a murder of God, and one who is entrusted with teaching his son
"Thou shalt not kill." Levinas goes on to show that "the important
question of the meaning of being is not: why is there something rather
than· nothing-the Leibnizian question so much commented upon by
Heidegger-but: do I not kill by being? (Ethics 120). The death of the
father leads the Holocaust novelist to this question, the question ex-
plored through the character and put to the reader. "I believe that I can
be a writer," Amost Lustig once said, "only because I have never
killed" (unpublished interview with Harry James Cargus). Knowing
how the question is all too often answered, we can understand what
lies behind Menahem's remark on behalf of God the Father in Wiesel's
The Town beyond the Wall: "All He asks is to weep with us. Within us. For
that our tears must remain pure and whole. Their source is the source
of life" (177). The patient who believes he is God in Wiesel's Twilight
asks Raphael to weep for him, reminding Raphael of his teacher's
remark on Ecclesiastes: "According to him, this desperate book refers
not to man but to the King of the Universe. 'For all my days are but
sorrow!' That is not man howling, but God" (213). The tears that are
the source of life are the source of the Holocaust novel. From between
the lines of the novelist's outcry over the death of the father we hear the
howl of God. Going deeper, we find that it is not for himself that the
dead Father weeps. He weeps for his child.
4
The Death of the Child
"I want to see with my own eyes the lamb lie down with the lion," says
Ivan to his brother Alyosha, "and the victim rise up and embrace his
murderer. I want to be there when everyone suddenly understands
what it has all been about. All the religions of the world are built on this
longing, and I am a believer. But then there are the children, and what
am I to do about them?" (Dostoyevsky 225). That is the question with
which we now collide in our movement toward the visceral recesses of
the event we term the Holocaust novel. In A Jew Today Elie Wiesel
points out that "the Nazis exterminated the weak and the children but
let the strong live. It is as though the Nazi killers knew precisely what
children represent to us. According to our tradition, the entire world
subsists thanks to them" (178-79). At the heart of the question of the
children lies the darkness from which the light of the Creation was
summoned. This is the darkness from which the Holocaust novel is
created. Yet in the midst of the darkness shine points of light that make
possible this impossible creation. That light is the fire hidden in the
ashes; it consists of the souls of the children turned to ashes. The words
arranged on the pages of the novel are made of these ashes, but their
meaning is made of that fire.
Wiesel says, "The Jewish children: they haunt my writings. I see
them again, I shall see them always. Huddled up. Humiliated. Bent
over like old men who were surrounded for their protection, but in
vain. They are thirsty, the children-and there is no one to give them a
drink. They are hungry, the children-and there is no one to offer
them a piece of bread. They are afraid-and there is no one to comfort
them" (Paroles 10). Finally, they are dead, and there is no one to say
Kaddish for them, except perhaps the one who, in a shriek of silence
made of the children's silence, writes a novel in the saying of one long
Kaddish. The Holocaust novel is as much a children's memorial as the
Children's Memorial at Yad Vashem. The passage through the novel
bears similarities to the passage through that memorial. A dark enclo-
sure made of white Judean stone, it is reminiscent of a tomb. Crossing
the threshold, one crosses over into a realm beyond this world, into
their world. In the darkness burn candles multiplied into a million and
a half points of light by mirrors covering the floor, walls, ceiling.
Standing in the midst of those tiny beacons, the visitor hears the names
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read off, one by one, slowly and solemnly, like prayers. Forevermore
they haunt you. The witness emerges transformed into a tomb.
"They did not even have a cemetery," Wiesel said. "We are their
cemeteries" (Against Silence 1:168). Out of the sepulchre of the self the
Holocaust novelist calls forth his offspring. If the child is the mainstay
of creation, however, then the phenomenological origins of the Holo-
caust novel are rooted in the collapse of the child at the origin. An
assessment of the death of the child with respect to the creation of the
novel must therefore begin at the source of the child. Let us first
consider the relation of the child to the one who bears the child: the
mother. The separation and reunion of mother and child express the
novelist's concern with the loss and recovery of life, with the fragmen-
tation and redemption of the soul. In this relation we discover the
critical importance of the feminine element in the phenomenology of
the novel.
The Mother and Child Disunion
Mikhail Bakhtin notes that a child receives the initial sense of self from
the lips of loves ones, chief among whom is the mother. "From their
mouths," writes Bakhtin, "the child hears their love in emotional,
loving tones and begins to recognize his name. . . . The first and most
authoritative words.... through which he acknowledges and dis-
covers himself as a something are essentially the words of a loving
human being" (Estetika 46). This existential condition underlies Jean
Amery's insistence that "everyone must be who he was in the first
years of his life, even if later these were buried under. No one can
become what he cannot find in his memories" (84). The figure of the
child thus makes the project of redemption a movement of return. If
only for a moment, the word returns from exile to be rejoined with its
meaning upon the loving utterance of the name of the child.
Just as love joins mother to child, so it joins soul to word and word
to meaning. Rebbe Levi Yitzhak of Berditchev once observed that all
the sages and scholars of the world can never understand the babbling
of a babe in its cradle. When the mother comes to the child, however,
she immediately knows what the sounds mean (see Buber, Tales 215).
Examining this relation of mother to child, we realize that the word
takes on meaning as it is infused with the soul and substance of the one
who speaks, "populated with his own intention," as Bakhtin puts it
(Dialogic 293). In its primal origin the substance of the soul is love, and
love is the substance of meaning. In her love for the child the mother
becomes all that a mother means. As a mother, she signifies the child, so
that in the relation between mother and child we have most fundamen-
tal instance of "the other in the same" (Levinas, Otherwise 25). Through
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this relation we see what Levinas means when he says, "The other is in
me in the midst of my very identification" (Otherwise 125). Thus the
child is in the mother, so that in her address to the child the mother
recognizes herself.
Hence the one-for-the-other of signification becomes the other-in-
the-one of subjectivity. Herman states this idea quite simply in I.B.
Singer's Enemies: A Love Story: "The bearer of children remains a child
herself" (135). Since the author's concern with life is generally ex-
pressed through a relation to the child, the novel frequently includes a
relation to the origin of life, to the mother. Ilona Karmel articulates such
a relation in An Estate of Memory through the tie that links two charac-
ters, Barbara to the mother, Aurelia: "For this Aurelia, Barbara felt
ready to do everything. The idea of sacrifice took possession of her;
never imagined clearly yet ever present, it lent her days the sense of
ascent toward a towering peak. Upon this peak a transformation would
occur. She, her whole being, would be suspended, someone else
would take her place for that instant, and at once she would be brought
back to kneel at Aurelia's side, to whisper, 'I for you-everything'"
(206). Barbara's connection with Aurelia reveals something very im-
portant about the author's relation to her character. The character born
of the author enters her (the other-in-the-one), so that she can be born,
transformed, out of the character. "I for you-everything" means that
everything I am lies in my being for you. The Holocaust novelist is not
only a witness for life but a witness who comes to life through the
witness she bears, as she would bear a child. Because the novelist
struggles to be reborn to life, she stands in a relation to the mother.
The interidentification suggested in Singer's novel thus reveals a
process of intercreation between author and character in the writing of
the novel. These interactions may tum up in an overlaying of mother
and child in the novel. In Aharon Appelfeld's Tzili: The Story ofa Life the
fifteen-year-old title character bears a child and is herself referred to as
a child (165). The one thing that defines her as a child is her connection
with her mother: "Every now and then her mother would call, 'Tzili,'
and Tzili would reply, 'Here I am.' Of her entire childhood, only this
was left" (158). This refers to both the summons and the response, both
the name and the reply to the name. What remains of childhood is
what remains of the self as a something, called forth upon the mothers
loving utterance of the name of the child. Tzili, of course, has long since
lost her mother, yet the call of the mother arises out of the distance that
separates them. "We say, 'far away,'" Buber notes in I and Thou. "The
Zulu has a sentenced-word instead that means: 'where one cries,
"mother, I am lost"'" (69-70). This distance that isolates the child from
the mother is a wound that cuts through the self. In her summons the
mother recognizes the pain of the wound. "You're suffering," Ilana
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says to Elisha in Wiesel's Dawn, like a mother addressing a child.
"That's what it means when a man speaks of his mother" (62). Thus the
novelist speaks of the mother in various ways to voice the detachment
of the self from life.
Because the mother is female, the child defined by a linkage to the
mother is often female. Yet the identifying relation also works the other
way, so that the death of the child signifies the death of the mother, that
is, the death of the source of life. This underlies the prominence of the
female child in the works of lIse Aichinger, Yehuda Amichai, Aharon
Appelfeld, Rachmil Bryks, Yoram Kaniuk, Ilona Karmel, Ka-tzetnik
135633, Arnost Lustig, Piotr Rawicz-nearly every Holocaust novelist.
It is the terrible death that Wiesel describes in A Jew Today:
She was six years old, a pale, shy and nervous child. Did she know what
was happening around her? How much did she understand of the events? She
saw the killers kill, she saw them kill-how did she translate these visions in
her child's mind?
One morning she asked her mother to hug her. Then she came to place a
kiss on her father's "forehead. And she said, "I think that I shall die today." And
after a sigh, a long sigh: "I think I am glad."
Thus my friend Shimshon learned that his little girl knew more about life
and the meaning of life than many old people. [128]
Shimshon learned from his little girl that the death of the child is the
death of every origin of life, that the lamb cannot dwell with the wolf
nor the kid lie down with the leopard without being devoured, and
that there is no child to lead them. liThe child sang about the dark
forests where the wolf dwelt," writes Appelfeld in Badenheim 1939 (62).
The poet sings about the child.
The novelist who wrestles with the collapse of meaning struggles
with the miscarriage of life at its source. The creator faces the impossi-
ble task of regenerating life and meaning from their source. The child
embodies the meaning, the mother contains the life, and both merge in
the female child. Within the novel, therefore, a character's relation to
the female child parallels the author's relation to the lost origins of life,
not only in its meaning but also in its mystery. Consider, for example,
the title character from Singer's Shosha in her relation to Arele. After
knowing Shosha as a child, Arele encounters her years later, when he is
a man. But "Shosha had neither grown nor aged," he relates. "I gaped
at the mystery" (76). Arele later marries this eternal child, and when
the matter of having children arises, he says to her, "I don't want
children. You are my child" (216). Arele marries Shosha not so that she
may become a mother but so that he may preserve her as a child and
thus harbor the mystery. In this way she becomes the source of his life;
the fountainhead of all significance in his life. For there is no meaning
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without mystery. Once the two marry, Shosha is not only the bearer of
Arele's name but also the mystery who gives meaning to his name.
Indeed, Singer recounts the tale of Arele's life in a book that bears the
name of the female child. Shosha is the link to Arele's childhood that
calls forth the child and therefore the life within him. "At the end of the
name," Edmond}abes has written, "there is the female name. One and
the same name" (Yuke1133). For the man is nurtured by the child he
nurtures, and that child, more often than not, is female.
In Lustig's Dita Saxova, the title character says, "The best thing I got
out of the war was when I was in Theresienstadt taking care of the
children" (128). Dita provides another example of the confluence of
mother and child. Hardly more than a child herself, she manages to
live in Theresienstadt by acting as a mother, preserving what is most
precious and most fragile in life, just as the author struggles to preserve
what is most dear through his female child. But his character fares no
better than the children of Theresienstadt, who, like Shimshon's little
girl, grew old before their time. Dita grows up only to die; the child
within her, the motherly child that cared for the dying children, dies
with those children. Although the circumstances vary, the death is the
same for another of Lustig's title characters. Katerina Horovitzova was
"a child and a woman both. Now the thing was, which of these aspects
do you want to suppress and which bring to the fore?" (Prayer 12-13).
The question is a matter of life and death, both for the child and for the
woman. Or rather, it is a question of death. In the universe of the
Holocaust novel the death of the child constitutes the death of the adult;
death is the death of the child. Undertaking the creation of the novel,
the author labors to give birth to what cannot live in a world where six-
year-old children declare, UI think I shall die today. I think I am glad."
The impossibility of post-Holocaust literature cited by writers like T.W.
Adorno (125-27) and Elie Wiesel (Dimensions 7) does not lie in the
undoing of forms or conventions. It lies in the death of the child,
particularly as it is articulated in the death of the female child. The
mother and child disunion brings about the novel's disintegration.
The female child's connection with the source and mystery of life is
not only a tie to a past origin but also a link to any possible future; in the
words of Buber, the child is "primal potential might" (Between 83). The
death of the child is the death of the future; the Holocaust novel's
interaction with the past is not just a commentary on what was but also
a response to what is yet to be. This stance on the part of the novelist
comes out in Lustig's Night and Hope, a book that began as a novel but
disintegrated into tales. In a story titled "Rose Street," for example, the
face of a little girl named Ruth becomes the face of a lost past and an
annulled future for the old woman Elizabeth Feiner: "The girl's face
with its inquisitive black eyes, such as she once used to have herself,
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seemed to her to represent a future reproach, because something that
not even Elizabeth Feiner was able to give a name to was marking the
child's face with the sorrowful expression that Jewish children so
frequently have" (79-80). Looking at the Czech edition, we see that the
child's face is not only "marked," it is vpisuje, "inscribed"; its expres-
sion is not only "sorrowful," but bolestny, "painful" or "agonizing"
(54). The pain that marks the face of the child is the pain of death, and
the inscription written into that face becomes the Holocaust novel. The
epitaph on the past becomes the text of the future. "Face and discourse
are tied," Levinas has argued. "The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this
that it renders possible and begins all discourse" (Ethics 87-88). In the
Holocaust novel discourse begins with the face of the child.
As the vessel of mystery, the female child is the vessel of the
eternal, a light that bums from beyond death to both illuminate and
darken the pages of the Holocaust novel. Such a child shapes the
present and the future for Joel in Amichai's Not of This Time, Not of This
Place. "When Ruth was burned," Joel explains, "revenge was burned,
too, and the country remained empty of mercy and of vengeance and
of man. Her face is the eternal light for my actions and, like all eternal
lights, her face is exerting a calming effect on me and fills me with
melody and happiness and sadness, instead of driving me to acts of
vengeance" (112-13). The death of the child precludes vengeance, be-
cause even in death the child signifies life. The task of the novelist is not
to seek revenge but to seek light, to ignite a flame of remembrance and
observance. To be sure, the Hebrew word here rendered as "light" is
not or but ner (182), which also means "candle." It calls to mind the
Sabbath candles lit to welcome the Sabbath Bride, that feminine fonn
who brings the eternal into time. It also calls to mind the lighting of a
candle in a tale told by Elie Wiesel in The Six Days of Destruction:
Suddenly, Old Itzikl remembered something important. He opened the bag
where he kept his tallit and tephilin, rummaged around in the bottom and
brought out a candle. He tried to light it but did not succeed. He renewed his
efforts, concentrating so hard he looked like a madman. Did he see his first
child fall into the pit? His second? The last one? I do not know what he saw. I
only know what he did: he finally succeeded in lighting his precious candle.
And he lifted it high above his head. At that precise moment the life of his last
child was extinguished. [25]
The Holocaust novelist writes to ignite such a candle, to remember and
observe, remember and preserve.
Just as the candle goes out, however, so the word is extinguished,
its meaning set adrift on a sea of words. The death of the child pre-
cludes all possiblity for the "success" of the Holocaust novel. The
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novelist knows that the flame bums in the process of the writing and
not in its outcome. The writer writes just as the man runs in Wiesel's
Ani Maamin, bearing a child in his arms:
I run
As far as my legs will carry me,
Like the wind,
Farther than the wind.
I run,
And while I run,
I am thinking:
This is insane,
This Jewish child
Will not be spared.
I run and run
And cry.
And while I am crying,
While I am running,
I perceive a whisper:
I believe,
Says the little girl,
Weakly,
I believe in you.
[89, 91]
In the place of the Muse is the dying voice of the female child.
The Holocaust novelist, however, cannot be faithful to the silenced
voice. The one who endeavors to generate a response to the dead child
inevitably ends by betraying the child, just as words invariably betray
silence. Again, in the death of the child-particularly the feminine
child-life is extinguished at its source, both for the past and for the
future. Yet to insert that child into the novel amounts to a rejection of
the death that must never be denied or forgotten. Quite often, then, the
child is present in the Holocaust novel by absence from it. In Adam
Resurrected by Yoram Kaniuk, Adam declares, "Ruth. That was my
daughter's name. She is the one I am looking for here, don't you know?
She is the one I betrayed" (23). The Hebrew verb here translated as
"looking for" is l'hapes (25), which may also mean "examine," as if the
thing absent were somehow present; if the Holocaust novelist works
through faith, it is not the faith that one day something will come but
that one day it was there. If anything is found, it is found again, as we
see it Piotr Rawicz's novel Blood from the Sky: "What of Naomi, the child
who was entrusted to me? Shall I find her again here on earth? Where
am I to look for her and where am I to take her?" (312). In this passage
confiee is the French word for "entrusted" (276), from confieT, the verb
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used for "commit" to memory and "plant" a seed. In this single word
we see that the child is the most precious of all things entrusted to us,
the vessel of life conferred upon us. In the novelist's act of remember-
ing and preserving, the child is the one committed to memory. In the
effort to regain life from the mother, from the earth, the child is the
seed from which that life must spring.
Underlying the Holocaust novel is the severance of the child from
the earth and therefore from the mother. The existential expression of
this separation is a severance of life from the soul. From Dante's
Beatrice to Goethe's Margaret the importance of the feminine aspect to
the life of the soul in a literary motif; so we see the intersection of
mother and child in the Holocaust novel. But neither Dante nor Goethe
could fathom the darkness or the depths of the Kingdom of Night.
Although these poets were versed in the spiritual agonies of the male's
isolation from the female, they had no concept of the extreme version of
this isolation, extreme to the point of perversion. At this extremity and
proceeding beyond all extremity is the mother and child disunion. Far
exceeding these poets' field of vision is the existential reality of the
Holocaust novel. There is perhaps no expression of that reality more
terrible than the last of Ka-tzetnik's visions in Shivitti: "My mother. I see
her naked and marching in line, one among Them, her face pointed
towards the gas chambers. 'Mama! ... Mama! ... Mama! ... I behold
my mothers skull in my mother's skull I see me. And I chase after me
inside my mother's skull. And my mother is naked. Going to be
gassed" (100-101). Hence the death of the child is expressed out of the
mouth of the child himself, the death of the soul and self of the child in
the absolute disunion of mother and child. From inside the skull of his
mother, crying, "Mama, Mama," he writes his novel. This is the most
fundamental phenomenon in the phenomenology of the Holocaust
novel.
In Wiesel's The Fifth Son, a novel about the child of a survivor, the
mother's isolation from the child is compared with the Shekhina's exile
from the world. "Your mother is in exile," the boy is told. "Just like the
Shekhina who is also in exile" (32). In this case the mother has been
removed to an insane asylum, unable to live in a world gone insane. If
the world has no place for the mother, no place for the Shekhina, then it
has no place for the child. And so he cries out, "I look at a trembling
child and I am that child.... I feel the need to hide, to huddle over
there in the comer of my room, in the bend of the planet. . .. I am
shrinking more and more until I am small, smaller, reviving the child in
me, even dying in his stead in the void, in the black and scorching
nothingness" (136-37). Yet the child who is revived is the child as
victim, dying for the child. In the mother and child disunion every-
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thing from which the soul draws its life is lost. The death of the child,
therefore, is the death of the soul.
The Child as Victim
Whether appearing among the survivors or among the murdered, the
child as victim appears initially as a messenger, as one who summons
the living from the heart of darkness, as one who summons the author
to the task of writing. The main character in A. Anatoli's Babi Ya~ for
instance, is a child who identifies himself as a messenger for those who
died at Babi Yar (147). It is not simply the status as messenger, however,
that casts the child in the role of victim; it is the child's fate as the
unheeded messenger, as the one whose outcry falls on deaf ears and
who is therefore betrayed by those who have ears to hear. Anna
Langfus demonstrates this point most unnervingly in The Whole Land
Brimstone, where we see a "good" Christian woman who abandons
and thus betrays a Jewish child. "I stopped my ears so as not to hear
him," she says. "He was calling from where I had left him. He hadn't
moved, for I had told him to stand still and wait for me. He was just
calling out and crying" (37). Renouncing any complacency that might
lead to the conviction that "They" are the ones who victimize the child,
Langfus casts her first-person narrator (a figure of herself) in a similar
role. Near the end of the novel she encounters a little girl in the streets
of her Polish hometown. The child is crying, "Mama, mama, mama,"
and yet, "For some reason I started running so as not to hear her
anymore" (305). In addition to a reiteration of the mother and child
disunion, we note in this persona of the author the terrifying stance of
the author with respect to the death of the child. Pursuing her project,
the author takes on a responsibility to the point of confession in regard
to the child as victim. The death of the child makes the phenomenology
of the Holocaust novel a phenomenology of confession.
This phenomenological condition may help to explain a dialogic
exchange that appears in Wiesel's One Generation After. "Don't worry,"
one voice declares. "I won't be the one to break your mirror: the child
will. And you are powerless against him. Eyes have no hold over him.
And he's not trembling. He is dead. You permitted him to escape your
grasp." A second voice replies, "It's incredible: you refuse to under-
stand. I wasn't the one who killed him. It was you" (124). A man may be
abandoned to a position of having lost himself as a child, like Bruno in
Appelfeld's The Age of Wonders, who laments, "Everything I had once
known, my childhood too, was over" (100), but as soon as the man
assumes the role of author, he assumes a role of response and therefore
of responsibility. Levinas writes:
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It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the Other and me is not
reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; and I am "subject" essentially in
this sense. It is I who support all. You know the sentence in Dostoyevsky: "We
are all guilty ofall and for all men before all, and I more than the others." This is not
owing to such or such a guilt which is really mine, or to offenses that I would
have committed; but because I am responsible for a total responsibility, which
answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility.
The I always has one responsibility more than all the others [Ethics 98-99]
Because the child is the victim, the author stands in a nonreciprocal
relation to the child. Because the author would posit a world, the
author is responsible for a total responsibility. Only through this ac-
countability can one hope to regain some shred of the soul that is lost
upon the death of the child. Michael, the main character in Wiesel's The
Town beyond the Wall, reveals what transpires in the author as the novel
comes into being. Early on, for example, Michael accuses God the
Creator (and thus implicates the author as creator), saying, "He took
my childhood; I have a right to ask Him what He did with it" (59). Yet
Michael is himself pursued by a child named Yankel, one on whom he
turns his back: "Michael had stood for too long at the window. When
he finally turned, Yankel was no longer in the room" (83). In the
nonreciprocity of this relation, Michael's responsibility announces it-
self upon the death of the child Yankel. At first he encounters this death
as the death of a totality, as the death of a world. "Why does the earth
gape at such moments?" he asks. "Why do we plunge toward the
void?" (94). Further, he feels that "a child who dies becomes the center
of the universe: stars and meadows die with him" (99). "The earth had
titled on its axis, and the sun had ceased to govern it" (100). The
emptiness into which Michael plunges is the void of the dead self.
Faced with the loss of the self, Michael confronts his responsibility; it
comes to him through the mouth of his absent auditor Pedro, who
reveals to him that the death of the child is more than an injustice, more
than a moral problem: "It is a question mark" (102). The question
distinguishes the author's existential condition with respect to the
child. Buber states it eloquently: "Out of the distance, out of its disap-
pearance, comes a second cry, as soft and secret as though it came from
myself: IWhere were you?' That is the cry of conscience. It is not my
existence which calls to me, but the being which is not I" (Between 166).
That being is the child as victim.
Placed in a position of responsibility, the character, like the author,
is faced with a project of return, one by which he would account for the
death of the child by assuming the place of the child. At this point
Pedro asks Michael whether he wanted Yankel to die. When Michael
refuses to answer, Pedro puts another question to him: "Is that why
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you wanted to go backwards in time? To become a child-and die?"
(103). Again Michael does not answer. In his silence there is more
confession than affirmation, and through his silence pours the silence
of his author, who works with a picture of his childhood home over his
typewriter. "That's where the town of my childhood seems to be now,"
we read in Wiesel's Against Silence. "Not here, but up there, in a
Jerusalem of fire, hanging onto eternal memories of night" (3:1). This is
the place to which he must return via his character, the place he can
never reach except through his character. Near the end of The Testament,
Wiesel's novel about the poet Paltiel Kossover, we see the culmination
of this movement of return. "Returned to my cell," Paltiel writes, "I
collapse. Finally alone, I become the child I never was, the orphan I
shall cease to be" (335). In this way the child as victim established
himself within the author to the extent that the author answers for the
victimization of the child. If the death of the child brings with it the
death of the man, then the man's hope for resurrection lies in his
attempt to become a child-and die. For both author and character the
novel is both womb and tomb, and in it lies the murdered child.
The contrasting images of tomb and womb come out in the title of
Lustig's Night and Hope, a book that begins, significantly, with a piece
titled "The Return." Dealing with Hynek Tausig's return to his Jewish
self, the theme of his first story is amplified in the second tale, "Rose
Street," in which Elizabeth Feiner is returned to herself as child upon
being beaten by a Nazi. Somewhat similar to Paltiel, she awakens from
her beating to behold, as a victimized child, the image of her father (99).
Lustig further reveals the power of death's proximity to transform a
person into a child in his piece "The Old Ones and Death" in Diamonds
of the Night. Once again, it is the aged female figure, the wife of Aaron
Shapiro, who becomes the female child victim. As Aaron is about to go
outside, his wife says she will wait for him, and her voice sounded
as if it were coming from another world, or as if that were where it was going. It
sounded dry and crushed and betrayed. As though she saw something or as if
she were afraid of something she couldn't put into words. As though it had to
do with something for which there were no words, something that was still a
part of life, but a step beyond it. Something she probably couldn't talk about to
anybody else. It sounded as if she were still here, but it wasn't she anymore.
Like the voice of an aged, frightened child. [79-80]
This passage reveals the eclipse of the Muse by another voice, the voice
of the child as victim; it is the voice of death that makes the victim a
child.
If that voice should deign to address the author, then it offers no
revelation but, again, poses a question. For Ka-tzetnik, the question
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comes not from the mouth but from the eyes, as we see in Sunrise over
Hell: "Nude Musselmen stare with eyes of children at the blocks, at the
Heavens, their eyes a question; questioning yet staring, as they get
their skeletons up on all fours into the vans. Spent, feeble, they creep
in. And their eyes, the eyes of children still hold a question" (175). The
Hebrew phrase translated as "their eyes hold a question" is aynyhem
shoelot davar, that is, "their eyes ask a question" (152), where "question"
is part of the verb, nQt the noun. This verb indicates the action by which
these living dead are transformed into children and, as children, they
are victimized. Looking up, they beseech the heavens in a reversal of
the question that comes from above: Where are You? In this question is
couched the prayer that Ka-tzetnik utters near the end of Shivitti:
"God / Give me this day the silent word, like the one / Their eyes gave
on their way to / The crematorium" (108). This prayer is the looking up
that the author performs while looking down at the blank page and into
himself in the effort to go where he can never follow.
Yet he attempts to proceed: Ka-tzetnik follows the fate of Moni, the
child hero of his novel Atrocity. In a moment that announces his
inevitable end, Moni sees traces of his own childlike face in the faces of
the dying: "They are asleep. More than one will never wake again.
Here and there, in such final moments of sleep, a smile will sometimes
flutter on a face, like the smile of a baby asleep. They pass from this
world illuminated with the pure, immaculate reflex of the first smile"
(85). In the end, Moni himself dies, a babe returned to his mother: "The
earth gathered him in like a mother cradling her little one to sleep.
Hush ..." (286). But this "hush"-the novel's last word, which in
Hebrew is not a word but shshshsh (224)-is more terrifying than
comforting. It is the sound of the shriek of silence, punctuated by
ellipses, thus refusing closure, like a wound. In this image of the child
as victim we find once more the juncture of womb and tomb, the union
from which the novel and its author are born. Whether the victim is a
child or an adult transfonned into a child, the author beholds in the
victim his own wounded soul. It is torn from him, as we see it tom from
Harry Preleshnik in Ka-tzetnik's House of Dolls. Upon seeing his sister
Daniella (another female child) turned into a "field whore," Harry
swoons and falls to the floor inside a camp infirmary. "Beside him on
the floor," the author relates, "lies his life like an infant of his.
Any moment now the black boot will crush it, and it won't show any
more from under the boot sole. Any second now. The infant lies beside
him ..." (215). Again we find the ellipses, again the open wound.
In the eyes that look to heaven, in the hush of the earth, in the life
on the floor, we discover that when the child is the victim something
more, something higher, is victimzed. Ka-tzetnik's hints are subtle, but
if we allow ourselves a moment of midrash, we find those hints of
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something more. The hush consists of the letter shin, the letter on the
doorposts signifying Shadai, which is one of the names of God. The life
that lies on the floor next to Harry is hayey (223), a word that contains
the double yud, another name of God. Who is the victim when the child
is the victim? Elie Wiesel offers one response in Ani Maamin: "And with
each hour, the most blessed and most stricken people of the world
number twelve times twelve children less. And each one carries away
still another fragment of the Temple in flames. Flames-never before
have there been such flames. And in everyone of them it is the vision of
the Redeemer that is dying" (27, 29). He goes on to cry out, "These
children / Have taken your countenance, / 0 God" (57). Levinas
writes that "the face speaks" (Ethics 87), and this is the face that the
author labors to bespeak in his engagement with the child as victim. It
is the face that reveals to him, as it revealed to Wiesel, that "the death of
a man is only the death of a man, but the death of a child is the death of
innocence, the death of God in the heart of man. And who does not
drink deep of this truth, who does not shout it from the rooftops, is a
man devoid of heart, of God, he has not seen the misty eyes of a child
expiring without a whimper, who dies before his parents and thus
shows them the way" (Beggar 99). So the novelist does not write: he
drinks and shouts and peers through misty eyes to show us the way.
The French text of this last quotation contains an additional phrase:
the child dies not only to show them the way but also ouvrir Ia voie qui Ies
attend, "to open up the path that awaits them" (91). These words,
indeed, cast a shadow, yet they reveal a truth in a statement Wiesel
makes in Messengers ofGod: "God does not wait for man at the end of the
road, the termination of exile; He accompanies him there. More than
that: He is the road, He is the exile" (132). If the way out of exile leads to
Jerusalem, then in the post-Holocaust era it begins in Auschwitz and
passes through the death of the child. The dead child who shows us the
road is the dead God who is the road and therefore the exile. The sign
of the exile is the death of the child, ever so innocent, ever so fragile.
One sees why "in Lublin, Hasidim were urged to live not only in fear of
God but also in fear for God" (Wiesel, Somewhere 134). One sees why, in
the words of Nikos Kazantzakis, "God is not Almighty. He struggles,
for he is in peril every moment; he trembles and stumbles in every
living thing, and he cries out" (204). Though the child dies without a
whimper, the author must make him cry out through his own outcry
and thus make heard a cry from on high. As Wiesel expresses it in
Against Silence, "The thirteenth-century Hebrew poet Eleazar Rokeah
says: 'Some people complain that God is silent; they are wrong-God
is not silent; God is Silence.' It is to this silence that I would like to direct
my words" (2:60). It is the silence of the dead child that makes the
silence that is God so deafening.
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Bakhtin has noted that in the novel, "the motif of death undergoes a
profound transformation in the temporally sealed-off sequence of an
individual life. Here this motif takes on the meaning ofan ultimate end.
And the more sealed-off the individual life-sequence becomes, the
more it is severed from the life of the social whole, the loftier and more
ultimate becomes its significance" (Dialogic 216). Through the portrayal
of the death of the child in the Holocaust novel we see the extremes of
this transformation. Indeed, we collide with those extremes in a scene
from Wiesel's first novel, one of the most dreadful in all literature:
One day when we came back from work, we saw three gallows rearing up
in the assembly place.... Roll call. 55 all around us, machine guns trained: the
traditional ceremony. Three victims in chains-and one of them, the little ser-
vant, the say-eyed angel.
The 55 seemed more preoccupied, more disturbed than usual. To hang a
young boy in front of thousands of spectators was no light matter. . . . All eyes
were on the child. He was lividly pale, almost calm, biting his lips. The gallows
threw its shadow over him. . . .
"Where is God? Where is He?" someone behind me asked.
At a sign from the head of the camp, the three chairs tipped over. . . .
The third rope was still moving; being so light, the child was still alive.
For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and
death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. . . .
Behind me, I heard the same man asking: "Where is God now?"
And I heard a voice within me answer him: "Where is He? Here He is-He
is hanging here on these gallows." [Night 70-71]
The persona who speaks here is the child Eliezer, who sees his soul die
with the one on the gallows. If what Barbara says in Karmel's An Estate
of Memory is true-"All of you have forgotten what a child is" (136)-
then we have this passage from Wiesel to remind us. In the words of
Issahar's wife, the woman in Wiesel's A Jew Today who sees dead
children everywhere, "they are God's memory" (81). If the Holocaust
author is summoned to remember, then this is the memory he must
assume.
The Baal Shem Tov once said, "Oblivion is at the root of exile the
way memory is at the root of redemption" (see Wiesel, Souls 227). At the
root of memory is the word. Since the child dies in silence-dies of
silence-the death of the child is the death of the word. As Lustig's
character Elizabeth Feiner, the old woman who in death becomes a
child, lay dying, "she no longer had the strength to keep death at bay
by thoughts of the little girl; the only thing she knew was what from
now on she was not going to speak any more" (Night 99-100). The Czech
word translated as "not going to speak" is nepromluvi (66), and it
implies not only speaking but also addressing someone. The child who
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no longer addresses anyone is the one whose address the author must
answer through the utterance of the death of the child. This address,
this silence, is the hero of the novel, just as it is the hero ofMichael's tale
in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall: "The hero of my story is neither
fear nor hatred; it is silence. The silence of a five-year-old Jew" (119).
Such silence lends the Holocaust novel its biblical aspect, since, as
Andre Neher has pointed out, in the Bible silence "is not only an object
but most frequently a subject. . . . Silence is an actor and one of the
principal actors in the vast biblical drama" (17). Pascal once cried out
that the silence "of these infinite spaces" terrified him (95), yet the
silence of a little child eclipses that infinity and makes infinite that
terror. For it is the silence not of space but of a child who dies word-
lessly, without a whimper, and whose wordlessness must therefore be
transformed into the author's word. The death of the child confronts
the author with the impossible task of becoming a translator of silence.
This linguistic difficulty that emerges upon the death of the child is
poignantly expressed in Herod's Children by Use Aichinger. There the
loss of both the child and the word is portrayed in one instance by the
loss of a German child's English language notebook. "A child must
have lost it," we read. "Storm riffles its pages. When the first drop fell,
it fell on the red line. And the red line down the middle of the page
spilled over its banks. Appalled, the meaning flew out of the words to
both sides and called for a ferryman. Translate me, translate me!"
(71-72). The German text contains a play on the words "appalled,"
entsetzt, and "translate," ubersetz (70); entsetzt may also mean "re-
moved" or "displaced." The image of blood in this passage calls to
mind the blood of the child by which meaning is displaced. The
meaning cries out to be translated-literally "carried over"-just as the
child cries out to be saved. Even when the child speaks, as in Saul
Bellow's Mr. Sammler's Planet, the words are unheard; a little one about
to be shot on the streets of post-Holocaust New York begs his assailants
not to kill him, but they simply didn't understand his words. Literally
not the same "language" (172). The loss of the child is the loss of the
language of the child. Once more we find that the problem of language
that confronts the author arises upon the death of the child. What is
literally not the same language must become the same language,
translated through the author's literary endeavor.
The image of ubersetzen or carrying over of meaning juxtaposed
with the carrying over of the child once more calls to mind the figure
who bears the little girl in his arms in Wiesel's Ani Maamin: "I perceive a
whisper: ... I believe in you" (91). In this utterance of ani maamin the
child whom the man bears becomes the bearer of the man, for the
utterance of the lost word may redeem the man. Faced with the project
of transforming the silence of the child into the language of life, the
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author attempts to transform the tomb into a womb. "The sufferings of
the innocent," Neher writes, "bring innocence to the guilty" (196). In
the phenomenology of the Holocaust novel the victim is the savior.
The Child as Savior
The Maggid of Dubno tells the parable of a father who takes his little
boy on a long, treacherous journey to a wonderous city. Whenever
they came to a narrow crossing, a dangerous river, or a high mountain,
the father would lift his child onto his shoulders, carry him over, and
set him safely on the other side. Finally, one day they arrived at their
destination, the wonderous city, at dusk. The city, however, was sur-
rounded by a wall, and its gates were locked; the only openings in the
wall were very small windows. Realizing that he had only one possible
hope of gaining entrance to the city, the father had his little boy climb
through a window and open the gates for him from within. Since the
day when the Sanctuary was destroyed, said the Maggid, the gates of
prayer have been locked. Only through the child, who is lighter than
an eagle, can we be redeemed. "For the outcry of children," he said, "is
formed by the breath of mouths unblemished by sin, and is therefore
capable of piercing the windows of Heaven" (Kitov 1:75-76). It has
already been suggested that the Holocaust novel has the characteristics
of prayer; in the Maggid's parable we see who carries that prayer to
heaven. There is, of course, an important difference: in the Holocaust
novel the victimized child is the child as savior. "They will lie down so
that we need not lie down," Aichinger writes (74). Yet in their lying
down is a summons for us to rise up. Moshe, in Wiesel's The Oath, states
quite explicitly the messianic significance of the child: "The Messiah.
We seek him, we pursue him. We think he is in heaven; we don't know
that he likes to come down as a child. And yet, every man's childhood
is messianic in essence" (132). The novelist who seeks life through the
word seeks resurrection through the child, and an important point of
reference in this search is the child within the novelist. Whatever life he
may have within him is born through that child; whatever life he may
return to is voiced through that child. In the words of Paul Tillich, "the
event of salvation is the birth of a child" (Nw Being 95). Hence the
return to life is expressed in Primo Levi's novel If Not Now, When? for
instance, by the birth of a child to White Rivka and Isidor at the end of
the tale (346). Similarly, the yearning for life is expressed in Yehuda
Amichai's Not of This Time, Not of This Place by Joel's desire for the child
at the beginning of the novel: "I awoke with a sharp pain of longing
within me. I suddenly wanted to be a child again in Weinburg, where I
was born" (8). Looking at the Hebrew text, one recalls that the noun
"child" and the verb"to be born" have the same root: to be born into life
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is to be made into a child. The original text also states that the longing
hatakh oti mibifiym, that is, "wounded me from within" (15). Only
through such an internal wound may the child here be born. Indeed,
the victimized child is the wound from which the salvific word issues;
if the word is to be born from the author, the author must take on the
wounds of the child. Without being thus wounded, the author could
not create a novel.
In one novel after another we find that the child emerges to restore
life to the surrounding characters. Such a redemptive child is born in
the camp in Karmel's An Estate ofMemory (153). In Wiesel's The Testament
the child's function as a link to life is presented quite clearly: "Let us not
speak of Raissa, Citizen Magistrate," says Paltiel. "She is not the one
who binds me to life; it is my son Grisha" (147). More important, Wiesel
demonstrates in this novel the role of the victimized child as savior to
the fallen man. As a medic in the Russian army during the Second
World War, Paltiel addresses an injured soldier as if he were a child:
"He was beautiful and light as a child. I spoke to him as I always did,
repeating what I always said to my dead: Don't worry, my little one, we
are almost there" (307). Then, carrying the "little one" on his shoul-
ders-just as the author tries to carry meaning through his words and
his silence (recall Aichinger's ubersetzen)-Paltiel stumbles: "My guard-
ian angel on my shoulders, I moved forward, tripping. Then I was
lifted off the ground. Violent red pain. I opened my eyes: the impact
had thrown me into a trench. Tom to bits, he was nothing but a de-
capitated, legless corpse. He had saved my life: I was only wounded"
(307-8). Here the image of the trench suggests the grave from which the
man rises thanks to the child, the grave in which the limbs are tom
from the child like meaning tom from the world. Such is the phe-
nomenological space in which the author works.
To the extent that the child takes on the function of savior, the space
of threat must become the space of protection, like the "circle of
protection" traced around the child in the "Titanium" chapter of Levi's
The Periodic Table (165-68). Zachor v'shamor again comes to mind: in the
death of the child we encounter not only what must be remembered
but also what must be preserved. The life that must be protected and its
connection to what might be lost are succinctly stated in a remark
by Arele in LB. Singer's Shosha. Explaining why he refuses to leave
Shosha, Arele declares, "I can't kill a child. I can't break my promise
either" (254). In the event of the creation of the Holocaust novel these
two refusals amount to the same thing. The child's tie to life is a tie to
the word; the man protects the child by protecting the integrity of his
word. Struggling to remain faithful to his word, the novelist struggles
to translate the outcry "formed by mouths unblemished by sin" into
his own outcry. In this endeavor the child shows him the way, like
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Rosemarie in Appelfeld's To the Land of the Cattails; a child killed for
being Jewish, she "was very sensitive to words" (70). The point is made
more powerfully still in Ka-tzetnik's Phoenix over the Galilee. Modeled
after his author, Harry Preleshnik insists that "his life has been spared
to voice the strangled scream of these two children" (123)-Daniella
from House of Dolls and Moni from Atrocity. The Hebrew word hishmaat
in the original (120) suggests that Harry must "make heard" that
scream, not only "voice" it. Only in this way can he be spared; only by
drawing the relation with the dead child into a relation with the living
can he return to life.
In Phoenix over the Galilee the dialectic by which the victim becomes
a savior is more than an empty abstraction: "The paper consumed
becomes ashes. But words, where do they go? This was how they had
been burned at Auschwitz, those whose bodies had turned to ash,
whose lives had been unlived. Where did their souls go?" (170). In the
creation of the novel we find a clue to this question. The soul of the
murdered child invades the survivor and there struggles to be trans-
formed into word, as the child becomes savior. In this struggle the
intersubjectivity between author and character becomes the intrasub-
jectivity of both. In Ethics and Infinity Levinas observed: "Constituting
itself in the very movement wherein being responsible for the Other
devolves on it, subjectivity goes to the point of substitution for the
Other. It assumes the condition-or the uncondition-of hostage.
Subjectivity as such is initially hostage; it answers to the point of
expiating for others" (100). To answer to the point of expiation is to bear
witness. Hence the witness born by the child makes the man into a
vlitness. When, for example, the children go on a hunger strike in
Rachmil Bryks's Kiddush Hashem, the women who witness it are given
new strength: "Ovora Leah and the other adults were astonished at the
unity and perserverance displayed by the children" (81). Later, when
children condemned to die are taken away, it is the child Rivkale who
cries, "Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One!" (112). The
einikeit or oneness of the children in the Yiddish text (54) expresses the
oneness of God; summoned to hear, the witness is summoned to make
heard that cry of faith. The message that makes the survivor into an
author is not one of death alone but also one of life. The former belongs
to time, the latter to eternity.
"For what is eternity in the life of man," writes Amichai, "if not to
see for a second time one's childhood?" (339). What is eternity in
human life, if not the drawing of human relation into divine relation?
An image from Wiesel's The Testament strikingly depicts the function of
the child as savior. Paltiel dons his phylacteries for his little one, saying,
"The next day I put on the phylacteries again. This time I waited until
Grisha woke up. He pulled at the straps, and that filled me with great
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joy" (332). Visualizing the little hands clinging to the tefilin straps, one
might suppose that the child holds on to keep from falling. Yet it is the
child who extends the lifeline of joy to the father, underscoring the
messianic function of the child as the man's link to heaven. Elsewhere
in The Testament this function is subtly and briefly indicated when Paltiel
alludes to the sounds reverberating through the streets of Jerusalem,
saying, "A mother's strident cry: 'Ahmad, you are coming?' And a
child answers, 'Coming, coming'" (190). As always, Wiesel's selection
of a name, however casual it may seem, is calculated and laden with
significance: the name Ahmad-Ahmed in the French text (157)-
signifies the Paraclete. Thus, the one who answers, "Coming, com-
ing," to the strident cry is the Comforter, the messianic mediator
between man and God.
It is not by chance that the female child in these novels is so often
named Ruth, the name of the mother of the House of David, of the
messianic line; recall works by Lustig, Amichai, and Kaniuk. In Adam
Resurrected Kaniuk brings out very clearly the reflection of the author-
to-character relation in the character-to-character relation; in the events
that transpire between Adam and the child/dog we perceive what
occurs in the event of the novel's creation. Emphasizing the phe-
nomenology of the name, for instance, Adam says to the child/dog,
"The problem before us is the selection of a name. Without a name
there is no existence.... Therefore, child, it is a time-worn custom-
every creature has a name, and you are nameless" (214). Soon he
commands the child, "Write, the name will create you, the name will
establish everything. . . . Write a name!" (219). Kaniuk's Adam as-
sumes the naming function of the first Adam in an expression of the
task that confronts the author himself. In the Hebrew edition the word
translated as "existence" is kiyum (187), which also means "affirma-
tion": in its messianic function the name of the child not only estab-
lishes being but also affirms it, bears witness to it. When the child
finally writes a name, it is the name Jesus, but Adam rejects this
Messiah: "No. Adam told him that story! Adam spoke-or maybe it
was Herbert?-and the child cocked his ear and listened. Adam spoke
about that Messiah because it was important for him to talk about him.
He was achild of this land, flesh ofits flesh" (220). Ultimately the child takes
the name David (221). From his line the Messiah is born-or rather,
is yet to be born.
In his effort to save the child, of course, Adam struggles to save
himself; the death that threatens the child is the death that threatens the
self. Once again revealing his authorial position through the existential
condition of his character, Kaniuk writes, "A hunted animal is staring
at Adam. A dog. A child that is an animal. Something frightfully ugly,
yet beautifully ugly. And he, he knows neither what to give, nor what
96 THE SHRIEK OF SILENCE
to say, nor how to rescue. For he himself is seeking a savior" (150). Yet
the character discovers that salvation can be obtained only as it is
offered; hence he sets out to save the child. We discover, then, how the
victimized child becomes a savior: it is by offering the man something
to save. The author bears witness to the death of the child not only for
the sake of the child but also for the sake of his own soul; saving the
child, the self saves itself. So we hear Michael's prayer, for example, in
Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall: "God of my childhood, show me the
way that leads to myself" (136). For only the child can lead the self to the
God of the child and thus redeem the man. Only the child can make
salvation an issue for the man, because only the child can confront the
man with the movement of return. As Ralph Waldo Emerson once put
it, "infancy is the perpetual Messiah, which comes into the arms of
fallen men, and pleads with them to return" (220). Thus bearing the
child, the man bears his own soul.
This is the miracle wrought by the child as savior; given one so
precious to protect, the adult has a motive to become better. So it
happens for Tola in Karmel's An Estate ofMemory when Aurelia's child
is born: "Goodness seemed to her like a foreigh language, which once
practiced is not half so difficult as it was rumored to be" (155). The Pardo
in The Parnas by Silvano Arieti makes a similar point after relating a tale
about the death of a Jewish child. The Jews and Christians of the Ital-
ian community argued over the burial of the child; "But," says the
Pardo, "think again of the little child. Everybody loved him, everybody
wanted all of him, body and soul; everybody was willing to accept him,
everybody was eager to save him" (54). All knew that saving the child
was the one means to self-salvation. To the extent that the man re-
sponds to the child's summons, moreover, he is able to hear that
summons; that which is most dear is multiplied through its preserva-
tion. In Haim Gouri's The Chocolate Deal Rubi saves a little girl from a
burning building and in the end realizes, "Since I d.dn't let her die, the
cry of the other girls is heard" (129). In the words of Bakhtin, "I must
become for the other what God is for me" (Estetika 52). God is the one
who declares, "Before they call I will answer" (Isaiah 65:24). Only by
answering the call of the child is a person able to hear the call and thus
become a living soul.
The event of finding salvation for the self in the salvation of the
child occurs at the end of Ka-tzetnik's Phoenix over the Galilee, when
Harry retrieves the body of a little girl from the wreckage of an
automobile: "It was his own body now, he felt, being caried in the arms
of a rescuer" (268). But let us not forget the terrible reality of what is
before us; certainly Ka-tzetnik, a man who went thirty years without a
night's sleep, does not forget. The novelist strives to answer the call not
just of the child but of the fallen child. "The child has got to fall into the
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water," Aichinger writes, "if it's going to be saved" (32); and Aichinger
the novelist has to pursue the child into those depths if she is to save
herself. Yet this is impossible; the death of the child-even when the
child is posited as savior-forever returns the author to the existential
condition of a lost self. "Adam knows who the child is," we read in
Kaniuk's novel, "but he doesn't know who he himself is" (330). The
failure to know oneself amounts to a betrayal of the child. The horror of
this realization is expressed in Mr. Theodore Mundstock by Ladislav Fuks,
where the title character collides with his failure to respond to the child
Simon: "It was the immeasurable horror of his realization that for this
boy who put so much trust in him he had done nothing of use all his
life" (207). Thus Mr. Mundstock sees that he has squandered his life in
a vain effort to preserve it.
As always, the character's horror is the author's horror: however
much he may labor, however long he may wrestle with the word, he
cannot wrestle the child to life; hence he is constantly returned to the
zero point. From the beginning of Fuks's novel, we see that Mr. Mund-
stock is shadowed by the one he cannot save, by the shadow named
Mon (7). Mon is short for the child's name, Simon. This fragmentation
of the name signifies both the broken identity of the child and the
splitting of the self. As though looking into a mirror-which itself has a
fragmenting effect-Ka-tzetnik describes the loss of identity of his
character Moni, the child hero in Atrocity: "Nobody recognizes him.
Nobody knows who he is. And Moni doesn't recognize anybody
either. He dissolves among thousands of Mussulmen. He is a drop in a
skeleton river flowing to a sea of ash. He shuffles across the camp, back
and forth, back and forth. He does not know where he has come from
or where he is going. He does not know who he is" (228-29). He also
does not know what he is, the Hebrew text reads (177). Moni does not
recognize himself because he does not recognize the others. The death
of the child undoes the recognition of the self by destroying the
recognition of the other. For the author, the child is the other whom he
struggles to recognize in an act of response; but death has claimed the
child, and so he does not recognize himself. For the death that rules the
concentrationary univer~e.has robbed the child of the loving word of
the mother, as in the case of Theo in Appelfeld's For Every Sin: "It
became clear to Theo beyond any doubt that he would never return to
his hometown. From now on he would advance with the refugees.
That language which his mother had inculcated in him with such love
would be lost forever. If he spoke, he would speak only in the language
of the camps. That clear knowledge made him dreadfully sad" (167).
The sum of the Holocaust novelist's knowledge comes to this dark
revelation uttered by a child no longer a child.
5
The Splitting of the Self
"The shattering of the 'I,'" Aharon Appelfeld has written, "is one of
the deepest wounds" caused by the Shoah (Essays 99). The pen that
descends to the page is a scalpel that cuts into the soul, incising a
wound to heal this wound. In the words of EdmondJabes, "the book is
a moment of the wound, or eternity" (28). The selfbled ofword, father,
and child splits, and the task with which the book confronts its author
is to split again and thus become other to himself in an utterance of the
splitting of the self. Bakhtin insists on the needfulness of this process of
the author's becoming other (Estetika 16), for only in this act ofbecoming
through the saying of the word can the author hope to bring the word
out of exile and restore something of the relation to father and child. In
short, he must die away from the death into which the death of father
and child has cast him.
The Holocaust author, then, initiates the movement of return at the
graveside where he is fragmented. "You are outside," writes Ka-
tzetnik in Star ofAshes. "On top of the earth. You weren't buried in the
pit. Somebody else was" (35). We have seen this somebody else.
Standing outside-even, or especially, outside the pit-the self loses
itself with the loss of that somebody else. Somebody else is sham
bifniym, the Hebrew text reads (35), "there inside" or, literally, "there
within the face," leaving the man alone al pney, "on the face" of the
earth: the Hebrew implies a removal of the face from the face and
therefore a severance of the self from itself. This division underlies the
brief tale of the survivor who threw himself onto a mass grave and
begged the dead not to reject him in Elie Wiesel's A Beggar in Jerusalem
(80). It suggests why the widow in Wiesel's The Jews of Silence goes to
Babi Yar every day to call out to her dead husband and speaks to no one
else (36). The other lies buried in the pit, and with him lies the word
that would constitute the self, the word now in exile, splitting the self
off from all others.
Because the self is exiled with the word, it becomes the place of
exile. The pit, Babi Yar itself, constitutes the fissure that splits the self,
as Michael discovers in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall: "The bottom
of the pit: it exists. It's within us" (82-83). Hence we have a reversal of
Jean-Paul Same's famous dictum that "hell is-other people" (No Exit
47). "Man carries his fiercest enemy within himself," writes Wiesel in
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The Accident. "Hell isn't others. It's ourselves. Hell is the burning fever
that makes you feel cold" (24). The splitting of the self breeds such a
confusion of categories. Instead of harboring life, the heart becomes
the house of the dead, the self transformed into a cemetery. The silence
within, the silence of the pit, is indeed the silence of the grave; yet it is
no more empty than the grave. It is a silence that moves, nefarious and
malignant, not only splitting but also devouring the self. LB. Singer
hints at this silence in Enemies: A Love Story when he writes, "Herman
thought of the Yiddish saying that ten enemies can't harm a man as
much as he can harm himself. Yet he knew he wasn't doing it all by
himself; there was his hidden opponent, his demon adversary" (162).
In Atrocity Ka-tzetnik is more explicit: "The serpent's head.... He
feels the beast devouring him to the last shred. Nothing is left of him.
Yet, he is alive" (182). The Hebrew verb translated as "devour to the last
shred" is taraf (132), which means "tear to pieces," a word all the more
expressive of the splitting of the self. Yet the man, Hayim-Idl, is alive,
his very essence consisting of this fragmentation.
In Ecrits Jacques Lacan writes, "Being of non-being, that is how I as
subject comes on the scene, conjugated with the double aporia of a true
survival that is abolished by knowledge of itself, and by a discourse in
which it is death that sustains existence" (300). The death that invades
Hayim-Idl, the beast that devours him from within, is hunger. As the
metaphor suggests, however, this hunger is much more than hunger;
Primo Levi has said, "Our hunger is not that feeling of missing a meal"
(lfl44). It is an absolute emptiness that cuts through the man deprived
not only of bread but also of the word. It is the phenomenological
nothingness that swallows the man from the inside; out of that void the
man as author takes up the endeavor to return significance to the word
that engenders life. Levinas, in fact, uses the simile of hunger to
describe the project whereby the split self struggles to reconstitute
itself. "Signification," he argues, "is signifying out of a lack, a certain
negativity, an aspiration which aims emptily, like a hunger" (Otherwise
96). Still alive, Hayim-Idl is what he is, but "because of that," to borrow
from Amost Lustig's Diamonds of the Night, he has "already stopped
being it without having become anything else yet" (42). The heart
continues to beat when it should have come to a stop. The beating
heart, the thing that fosters life, now fragments it by making the man
into what he is and no more; robbed of his yet-to-be, he is robbed of his
present, that is, of his presence. The split self is the absent self, the self
made of hunger.
Bakhtin has held that "all duration confronts meaning as yet-to-be-
fulfilled, as something incomplete, as not-over-yet" (Estetika 107). The
process of the creation of the novel is a process of reintroducing this
yet-to-be to the self that has been torn to pieces. Split by a past in which
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the self lies buried, the author assumes this orientation toward the
future in an effort to heal and thus resurrect the self. The dialogic open-
endedness of the novel bespeaks its orientation toward "a still latent,
unuttered future Word," as Bakhtin puts it (Problems 90); its form and
content, which are of a piece, reveal the split that it seeks to overcome.
"The I of Then," Ka-tzetnik writes, "and the I of Now are a single
identity divided by two" (Shivitti 100). This statement sums up the
phenomenology of the novel as a phenomenology of the soul. In the
novel what is divided takes on the form of a single identity, a single
human voice, whose division might be overcome in an utterance of its
division.
The Splitting of the Novel
In The Symbolism of Evil Paul Ricoeur suggests that narrative form is
couched in a structure of loss (169-70). As a narrative, the Holocaust
novel takes on a form expressive of what is lost, and the thing lost
consists of word and meaning, father and child, self and the truth of
the self. From the existential standpoint here adopted, "truth," as
Kierkegaard writes, "consists not in knowing the truth but in being
the truth" (Training 201). Truth is subjectivity, and subjectivity, like the
novel, is constituted by the word. "It is from Speech [parole or the
word]," Lacan asserts, "that Truth receives the mark that establishes it
in a fictional structure" (Ecrits 306). This applies to the living subject as
well. The fictional structure of the Holocaust novel is not a mirror held
up to reality but is rather an expression of a living soul split from itself
and thrown outside of reality. The novel is subjectivity, a subjectivity
that is not itself. The event of the novel is the event of the split self
whose truth has been lost; hence the novel takes on the fictional
structure of that loss. At the heart of the novel, to borrow from Bakhtin,
"lies the discovery of the inner-man-'one's own self,' accessible not to
passive self-observation but only through an active dialogic approach to
one's own selt destroying the naive wholeness of one's notions about the
self that lies at the heart of the lyric, epic, and tragic image of man"
(Problems 120). Bakhtin argues further that "the unity of aesthetic form is
the unity of the position of the active body and soul, of the whole man"
(Estetika 76). This interconnection of self and novel forms the core of the
phenomenology of the Holocaust novel.
Bakhtin has pointed out that "a man never coincides with himself.
One cannot apply to take the formula A = A. . . . The genuine life of
the personality takes place at the point of non-coincidence between a
man and himself. . . . The genuine life of the personality is made
available only through a dialogic penetration of that personality" (Prob-
lems 59). Just as the event we call the self consists of such an interaction
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of voices, so does the event we call the novel. Through the shifting of
voices in the novel we encounter the shifting voices-and the splitting
silences-of the self; the tectonics of the self compose the architec-
tonics of the novel. The permutations of time and space are tied to this
structural/phenomenological feature of the novel. Yehuda Amichai
expresses the splitting of the self in Not of This Time, Not of This Place
through a corollary splitting of space, setting the novel at once in
Weinberg and in Jerusalem. Amichai's main character, Joel, says, "I am
sure there are people in Jerusalem who would swear I am still there"
(36). The Hebrew text is more telling: the phrase rendered as "still
there" is nisharti sham (53), or "I have been left behind there," implying
a removal of the self from itself and setting up the shifting of the
character'~voice from "I" to "he" and back as he shifts from Weinberg
to Jerusalem. Such a splitting of the character's self belies the split
within which the author is operating.
Bakhtin has argued that "form is a limit aesthetically treated. The
point here concerns a limit of the body, a limit of the soul, a limit of the
spirit" (Estetika 81). The aesthetic limit, then, sets up the existential
split. In The AgeofWonders by Aharon Appelfeld, Bruno speaks as "I" in
Part1and is narrated as "he" in Part 2. The I who relates Part1is the hale
and whole I of the child recounting the tale of his loss of himself; in Part
2 the novel takes on the form of third-person narration because the
character is now proceeding from a position of loss. Levinas has shown
that lithe differing of the identical" is a manifestation of time (Otherwise
9). The splitting of the character into I and he parallels the splitting of
time into before and after, with the event that lies between left to
silence. Levinas continues, "Time and the essence it unfolds by man-
ifesting entities, identified in the themes of statements or narratives,
resound as a silence without becoming themes themselves" (Otherwise
38). Out of this silent between-space, in which the novel's time and
essence are hidden, the author silently struggles to establish his pres-
ence in the novel; in the event left out lies the seed from which the
novel emerges, for this is the event that leaves out the self.
Another example of the alternate splitting of voices into I and he
can be found in Haim Gouri's The Chocolate Deal. Commenting on this
work, Gouri has said,
The Chocolate Deal is very different. Most probably I would not have written
such a book were it not for the fact that as a young man. . . I arrived in war-tom
Europe soon after the Holocaust. There I saw and met the remnants of the
Jewish people. This encounter changed my life. Once on a cold, wet winter
night I chanced to be in a displaced persons camp in Vienna. There I met a
young, lovely woman from Budapest. The camp was crowded, the air was
dense with cigarette smoke, the smell of recently unpacked clothing from the
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JOINT, together with the sharp aroma of ammonia and carbolic acid. People
were living together and finding each other on three levels of wooden plat-
forms. Among them were those whose sleep was haunted by nightmares and
screams. These were people who were robbed of all except their will to live and
wounded pride. I was then a young man unable to speak the many languages
spoken there-Yiddish, Polish, Hungarian, Roumanian. . . and only later did
I fully grasp what had happened to these people. I turned to the young woman
and said to her that the place reminds me of Hell. She looked at me with a
pensive smile and responded: "Gouri, I think you are a poet. A poet has to be
careful in his choice of words. Hell is something else." On her arm was a
tattooed number from Auschwitz.
The Chocolate Deal deals with Mordi and Robi. It is about their meetings
among the debris of an un-named city. Perhaps there is something of Vienna
and Budapest in the description. It is about a return to life. It is about the
condition that allows these people to pass up the soup offered at a public
kitchen because it was not hot enough. . . . You picked up the elements of time,
the subtle lines that separate thought and action, dream and reality. All these
come together in the choices the two heroes make among the range of possible
dilemmas. There is an accounting to be made with remembrance and death,
and the awful compromise of passions and life. [Personal communication with
the author, 11 December 1988] .
Gouri's own displacement in the displaced persons camp consists
of a displacement of language; Yiddish, Polish, Hungarian, Rouma-
nian-all indicate the displacement of the selfby the exiled word. Even
more revealing for the disjunction of the self is the dissociation of the
word from its meaning: Hell is something else. The division of the
word underlies the division of thought and action, of passion and life,
that Gouri describes with respect to the novel. The divisions in the
novel point up those collisions that result in the splitting of the self,
both for character and for author.
Edmond Jabes articulates the question at hand by saying, "00 I
know if I am in the book and when I am not? The book breaks off from
the book only to rejoin it farther on. So the empty space between two
pages or two works is the place and non-place where our limits of ink
and screams are set up and broken down" (215). Ka-tzetnik once said
that he was halfway through Shivitti before he realized he was writing
in the first person (conversation with the author, 13 July 1989). In that
work he explains, IIAll I've ever written is in essence a personal journal;
a testimonial on paper of II1II: I who witnessed. . . I who experienced
... I who lived through .... I, I, I, till-mid-writing-I used to be hit
by the need to transform II' into Ihe.' I feel the split, the ordeal, the
alienation of it, and worst of all-may God forgive me-I feel like The
Writer of Literature" (77). Reading these lines, one cannot help but
notice the I-slash-I-slash-I, the slashing of the I into I and he that occurs
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not only in the creation but also in the structure of the novel; Ka-
tzetnik's confession helps us to see what that structure reveals about its
genesis. To write is to split word from silence, ink from paper, presence
from absence, and self from itself, the self already split by the loss from
which it writes. It is the wounding of the wound in an effort to heal.
What Ka-tzetnik says about his novels Piotr Rawicz conveys within his
novel Blood from the Sky through his character Boris: "When speaking of
himself, Boris used sometimes the first and sometimes the third per-
son. Did this wavering betoken a hidden need to objectivize his own
existence, a need generally experienced by those whose existence is
giving them the slip?" (139). Significantly, the French word translated
as "betoken" is traduisait (125), which means "translates": the splitting
of the author translates into the splitting of the character. One meaning,
one truth, translates into another through the language that constitutes
both, the language of the novel.
The discourse of the novel expresses the discursive structure of the
self. The author, a translator of silence, is also the translator of the split
self into the novelistic word. Yoram Kaniuk hints at this in Adam
Resurrected: "Adam is a word: illuminate that word with the proper light
and it takes on a completely different meaning, containing all human
possibilities" (199). Here the Hebrew word for "human" is actually
gnozot (175), which means "hidden"; the term for "word" in this pas-
sage is milah, which also means "speech." The word-to-word interac-
tion in the novel reflects the dialogic interaction of the self with itself in
an attempt to reveal what is hidden, what is lost, what is other. Hence
we find that the novelist employs various means of inserting the voice
of the other into the text. This insertion may take the typographic form
of using italics to set off one voice from another, as in Ka-tzetnik's
Phoenix over the Galilee, Lustig's Darkness Casts No Shadow, or Elie Wie-
sel's The Town beyond the Wall and Twilight. This use of italics not only
sets up the splitting of the character-to-character relation within the
novel; it also establishes a relation of what is within to what is beyond,
drawing into the novel the split self that is outside the novel. The
infusion of the beyond into the within takes other forms as well.
Paltiel's text is injected into the text of Wiesel's The Testament, for
example, and the inclusion of letters breaks up the text of The Fifth Son.
In Babi Yar Anatoli introduces the report of the other witness (74ff.), and
in Blood from the Sky Rawicz includes a variety of voices in the form of
author, narrator, and even footnotes.
By all of these means the author endeavors to secure his presence
within the novel in the aftermath of the loss of presence. When the
appearance of the author takes an overt form-as in chapter 17 of
Rawicz's Blood from the Sky, titled "In which the author speaks again"
(138)-the author assumes the position of character in his own work.
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The direct voicing of the author is imposed upon a context of indirect
voicing and thus fragments that context in the very effort to merge with
it. The same becomes the other in an alienation of the same, indicating
the initial alienation from which the author proceeds. In Primo Levi's
The Periodic Table, when the author as character hears his own words in
the mouth of another character, he says, "The phrase was mine, but
repeated by him it struck me as hypocritical and jarring" (219). Stonata is
the Italian word translated as "jarring" (223); it also means "false" or
"out of place." The author turned character is the author out of place,
split from himself in an articulation of the phenomenological splitting
of the self that underlies his creation. "To find myself," writes Levi,
"man to man, having a reckoning with one of the 'others' had been my
keenest and most constant desire since I left the concentration camp"
(Periodic 215). Ritrovarmi means not only "to find myself" but also "to
recover Jl.lyself," "to become present" (219). Yet when the author be-
comes character, the reckoning with the other in the endeavor to
recover the self only accentuates the loss of the self and the breakup of
the novel.
Mindful of such dangers, some authors attempt to foster a pres-
ence both outside and inside the novel through the use of a preface.
This direct address is calculated to enable the reader to hear the au-
thor's voice through the indirect address of the character-to-character
interactions. Yet, struggling to establish a position in both places at
once, -the author, as well as the novel, is inevitably split between the
two. Ka-tzetnik in Phoenix over the Galilee attempts to provide his
audience with a key to reading the novel (vii). Wiesel begins The
Testament with a prefatory encounter between himself and one of his
characters, Grisha Kossover. In The Parnas Silvano Arieti, who also
inserts himself as a character, includes a preface to declare the factual
nature of his tale. "Only one character," he explains, "has been added:
a young man I have named Angelo Luzzatto. He is a composite of
several people, all real, all known to the community I describe" (3).
Later in the novel Arieti is asked if he is Luzzatto (114), suggesting that
not only Luzzatto but also perhaps all the characters in the novel are a
composite of voices orchestrated by the voice of the author. I am
Legion, the novelist all but cries out, for we are many; in the words of
Jabes, "I am multiplied in my sentence as a tree unfolds its branches"
(56). Hence the character threatens the author in the midst of his
identity; yet this threat is just what instills the author with a sense of
identity. "If I could," writes Wiesel in Twilight, "I would ask Lear to
write a play on Shakespeare. To me, Raskolnikov's opinion of Dos-
toevsky is no less valid than Fyodor the Epileptic's opinion of Raskolni-
kov" (178). Taking on a life of his own, the character turns the author-
and the novel-back on himself.
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In the first volume of Against Silence Wiesel declares, uNovelists
ought not to speak. Their mission consists in listening to other voices,
including those of their own creations, of their own characters" (249).
When this occurs, Bakhtin notes, lithe life of the hero begins to strive to
break through form and rhythm, to obtain an authoritative, mean-
ingful significance.... An artistically convincing completion becomes
impossible: the soul of the hero shifts from the category of other to the
category of I-it disperses and loses itself in spirit" (Estetika 116). This
breaking through form and rhythm is at the root of the splitting of the
novel. As soon as the character becomes an I, divorced from the author,
the author is returned to a divorce of himself from himself; stranded
once more at the zero point, he shifts from the category of I to the
category of other. In the Holocaust novel the identity of the self is no
sooner confirmed than it again breaks down. As Ellen Fine has argued,
if Holocaust literature lIis distinguished by a deep sense of loss. . . it is
essentially the loss (or lack) of identity that is its principal theme. The
act of writing is closely linked to an exploration of the self" (1474).
The Breakdown of Identity
As Yehiel De-Nur lay dying in an Italian hospital immediately after
World War II, he asked for writing materials. He had vowed to bear
witness to what he had seen. Still in the striped shirt and trousers he
had worn for two years in Auschwitz, he began his desperate tale. Two
weeks later Sunrise over Hell was compleled. He handed the manuscript
to a Jewish soldier, who noticed that no name appeared on the title
page. IIWho is the author?" the soldier asked. De-Nur replied, liThe
name of the author?! The authors went to the crematorium. They wrote
this book. Go on, you write their name: K. Tzetnik" (Shivitti 16). With
the splitting of the self it is not the author as I who undertakes his task
but the author as other, who has lost his I-and who tells us so in
various ways through his characters. Paltiel, a character who is an
author, remarks in Wiesel's The Testament: liThe house is my house, but
I ... I am not I" (288). In Darkness Casts No Shadow we hear Lustig's
character Manny declare, III am and, at the same time, I'm not. Or as if
I'm somebody else" (74). Jose Ortega y Gasset has said that "to feel
oneself lost implies first the sensation of feeling oneself-that is, meet-
ing oneself, finding oneself" (31). But the path that the author travels
through the novel in the meeting with himself is one by which he
speaks-and breaks. For here he meets a self whom he does not
recognize.
Lacan raises the issue of identity in The Language ofthe Self: "In order
to be recognized by the other, I utter what was in view of what will be.
In order to find him, I call him by a name which he must assume or
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refuse in order to reply to me. I identify myself in Language, but only
by losing myself in it" (63). Responding to the past in view of what is
not yet, the Holocaust author confers a name upon his character by
which he might recognize himself, only to lose himself once more in
his discourse. Within the discourse of the novel, which is the discourse
of a world, the characters place, to borrow again from Lacan, "is
already inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name" (Ecrits
148). Indeed, to be a character is to have a name. Yet, as Jabes has said in
an utterance of the conflict that harrows both author and character,
"two names quarrel over my heart and mind" (28). Thus, in the break-
down of identity that comes with the splitting of the self, the characters
name is often transformed into another name, into the name of the
other. In The Whole Land Brimstone by Anna Langfus, for instance,
the main character is not identified by her given name but only by the
assumed name Maria, a Christian name and thus the name of the alien
and alienating other. The alienating implication of that name is more
pronounced in Amos Oz's Touch the Wat~ Touch the Wind, where Elisha
Pomeranz takes on the name of Dziobak Przywolski, son of the virgin
Mary (or Maria). Since the removal of one's name implies a removal of
one's place, Pomeranz becomes a wanderer when he adopts his new
name: "He passed on from darkness to darkness, as if he were cloaked
in darkness" (10). The Hebrew word for "darkness" here is mahshakh
(14), a term also used for the realm of the dead or the darkness of the
grave. The breakdown of identity is a breakdown of life; the split self is
the dead self.
The self assumes a new name in order to escape death only to
collide with the darkness of death. This is what happens to Hynek
Tausig in "The Return," the first of the tales in Lustig's Night and Hope:
"He must convince himself in the first place that he no longer had
anything in common with Hynek Tausig. Did you say Tausig? Oh, dear
me, no. I would not have anything to do with him.... Hynek Tausig
really was Alfred Janota. The identity card was genuine" (14-15). The
Czech text is more expressive of the split, since the phrase "the identity
card was genuine" is a translation of legitimace nenz[alesnd (11), literally
"the forgery was legitimate." The new name is a lie, and in the lie lurks
death. The sign of truth in this case is the sign of the higher relation, a
relation to the One who breathes life into man and truth into life; it is
the sign of the Covenant, the circumcision by which identity is in-
scribed upon the man. About to undergo the baptismal ritual of the
bath, Tausig realizes that he "would be left behind in the baths, only
Janota would come out" (23). Wishing to avoid recognition, however,
he avoids the bath; ordinarily men are the same when naked, but
now, in the inversion of truth and lie, they are equal only when
clothed, wrapped in a cloak of darkness. In his effort to be one of Them
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Tausig becomes nothing, a self that has labored itself into no self.
Ultimately, then, he understands that "the worst thing that could
happen to a man"-even worse than death-"was to be cast out ... to
be someone else" (36). A man cannot live if he is not who he is, if he is
split from himself. Tausig, then, overcomes that split by rejoining those
condemned to death. Thus he discovers life.
The breakdown of the self that comes in the wake of the name
change is central to the theme of Blood from the Sky, where Rawicz
creates the character Yuri, who assumes the identity of Boris. Noting
again the shift from third to first person, we read, "It was all very well
Boris's presuming on his 'legitimacy' vis-A-vis Yuri: the latter was not
without weighty arguments of his own. Their quarrel, if quarrel there
was, went on so long ago that it no longer even succeeded in 'harrow-
ing' my inner self. Though (and this was the main question) was there
anything whatever to harrow?" (233). The French phrase rendered as
"so long ago" is aune telle distance (209), "at such a distance," accentuat-
ing the distancing of the self from itself in the breakdown of identity.
The verb "harrow," moreover, is dechirer, which means "tear to pieces"
or "splinter," underscoring the splitting of the self into no self. Similar
to the example of Hynek Tausig, the question ofwhether Yuri/Boris has
any self left to harrow is decided by the sign of circumcision. This sign
places the character in "the true Temple" of his "crucial dream," where
he is able to become himself even under the threat of death (206-9).
Further, identifying the sign as the "tool," Rawicz implies a symbolic
connection between the penis and the pen and therefore a linkage
between character and author. Through a process of creation sug-
gestive of procreation the author pens his character in an effort to make
the character into a sign of the split that he would himself overcome.
We have seen that in the case of Ka-tzetnik the author himself
adopts a different name as author. In Phoenix over the Galilee, moreover,
Harry Preleshnik, a persona of his author, declares, "My name was
burned with all the rest in the crematorium at Auschwitz" (28). In this
instance the character does not assume a different name but loses his
name, which amounts to the same thing: the death of the self. When
Harry becomes number 135633 in Sunrise over Hell, he is told, "You're
dead. Name's exactly what this number says on your arm. It's what
they call you by when the furnace wants you" (161). Near the end of the
novel we read, "'Could I be wrong .. ,'he ventured, 'my name used to
be Preleshnik'" (201). Harry eventually becomes an author in Phoenix
over the Galilee. The bond between character and author is emphasized
by the number they share, the number that eclipses their names and
splinters their souls. The situation of Primo Levi in The Periodic Table is
comparable. "At a distance of thirty years," writes the author/char-
acter, "I find it difficult to reconstruct the sort of human being that
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corresponded, in November 1944, to my name or, better, to my num-
ber: 174517" (139). Once again we note the distance, distanza (143), that
iterates the splitting of the self. Recalling a passage from Levi's If This Is
a Man, we note the breakdown of identity perpetrated by the number,
as if the number were itself a perverted name: "My number is 174517;
we have been baptized, we will carry the tatoo on our left arm until
we die" (22).
In Essays in the First Person Appelfeld writes, "We had been taught
to speak about the Holocaust in the language of big numbers, and no
language distances you from contact more than such a language" (21).
When the name becomes a number it is couched in this language that
distances the self from itself, a language that confiscates the name in a
slaying of the self. As Sartre expresses it, "ideal nothingness in-itself is
quantity" (Being 263); the quantifying of the self indicates the splitting of
the self into no self, into a missing self. It is as one who has been
inscribed with a number that Rubi, for example, in Gouri's The Chocolate
Deal cries, "I don't want to keep searching for my name on the list of the
missing. I want to jump from here into another place. Always moving.
To show them. I'll go on living. You see? I'm not dead. They haven't
confiscated my name. And I haven't forgotten the names of the others"
(41). Regaining the confiscated name rests on the memory of the names
of the others, and this poses another question: Whose name belongs to
whom? At the outset of Gouri's novel, there is a confusion in the
association of the name with the face: "Now he [Rubi] sees another face
upon the man [Mordi] before him. But that face also fits his name. And
so it is him. Apparently it's him" (4-5). To be sure, the name is tied to the
face; the face speaks, and the name bespeaks the face. The breakdown
of identity that alters the name, then, splits the face in the midst of its
speech. Thus toward the end of the novel Rubi says, "I'm telling him
profound things, isn't that so?-profound and very interesting, be-
cause Mordi is speaking from my throat" (129). The face speaks, but in
the splitting of the self the face splits.
Hence the motif of the double is common in the Holocaust novel,
but it is not to be confused with the Jekylls, Golyadkins, or Steppen-
wolfs of Doppelganger literature. Rather, the Holocaust novel embodies
a condition of self-contradiction-Selbst-Widerspruch, speaking against
oneself. In I and Thou Buber responds to the question of what self-
contradiction entails:
When man does not test the a priori of relation in the world, working out and
actualizing the innate You in what he encounters, it turns inside. Then it
unfolds through the unnatural, impossible object, the I-which is to say that it
unfolds where there is no room for it to unfold. Thus the confrontation within
the self comes into being, and this cannot be relation, presence, the current of
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reciprocity, but only self-contradiction. Some men may try to interpret this as a
relation, perhaps one that is religious, in order to extricate themselves from the
horror of their Doppelganger: they are bound to keep rediscovering the decep-
tion of any such interpretation. Here is the edge of life. What is unfulfilled was
here escaped into the mad delusion of some fulfillment; now it gropes around
in the labyrinth. and gets lost ever more profoundly. [119-20]
The doubling in the Holocaust novel, then, does not oppose good and
evil, success and failure, or animal and spirit; rather, it represents a
breakdown in the relation of self and other, of I and Thou, that is critical
to identity. Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi offers a helpful insight when she
notes, "The characters in most of the survival novels have at least one
companion who for some period shares their struggle" (79-80). Con-
trary to what Ezrahi implies, however, the struggle is not just for
survival but for a restoration of the wholeness of the self through a
relation to the other; it is not that the other assists me, but rather I must
be for the other in my saying of I.
"What is mine," Bakhtin has maintained, "is not in me and for me
but in the other" (Estetika 101). Levinas adds that the "other is the heart,
and the goodness, of the same, the inspiration or the very psyche in the
soul" (Otherwise 109). The pairing of Rubi and Mordi in Gouri's novel is
one example of the double motif. Others include Danny and Manny in
Lustig's Darkness Casts No Shadow and Gregor and Gavriel in Wiesel's
The Gates of the Forest. In fact, from the pairing of Michael and Pedro in
The Town beyond the Wall to the coupling of Raphael and Pedro in
Twilight, doubles abound in Wiesel's works. In A Beggar in Jerusalem,
the novel that follows The Gates of the Forest, for instance, the doubling
of David and Katriel is established at the very beginning: "He [Katriel]
is beckoning. Do you see him now? It is he. It is I. My name is David"
(4). Shortly thereafter, David says, "People will ask in astonishment:
'Still no trace of Katriel?' I shall answer: 'His trace? I am his trace' " (7).
In Wiesel's next novel, The Oath, the old man Azriel says to his revolu-
tionary friend Abrasha, "You want me to be your double? You must be
joking. Did you take a good look at me?" (72). Yet the doubling does not
lie so much in resemblance as in the act of taking a good look, peering
into the face of the other until one sees one's own face staring back: it is
he, it is I.
The antecedent for this "it" is the author of the novel, which, in its
form and content, articulates the breakdown of identity. As Bakhtin has
pointed out, the relation between author and character in the process
of creation makes it possible to say, "'I am me' in someone else's
language, and in my own language, 'I am other' " (Dialogic 315). There-
fore, Bakhtin argues elsewhere, "there can be no firm image of the hero
answering to the question 'Who is he?' The only questions here are
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'Who am I?' and 'Who are you?' But even these questions reverberate in
a continuous and open-ended interior dialogue. Discourse of the hero
and discourse about the hero are determined by an open dialogic
attitude toward oneself and toward the other" (Problems 251). The
questions Bakhtin invokes underlie the breakdown of identity; the
author's stance toward the self as other-the 'stance of the split self-
determines the discourse of the character as a discourse about the
author. An example of the confluence of the questions "Who am I?"
and "Who are you?" is found in the pairing of Leonid and Mendel in
Levi's If Not Now, When? After Leonid died Mendel had a dream in
which someone "asked Mendel who he was and Mendel couldn't
answer, he didn't remember his name anymore, or where he was born,
nothing" (228); near the end of the novel it is said that Mendel "had
been a missing person since he had met Leonid" (341). The Italian word
translated as "missing" in this last passage is disperso (255), "dispersed"
or "scattered."
The difficulty of the self, regarding both author and character, lies
not in difference but in a certain resemblance. In the event of creation
the author labors to become other to himself, as Bakhtin has observed
(Estetika 16); to become the same as the character would only exasperate
the breakdown of the self and feed the sickness the author tries to
overcome. In Kaniuk's Adam Resurrected, therefore, Adam's mental
illness is indicated by, among other things, his resemblance to Herbert
Stein, who is referred to as his twin (59). A more revealing example can
be found in the twins who tum up in Appelfeld's Badenheim 1939;
significantly, they are professional readers of poetry. "The readers
were twin brothers who during the course of the years had become
indistinguishable. But the way they read was different; it was as if their
sickness had two voices" (27). Their sickness makes them indistin-
guishable; their sickness is that they are indistinguishable. That sick-
ness has two voices; the splitting of the voice, which is the splitting of
the self, is the sickness itself. It is the sickness of isolation within the
self, cut off from the other who would posit the difference of I and Thou
upon which identity rests. In this isolation the self is confined to the
sameness, to the resemblance, of I and I. If in the relation between I and
Thou one plus one equals one, in the isolation of I and lone plus one
equals zero.
The Holocaust novelist, then, attempts through creation to break
free of the isolation that splits the self, hence the dialogic interaction
with the character. "The author speaks not about a character but with
him," Bakhtin writes (Problems 63). Bakhtin also observes that "every
dialogue proceeds as though against the background of a Third who is
invisibly present, standing above the participants in the dialogue"
(Estetika 306). The function of this Third, who is similar to Lacan's
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Other, is "to introduce the dimension of Truth" (Lacan, Language 269).
The breakdown of identity is intelligible only in the light of some truth
of identity posited by the presence of the Third in the dialogic relation
between I and Thou. Unsurprisingly, therefore, such a presence often
shows up in the novel itself, revealing what occurs in its creation. As
the author Paltiel writes his text in Wiesel's The Testament, for instance,
he says, "I should stop writing and talking to myself, especially since I
am not alone. Someone is watching me with a smile. Sitting in the
opposite comer, under the skylight, his hands folded under his knees,
David Aboulesia-or is it my father?-is gazing at me" (335). Both
David Aboulesia and Paltiel's father function as voices of truth in the
novel, as the "over-I," to use Bakhtin's term, "the witness and judge of
every I" (Estetika 342). Aboulesia is Paltiel's witness, and his father is his
judge; both constitute the Third who is positioned between the author
and the text. In the words of Levinas, "the apparition of a third party is
the very origin of appearing, that is, the very origin of an origin"
(Othenoise 160). Here the origin is the origin of the novel. The Third
does not appear because the author writes; rather, the author writes
because the Third appears and poses the question that decides the
presence of the self: Where are you?
In the lines above cited from Wiesel's novel the confusion of
identity is not rooted in a breakdown of identity; instead, as Levinas
has said, "the Good cannot become present or enter into a representa-
tion.... It has chosen me before I have chosen it" (Othenoise 11). The
Third, then, is present as a trace, as a pronoun without an antecedent
noun, ineffable and unidentifiable; hence only in the context of the
Third can identity be an issue in the splitting of the self. Because the
Third eludes identification, it often reveals itself in the novel as a ques-
tion or a shadow of the self. The question "Who is with me? Who?" is
repeated in Amichai's Not ofThis Time, Not ofThis Place (96, 111). In Touch
the Wate~ Touch the Wind Oz suggests this trace of the Other: "Suddenly,
in the course of an autumn in the late fifties, Pomeranz realized beyond
all shadow of a doubt that he was being followed, wherever he went,
cunningly, silently, patiently" (51). In the Hebrew text the root of the
word "followed" is in fact akav (57), the word for "trace"; the term
rendered as "silently," hariyshiy, can also mean "hushed" or "whisper-
ing." Something (or someone) is present by its absence, present as a
trace, and heard only as the kol demamah dakah, the "thin voice of
silence" of 1Kings 19:12. The "Infinite," Levinas observes, "anarchically
affects the I, imprinting itself as a trace in the absolute passivity-prior
to all freedom-showing itself as a 'Responsibility-for-the-Other"
("Signature" 189). What whispers not only speaks-it also summons.
With the introduction of this notion of the silently whispering
trace, the Muse assumes the features of a messenger who never quite
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catches up with the character. As the messenger of the Third, of the
Other who might introduce the radical otherness of a truth that would
overcome the splitting of the self, this figure often takes the form of the
madman. The madness in question, however, cannot be reduced to the
madness of clinical psychology. "Mystical madness," Wiesel notes, "is
redeeming. The difference between a mystical madman and a clinical
madman is that a clini<;al madman isolates himself and others, while a
mystical one wants to bring the Messiah" (Against Silence 3:232). Mys-
tical madness transcends the pretensions of anything outlined by the
pseudoscience of psychology; it emerges on the edge of a total break-
down of the word in both its material and spiritual aspects. As Michel
Foucault has expressed it, "Language is the first and last structure of
madness, its constituent form; on language are based all the cycles in
which madness articulates its nature. That the essence of madness can
be ultimately defined in the simple structure of a discourse does not
reduce it to a purely psychological nature, but gives it a hold over the
totality of soul and body" (Madness 100). Because the splitting of the self
entails a splitting of the word, the novelist who wrestles with that split
also wrestles with madness, body and soul.
Man and Madman: From the Body to the Bridge
"In the beginning," declares Dr. Benedictus in Wiesel's Twilight, "there
was madness.... Christianity believes that in the beginning was the
Word. But before the Word, what was there? Chaos? But what is chaos
if not the loss of perception, sensitivity, language? A total pathological
retrenchment. Before Creation, there was a vision of the future, and I
tell you, that vision could originate only in great madness" (37-38). The
beginning here described is a condition of fragmentation and loss; as
such it characterizes the phenomenological condition for the creation of
the Holocaust novel. In this beginning, too, is madness. Unlike the
Creator of all things, however, the novelist is a human being. "The
boundaries of my body," writes Jean Amery, "are also the boundaries
of my self" (28). According to Jewish tradition, body and soul are of a
piece. The Sages have pointed out, for example, that the performance
of the mitzvot as an act of the soul requires the involvement of the body,
that is, a confluence of ~ody and soul. Opposite this view is the Greco-
Christian tradition that pits the body against the soul. Expressions of
this split are as ancient as Plato's Phaedo (92-93) and as modem as
Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, where he argues that the soul
"is more easily known than the body" (95), as if consciousness can do
very well without the body. Yet this is precisely the disease that breeds
madness in the splitting of the self.
In keeping with a Jewish approach, Bakhtin has maintained that
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"there can be a conflict between the spirit and the inner body, but there
can be no conflict between the soul and the body, for they form one and
the same valuable categories and express a single, creatively active
relation to the givenness of man" (Estetika 120). In the beginning,
indeed, is madness; and the body is the beginning of the self, inasmuch
as the self is a subjectivity that signifies something. "Signification,"
Levinas explains, "is the one-for-the-other which characterizes an
identity that does not coincide with itself. This is in fact all the gravity of
an animate body" (Otherwise 70). This one-for-the-other has meaning,
he elaborates, "only as a tearing away from oneself despite oneself....
And to be tom from oneself has meaning only as a being tom from the
complacency in oneself characteristic of enjoyment, snatching the
bread from one's mouth. Only a subject that eats can be for-the-other,
can signify. Signification, and the one-for-the-other, has meaning only
among beings of flesh and blood" (74). Madness is a disruption, an
interruption, an eruption of this signifying activity that distinguishes
the self in its flesh and blood. It is a hunger that disrupts the daily
incarnation of eating bread, a hunger that erupts in an outpouring of
words or a shriek of silence. Madness, therefore, begins with the body.
The splitting of the self articulated through madness almost invariably
finds expression in the fragmentation of the body.
A graphic indication of this fragmentation turns up in Adam Resur-
rected, Kaniuk's tale of a madman. Here the title character's madness is
manifested by his imagining internal ailments and then undergoing
the appropriate surgeries. Adam's body, we read, "has spat out about
ten organs" (64). This chopping up of the body evinces the tearing
away of body and soul in the splitting of the self. The character's here is
a nameless elsewhere from which the body would extract itself in a
literal rending of itself to pieces. Thus we see a further ramification of
the permutations of time and space. "Today," declares one of the
Schwester twins in Kaniuk's novel, "our business is to rescue as many
as possible from the slaughter. Though they are already slaughtered.
Yes, their bodies have reached this land, but their souls are still in the
furnaces" (55). In this comment on the inmates 'Of the insane asylum,
the image of slaughter suggests that the self is not only split-it is
sundered, butchered, dismembered. The Hebrew word for "soul" in
this passage is nefesh (50), a term that suggests life, mind, human being,
self, and even body. The use of this word accentuates and illuminates
the split under consideration: the breakup of the self is a splitting of
mind and being, of body and life itself.
In the splitting of the body the self loses all recognition of itself.
Hence in Star ofAshes Ka-tzetnik cries out, "Body! Who are you?" (116),
using the word guf for "body" (116); like nefesh, gut is also laden with
meaning, alluding to self, substance, being, essence. Because the self-
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recognition that establishes substance lies in a relation to the other, the
loss of.recognition of oneself may be couched in the failure to recognize
the other. Here too the body defines the parameters of relation; the
alienation from one's own body is invoked as an alienation of the body
from the body of the other. "My body," Bakhtin has observed, "is a
fundamentally inner body; the body of the other is a fundamentally
outer body" (Estetika 44). A collision of the two occurs in Ka-tzetnik's
Sunrise over Hell when Harry encounters Marcel for the first time in the
concentration camp: "Harry stared at the alien's head, the alien's body,
and felt great fear. An engulfing terror washed through him. Marcel
Shafran was addressing him out of an unidentifiable body" (108).
Harry's terror at the sight of Marcel is a terror at the image and
substance of himself, ultimately lost. Toward the end of the novel we
read, "No longer his own self, he had become enthralled by a force
stronger than death ... rendering the body's purged substance trans-
lucent as sunrise" (208). "His own self" is a translation of atsmo, mean-
ing "his very essence" or "his own substance"; the phrase "body's
substance" is a rendering of homer (179), which means "matter" or
"material." As the material of the self, the body is definitively tied to the
essence of the self. The fragmentation of the one results in the splitting
of the other; the isolation of the one leads to the loss of the other.
In its isolation from its essence the body is nothing more than so
many chemicals, as Lustig indicates in Darkness Casts No Shadow (60).
The self-contemplation that issues from this gross reduction-a con-
templation in which madness stirs-arises in a state of isolation. The
main character in Lustig's Dita Saxova insists, "IWhat I am fighting now
is my own private invisible war, and it's nobody's business.' ... It was
not only her body she was looking at and li~teningto. She was listening
to a voice inside her. It gave her the impression of being a person
walking on a very fragile surface" (46-47). This fragile surface is the
surface of sanity rubbing up against the surface of madness, just as the
voice rubs up against the body in a contemplation that divides the voice
from the body, the self from itself. In Being and Nothingness Sartre
observes, "To the extent that my body indicates my possibilities in the
world, seeing my body or touching it is to transform these possibilities
of mine into dead-possibilities" (403). The fragile surface of which Dita
speaks is the outline of possibility traced by the image in the mirror. So
the author who has been reduced to a body strives to touch the body
that is other, the body of the character, in a mad struggle for possibility.
The character, who is but a voice, endeavors to assume a body, to break
through form and rhythm, to become a self. IISelf-consciousness,"
Bakhtin points out, "as the artistic dominant governing the construction
of a character, cannot lie alongside other features of his image; it
absorbs these other features into itself as its own material and deprives
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them of any power to define and finalize the hero" (Problems 50). Thus
the author fashions a mirror that must reject him as he gazes into it. For
the image in the mirror defies definition, feeds on illusion, and fosters
isolation.
Foucault writes, Illn this delusive attachment to himself, man gen-
erates his madness like a mirage. The symbol of madness will hence-
forth be that mirror which, without reflecting anything real, will
secretly offer the man who observes himself in it the dream of his own
presumption" (Madness 27). In Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall
Michael articulates the fragmenting effect of the mirror: III am alone.
Mother is no more. The mirror harbors other visions: the mirror itself
would reject me and deny me" (149). The absence of the mother
signifies the absence of life. The self alone is the self split from the
origin of life and therefore from its own life; the mirror has nothing to
reflect because the self is nothing but a body. III was my body," Amery
stated, IIand nothing else: in hunger, in the blow that I suffered, in the
blow that I dealt. My body, debilitated and crusted with filth, was my
calamity" (91). Hunger, the emptiness of the stomach, the void that
invades every cell, is the nothingness of the self. III was a body,"
declares Eliezer in Wiesel's Night. IIPerhaps less than that even: a
starved stomach" (59). Hunger here signifies much more than a phys-
iological condition; it is, again, the phenomenological lack from which
the author proceeds and through which the character is broken apart.
This schism that breeds schizophrenia comes out in Night when Eliezer
asserts, III was dragging with me this skeletal body which weighed so
much. If only I could have got rid of it! In spite of my efforts not to think
about it, I could feel myself as two entities-my body and me" (89).
Transformed into nothing but a body, the I is made into an It; yet the I
resists this transformation. The self begins with the body, but it is not
reducible to the body. So the body renders the I that contends with it
other to itself: the lime" in the phrase limy body and me" is a divided
entity.
In Lustig's Darkness Casts No Shadow Manny IIdragged the taller boy
as if he were a piece of his own body which had been tom loose" (150).
The taller boy is Danny, Manny's double. Split from itself, the self is
split from the other; the tom body announces the isolation of the self,
and the isolated self is a dead self. Thus, standing before the mirror that
tears the self from itself, Eliezer ends his tale in Night by saying, IIFrom
the depths of the mirror, a corpse gazed back at me. The look in his
eyes, as they stared into mine, has never left me" (116). Similarly, one
recalls a passage from Ka-tzetnik's Star of Ashes: IINight about you.
Auschwitz about you. Death holds your life between his hands-a
circular mirror held up to your eyes" (68). Once again we find that in
the Holocaust novel no mirror is held up to life; rather, death holds up
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the mirror to the self. The novelist gazes into the eyes of the Angel of
Death, the Angel with a Thousand Eyes, until his own eyes look back at
him through the visage of his character. The task, however, does not
end here. The man may tum away from the mirror in an effort to return
to life, but the eyes of the angel follow him. In the universe of the
Holocaust novel, then, the discourse of life-and with it the life of the
self-collapses. In place of that discourse is the mute stare of death that
rises up from the depths of the mirror. The function of the word in the
Holocaust novel is to free the self from that gaze and return it to a
dialogic relation with life. The author must accomplish this not by
imposing upon the character a face liberated from the mirror but by
creating for his character a face that speaks.
Here we have more evidence that the recognition of the character
as other is critical to the author's recognition of the self as I. As always,
the author expresses the problem of self-recognition through the char-
acter. In An Estate of Memory, for example, Kannel's character Barbara
desperately feels her face, "trying to assure herself that what lay under
the yellow film was still her own face" (176). Feeling her own face, the
character seeks her own word. Yet in the very act of the self's feeling
itself, the noncoincidence of the self with itself, the problem of identity,
is reestablished: Who is feeling whom? Which I am I? The implication
of such questions emerges in Raphael's statement to Pedro in Wiesel's
Twilight:
I am convinced, Pedro, that I am going mad. I may even be mad already. Is this
me I glimpse in the mirror? Is this me speaking to you, speaking to myself? Is
this me writing to you? Why is my hand trembling? Why do I feel that I'm
awake even when I sleep? Why do I feel as if another were sleeping inside me?
In my dream, I see two boys running toward the sea, one chasing the other, and
I don't know whether I am the one or the other, or the spectator watching them,
or the drowning man crying for help. Is this what madness is like? [27-28]
This is the question posed by the writing of the Holocaust novel itself: Is
this what madness is like? This question is not entirely rhetorical;
Foucault observes, "There is no madness except as the final instant of
the work of art-the work endlessly drives madness to its limits; where
there is a work of art, there is no madness; and yet madness is contempo-
rary with the work of art" (Madness 288-89). In this and yet lies the
problem of the splitting and the regeneration of the self.
"Madness begins," Foucault says, "where the relation of man to
truth is disturbed and darkened" (Madness 104); this relation is
grounded in the dialogic relation between self and other. The self-
both as author and as character-attempts to engender this relation
and hence this recognition through the word; but on the fringes of
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madness, "the more I talk the more I empty myself of truth" (Wiesel,
Gates 163). The ramifications of this existential condition come to light
in Grisha's comment on Dr. Mozliak in Wiesel's The Testament: "He ex-
tracted words from me, sentences, shreds of silence; I became more
and more impoverished. The more I spoke, the less I existed; he robbed
me of what I cherished most. I no longer recognized myself" (304). Dr.
Mozliak, the figure of the lie, threatens Grisha's relation to the truth as
a relation to his father Paltiel, to the other through whom he might
recognize himself; like his father and like his author, Grisha is a poet. In
order to restore the integrity of his relation to the father as a relation to
truth-and therefore the integrity of himself-Grisha bites off his own
tongue. He is the one who may save the word of the father and thus the
relation that constitutes the truth of the self. "At the same time," Wiesel
has pointed out, "in order to save it, he had to bite his tongue off. He
had to become mute in order to talk. But once he is mute, he cannot
talk" (Patterson, In Dialogue 39). The body is mutilated to restore the
self, yet the breaking of the body .is a splitting of the self. Hence
madness looms.
In LB. Singer's Shosha we see the loss of self-recognition concurrent
with the loss of the higher relation when Arele asserts, "I didn't
recognize myself. I was no longer formed in the image of God" (13).
Arele attempts to regenerate the lost recognition through his relation to
Shosha, and through Shosha the madness that threatens Arele's iden-
tity is posed; she has a dream, for example, in which a demon tries to
convince her that Arele is not Arele (106-7). The problem of identity for
the self has its consequences for the identity of the other, who, like
Arele in his relation to Shosha, often bears the features of the father.
This is a point made in Levi's If Not Now, When? through the character
Gedaleh, the partisans' leader who proposes that they have a flag with
the image of a madman on it (186). The confusion of identity unfolds
the wanted poster for Gedaleh has someone else's face on it (182).
"Gedaleh has many faces," we read. "That's why it's hard to under-
stand him; because there isn't just one Gedaleh" (229). The confusion
of faces underscores the confusion of the word that creates the dialogic
relation on which identity is founded. "Hynek Tausig had had his
moustache shaved off," Lustig relates in Night and Hope. "At least
nobody would recognize him now" (33). Yet Tausig needs the recogni-
tion lost upon the alteration of the face in order to be Tausig. The
imprint that identifies him as Alfred Janota is precisely the false word
(it is, after all, his mouth that he alters) that splits him from himself, the
thing that does violence to his face.
What returns Tausig to himself is the realization that the violence
he would do to his identity amounts to a betrayal of the other. This
concern, to be sure, is central to the existential dilemma that confronts
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the author: How does one bear witness without betraying those for
whom the witness is borne? The dilemma is existential because in the
betrayal of others the I is itself lost. In Appelfeld's For Every Sin an
informer is told, "Don't say 'I.' You lost your 'I.' You're a nothing" (49).
Appelfeld makes this point more insistently in Tzili: The Story ofa Life.
In this novel Zigi Baum, a man guilty of abandoning and then surviving
his wife and children, says, "The day of judgment will come in the end.
If not in this world then in the next. I can't imagine life without justice.
. . . You remember how we used to fight over cigarette stubs? We lost
our human image-do you say human image or divine image?" (152).
You say both; each is tied to the other. Since the I is lost in both its
images through its betrayal of the other, Zigi Baum ultimately kills
himself (like a number of Holocaust authors). In the passage cited the
Hebrew word for justice, tzedek, connotes rightness and righteousness.
Further, the phrase "we lost" is a translation of iyvadnu (68), from the
verb ived, which also means "to destroy"; indeed, this verb is used in
the expression "to commit suicide," ived atsmo. The self that destroys
the relation to the other through betrayal also destroys itself.
The self's betrayal of the other is a failure to be present before the
other; the sickness of the split self lies in its being neither here nor
there, marooned in a nameless elsewhere. "Being left behind is a kind
of madness," Gauthier Bachman puts it in Jakov Lind's Landscape in
Concrete (60). It is not exactly "left behind" in German, however, but
"remaining behind," zuruckbleiben (90); the problem lies with the char-
acter himself, not with another who might have abandoned him. "I'm a
sick animal," Bachmann laments. "I'm neither above nor below" (130).
To remain behind is to remain in the confinement of the self, in the
isolation of the self and from the self. In that confinement madness
threatens the self, as it does Mordi in Gouri's The Chocolate Deal. Hidden
in a cellar that becomes the tomb of his soul, he declares, "Already
madness is creeping all over me. I feel it. Creeping upward. Yesterday
it passed my belt, reached close to the heart" (57). Foucault argues that
"the madman is not the first and most innocent victim of confinement,
but the most obscure and the most visible, the most insistent of the
symbols of the confining power" (Madness 225). From within this
confinement life's "inner infinity," as Bakhtin calls it, "struggles to
break through" (Estetika 176-77). Madness, precisely because it sym-
bolizes the confining power, is the sign of that infinity's struggle. The
author struggles to break free of the self through the creation of a
character who must break free of the structure of the novel itself. Thus
in the novel madness is indicated by a text that is at once liberating and
confining.
Discourse in the novel is also both liberating and confining in-
asmuch as it is a discourse of remembrance, a discourse that both
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bridges and isolates. As the film director in Amichi's Not of This Time,
Not ofThis Place points out, "Memorial days bring out the madmen like
mushrooms" (200). As a bridge and as a messenger, the madman is
essential to the function of memory and therefore plays a prominent
role in the Holocaust novel. "For this theme," Wiesel has said, "I need
the madman" (Patterson, In Dialogue 48). In his novel Twilight, for
instance, we see a number of madmen in the confines of a sanatorium;
but in the context of confinement the madman signifies the infinite
aspect of the self, the very thing that makes possible the splitting of the
self. "Infinity cannot be challenged with impunity, and madness is
infinite down to its fragments" (11). Hence, "when one is mad, one is
everywhere . . . when one is mad, one rushes toward the unknown.
When one is mad, one becomes the unknown" (148). When one is mad,
one is everywhere, as the silence of the unknowable is everywhere.
The infinity of space lies not in its vastness but in its silence. The
madman is the author's vehicle, the messenger of the silence that both
threatens the self and calls it forth. In the words of Gavriel's grand-
father from Wiesel's The Gates of the Forest, "Madmen are just wandering
messengers, and without them the world couldn't endure" (14). In
The Testament Paltiel reiterates, "Maimonides is right: a world without
madmen could never exist" (161). Nor could the novel that invokes a
world exist.
The madman is the voice of the radically alien discourse that makes
truth an issue in the novel; the splitting of the self can be an issue only
with respect to a problematic of truth. The madman, therefore, is tied
to a third position that stands above and between the dialogic interac-
tions of the novel. In this position the madman is associated but not to
be identified with Hashem, the One who poses the problem of pres-
ence through the eternal question, Where are you? Given the associa-
tion of the madmen with God, we cannot declare that God is the one
who summons the self, unless this is said "out of that decisive hour of
personal existence when we had to forget everything we imagined we
knew of God, when we dared to keep nothing handed down or learned
or self-contrived, no shred of knowledge, and were plunged into the
night" (Buber, Between 14-15). In the Holocaust novel the madman
plunges us into the night and makes visible the decisive hour of
personal existence that marks the phenomenology of the novel. "God
is not madness," Menachem insists in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall
(148), but God often makes mad those chosen to be His messengers.
Thus in Twilight Wiesel's main character, Raphael, sets out to explore
the relation between madness and prophecy (45). Indeed, his brother
Yoel feigns madness before his Soviet interrogators by turning himself
into the prophet Jeremiah (92-93). Significantly, in Wiesel's view one
important lesson that Jeremiah teaches "all tellers of tales" is that "to
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transmit is more vital than to invent" (Portraits 126). The task that
confronts the split self is to become a bridge-to God, to man, and to
itself. The alien discourse of the madman, then, contains aspects of
prophecy that would bridge the self with the other by way of the Third.
In Singer's Shosha Arele cites the Gemara to point out that "when
the Temple was destroyed God gave the power of prophecy to
madmen" (114). Suc~ a connection between the discourse of the mad-
man and that of prophetic truth as it comes from God is common in the
Holocaust novel. In Kaniuk's Adam Resurrected, for example, one of the
Schwester twins declares, "And He will again reveal Himself to and
speak to the insane! They comprehend, they are sensitive, they shall
see Him. Who are they, though, these madmen of ours? Tell me! ... I'll
tell you. All of us who came back" (51). Mrs. Seizling, the founder of the
asylum-in this tale, asserts, "God has loved them. Spoken with them.
Not with the politicians, not with the kings-but with the psychotics
has He spoken" (50). The Hebrew word used for "psychotic" here is
m'toraf(45), which indeed means "mad," but it can also mean "exiled."
Those who residein Kaniuk's asylum and in the Holocaust novel itself
are exiled from a world reduced to ashes, like the word exiled from
meaning, like the self exiled from itself. The one link that remains for
them-the link to the exiled word, the dead father, the dead child-is
madness. "Only in the dark days of madness," Adam comments on his
relation to the child, "were we able to make a contact of hearts" (366).
Hence "without my madness," Adam cries out, "I am a tabula mortua,
blank as death, zero" (359). For without his madness he is without the
bridge to that Word which posits him as a self and through which he
recognizes the splitting of his self.
This linkage with the Word that signifies the presence of God is
articulated in nearly all Holocaust novels dealing with madness; to be
sure, Holocaust novels must deal with madness. In The Parnas by
Silvano Arieti, Emesto says to the Pardo, "At the price of becoming ill,
you tried to save the image of man. I was right this afternoon when I
said that your illness is part of the Shekhinah with which you are
touched. What is ill in you is intertwined with what is strong and holy
and springs from the same source. Your illness is demanded of you"
(87). Illness is intertwined with but not the same as what is holy. Franz
Rosenzweig has writ~en, "It was a superstition of antiquity, to call
insanity 'divine,' but the road to insanity is divine.... The fear of
insanity need not be greater than, or different from, the fear that ought
to dominate life as a whole: the 'fear of the Lord'" (Glatzer 44). Perhaps
we should reverse Rosenzweig on one point and say that the road to
the divine is fraught with madness. Madness is not the cure but rather
the vaccine, the dose of illness, that opens the way to what is needful.
"At the present level of human evolution," Saul Bellow writes in Mr.
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Sammler's Planet, "propositions were held ... by which choices were
narrowed down to sainthood and madness. We are mad unless we are
saintly, saintly only as we soar above madness" (87). Such is the
ultimate either/or that divides the self. Within the dialectic of the self's
existential condition, the very thing that divides it opens the path to its
reconstitution. In the splitting of the self, what lays hold of the body
becomes a bridge. "The self must be broken in order to become a self,"
Kierkegaard has said (Sickness 199). So the Holocaust novelist speaks
and breaks in the endeavor to restore the relation to the other that
engenders the self through the relation to the character as other.
Like most authors, Lustig comments on himself as author through
his comments on his character in the novel itself. In Diamonds of the
Night, for example, he writes, "A few of the survivors will be somewhat
deranged, although nobody else will be able to tell. They'll be de-
ranged in the sense that their madness will be like an invisible bridge
spanning the distance between what was and what is yet to be" (120).
Thus the author becomes invisible in the text, visible through invisi-
bility, a silence that shrouds every word, a madness that haunts the
illusion of sense. In the moment of the novel's creation the one who
would become a bridge stands on a bridge, like Lustig's Katerina: "She
was standing on the bridge and she must cross it, not just stand there,
even though she might face fire and brimstone on the other side"
(Prayer 29). The event of the novel is the event of just such a crossing
over, not from here to there but from there to here. The phenomeno-
logical task, after all, is to be here, to answer, "Hinehni-Here I am!" To
answer, "Here I am," is to cross over. The Jewish condition is one of
crossing over: to be a Hebrew, an ivriy, to is be one who must avar, that
is, "cross over."
lIse Aichinger's ubersetzen, to "translate" or "carryover," again
comes to mind. Near the end of Herod's Children we see her main
character, the child Ellen, on the edge of that decisiveness that would
make her who she is. Attempting to follow the trains into the Kingdom
of Night, she says, "II want to get to the center, to the bridges.' One
more time she tried to explain everything. Yet it seemed to her while
she spoke that it couldn't be explained, that her thoughts never grew
voice in that silence: she was moving her lips dumbly. What she was
doing could not be reasoned, for it carried its reason within. One has to
go alone to the bridges" (236). The German phrase rendered as "to the
center" is in die Mitte (235), that is, "into the middle." The bridge goes
from there to here, yet it also goes from here to the middle, to the
between that makes up the essence of relation. In the between body and
soul are once again joined together in the embrace that constitutes
relation. We can embrace only the other, as Bakhtin has rightly said, "in
all the moments of his being, his body, and in it his soul" (Estetika 39).
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This, indeed, is what the split self has lost and what the word might
restore: the embrace of and therefore the relation to God, the other, and
itself. If a resurrection of the self is possible, then it can happen only in
the restoration of relation-to the word, to the father, to the child. Only
from the midst of this trinity can the self be reborn.
6
The Resurrection
of the Self
Elie Wiesel has written, "It is not given to man to begin; that privilege is
God's alone. But it is given to man to begin again-and he does so
every time he chooses to defy death and side with. the living" (Mes-
sengers 32). Many commonly view art as a kind of hubris, whereby a
mere mortal assumes or unsurps the role of the Creator to call a world
into being. Such a view cannot apply to the Holocaust novel. There the
mortal does not create but re-creates; there the author does not begin
but begins again. "My purpose and aspirations as a writer," Wiesel
explains, "are not to build but to try to rebuild a vanished universe;
instead of creating characters and situations, I try to re-create them
book by book, story by story, tale by tale" (Against Silence 1:370). The
defiance at work in the Holocaust novel is not the Promethean defiance
of the Creator; it is the human defiance of the Adversary, a defiance of
death, despite every reason, every temptation, to surrender. The Holo-
caust novel occurs where by all rights every human utterance should
have been swallowed up in the silence of death. Upon the utterance of
the word that brings the novel into being, already a resurrection is at
work. "From the moment the Word expires," Andre Neher has said,
"everything is so regulated that it will rise again, since, assuredly, it
was in view of this resurrection, after a given period of silence, that the
Word was pronounced" (23). Ka-tzetnik wrote his first novel, Sunrise
over Hell, as he lay dying. Yet upon the completion of the novel, he
made a sudden and unexpected return to life, as though regenerated
by the word itself (conversation with the author, 13 July 1989).
On the edge of death the man is reborn; resurrection occurs in
cemeteries. "Here it is: life!" writes Ka-tzetnik in Star ofAshes. "Crying
out at you from your own grave: live!" (31). The novel itself cries out
through a voice that bounds back at the man, coming from him and
from beyond him, calling him forth: "Back of him lay Auschwitz-
mute, petrified. He screamed. Heard a voice. Startled, he looked
around. It was his own voice bounding back at him" (190). As the sound
echoes back, the scream transformed into a voice, the resurrection, the
transformation of death into life, is set into motion. The death that is
Auschwitz lies in the pertrified muteness that is Auschwitz. Any life
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that may arise from that death comes with the bounding back of a voice
that breaches the muteness. Hence even over hell the sun may rise, as it
does in the closing lines of Sunrise over Hell: "Red sunrise blazed on his
raw skull. From the distance came rolling a Russian tank, closer. Rising
from the mound of corpses to his knees, Harry Preleshnik appeared to
be one, grown from their midst" (215). In the Hebrew text the novel's
last sentence is more revealing. It reads, V'dumah hayah k'tsumeah v'olah
m'tokhah (184), which may be translated, "And the silence was like a
plant, and it rose up from their midst. " Like a plant, the man is made of
the silence of the dead from which he rises, and he does rise, instilled
with the silence that he must make into a voice.
Like an echo, images from the passage above recur in Ka-tzetnik's
Atrocity: "Will this cry reach an ear after we have all passed from the
world? A voice cannot be burned. Roots. Mute tree roots on Auschwitz
soil. When the time comes will they be able to recount one whit of it?"
(178). Once again, the Hebrew is more suggestive, for the word "roots"
is sharashiym (135), and in Hebrew words themselves are made from
sharashiym, the roots. The silence that rises like a plant has hidden
beneath it roots from which words might be born: a voice cannot be
burned. The roots of the voice are the roots of resurrection. But the
question remains: Will the words cut off at the roots be able to rise up
from the mute soil of Auschwitz? It will be said that in the end
something arises; after all, we hold the novel in our hands. From the
phenomenological standpoint, however, the novel is not simply the
object we hold. It is an event, a process of dialogic interaction under-
taken by a living soul. Because the discourse of the novel is dialogic, it
is open-ended. Every word seeks a response; every utterance rises up
only to die away. "The word already spoken," Bakhtin has noted, "has
a ring of hopelessness in its already having been pronounced: a word
uttered is the dead flesh of meaning" (Estetika 117). Lacan observes
further, "The symbol manifests itself first of all as the murderer of the
thing, and this death constitutes in the subject the eternalization of his
desire. The first symbol in which we recognize humanity in its vestigial
traces is the sepulture" (Language 84). In this case the desire that is
eternalized is the longing for rebirth. The novelist no sooner emerges
from the tomb than the problem of resurrection reestablishes itself.
Once again the author must take up a creation that is a re-creation,
beginning again and ever again.
One is tempted to call to mind the image of Sisyphus descending
his mountain to put his shoulder once more to the rock. To be sure,
Albert Camus summons this image in his concern with "absurd crea-
tion," declaring, "When the images of earth cling too tightly to mem-
ory, when the call of happiness becomes too insistent, it happens that
melancholy rises in man's heart: that is the rock's victory, that is the
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rock itself" (Myth 90). For the Holocaust novelist, however, memory
does not cling; it must be pursued. What the author pursues is not the
memory of earth but the memory of ashes. The rock is not the stone of
his labor but the stone that seals his tomb; it is the petrified word-
lessness that he opposes with his word. How does the human being
transform the scream into a voic~? What is the nature of the response
that is couched in the voice? Where does the memory born of response
take the witness? And when, if ever, does the resurrection come?
These are the questions that shape the author's existential condition
and that lend our concern with the novel its phenomenological aspects.
Metaphysical Laughter
In the face of the death from which the soul would be resurrected,
"revolt is not a solution," as Wiesel has said, "neither is submission.
Remains laughter, metaphysical laughter" (Souls 199). The transforma-
tion of the word that may set the self free originates in this laughter
"Laughter lifts the barriers," Bakhtin writes, "and opens the way to
freedom" (Estetika 339). In his book on Rabelais Bakhtin argues,
"Laughter ... is one of the essential forms of truth concerning the
world as a whole.... Certain essential aspects of the world are ac-
cessible only to laughter" (66). The truth here sought, however, does
not concern the world so much as the collapse of the world and with it
the splitting of the self. Bakhtin makes this point with respect to the
self: "Laughter is essentially not an external but an interior form of
truth" (Rabelais 94). As an element of the inwardness of the human
being, of the depth dimension of the inner being, laughter here takes
on its metaphysical aspect. When the word is exiled from its meaning,
when the symbols of truth become signs of nothing, when the silence
of the sky transformed into a cemetery is deafening-laughter remains
the one avenue to life, the sole distinction between life and death.
Thus we can take Bakhtin's assertion that "death is inseparable from
laughter" (Dialogic 196) to a deeper level. Death is inseparable from
laughter because laughter is inseparable from life's attachment to life,
from that love, that eros, that engenders life. "You asked if I understand
love," says Pedro to Michael in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall. "I
understand it because I understand death, too" (126). He understands
love and death because he knows how to laugh (16, 42). Henri Bergson
has shown that life's attachment to life is a "love for that which is all
love" (212). Pedro understands death because he understands that its
opposite is love. As life's attachment to and affirmation of life, love is
made manifest through laughter. Laughter sows the seed that grows
life from death, word from silence. "The spermatic word," Norman O.
Brown calls it. "The sower soweth the word. In the beginning was the
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word, in the beginning was the deed; in the resurrection, in the
awakening, these two are one: poetry" (265-66). Wiesel, however,
adopts a metaphysical view of laughter that leads him to an anarchic
beginning, to the beginning before the beginning. Then, he writes,
"there was neither the Word, nor Love, but laughter, the roaring,
eternal laughter whose echoes are more deceitful than the mirage of
the desert" (Accident 46). This is the metaphysical laughter that makes
possible the word and the love that underlie human beginnings; this is
the laughter that engenders the poetry that Brown associates with
resurrection and awakening.
Taking poetry in its widest sense, we recall Bakhtin's claim that in
the development of the novel laughter "freed consciousness from the
power of the direct word, destroyed the thick walls that had impris-
oned consciousness within its own discourse, within its own lan-
guage" (Dialogic 60). While this statement may apply to the novel in the
pre-Holocaust era, in the Holocaust novel the author is not trying to
free himself from his own language but from the "emptiness and
silence of an imposed Absence," to use Alvin Rosenfeld's phrase (15).
Laughter makes that silence heard and transforms that absence into a
presence. It is the articulation of the passion of which Gregor's grand-
father speaks in Wiesel's The Gates of the Forest: "The soul needs storm
and fire and dizziness. The body has time; it moves slowly and pru-
dently, step by step, in obedience to laws of gravity, but the soul
brushes time and laws aside; it wants to push forward, regardless of the
cost in pain, or intoxication or even madness" (11). In the French text we
see that the soul veut courir (19), "wants tor run" and rush ahead, a
stronger statement than "wants to push forward." The novel explicitly
describes this rushing forward when Gavriel rolls away the stone that
seals him in the cave with Gregor and goes out to confront the soldiers
who are after him: "Gavriel stood up and examined the first soldier
and then the loudly panting dogs. Gavriel frowned, his shoulders
twitched. Then, in the face of the soldiers and the stupefied dogs, he
burst suddenly into overwhelming laughter" (50). In that laughter we
hear the reverbations of the roaring, eternal laughter of the beginning.
Viewed in its metaphysical aspects, laughter is a component of the
bridge between word and meaning, self and other, God and man.
Metaphysical laughter takes the man beyond the confines of space and
time, of fear and isolation; it has a ring of madness about it, of a mad
struggle for possibility, without which there can be no resurrection.
The madman in Wiesel's Twilight laughed in response to Raphael's
question about whether he saw God at work in the horrors of the
world: "And his laughter frightened Raphael more than his prophecy"
(210). When neither a yes nor a no will suffice, when a no must be
turned into a yes, laughter bursts forth. This confluence of neither/nor
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and both/and comes out elsewhere in the Holocaust novel. In The
Chocolate Deal by Haim Gouri, for example, we read, "And what about
those mouths gaping there in a terrible scream? A mistake, gentleman!
They're not screaming, God forbid. They're laughing" (117). Death and
life, love and death, merge in this emergence of laughter in the scream;
laughter is the initial becoming-heard of the shriek of silence. "Do you
know why he was crucified?" Gregor asks of a certain Jew in The Gates of
the Forest. "I'll tell you: because he never learned to laugh" (58). In the
struggle to choose life over death, to draw life out of death, the Holo-
caust novelist must at the outset learn to laugh.
Aharon Appelfeld opens his novel The Age of Wonders with the
figure of a woman "who burst out laughing ... the woman laughed
and there was a kind of crazy enjoyment in her voice, as if this were
what she had been waiting for all of her life" (9). In the laughter of this
character rings the laughter of the author. We not only confront his
words on the page, but from between the words also arise traces of the
laughter that sets him into motion, raising him up from the dead.
Appelfeld writes, "Angry words, such as I had never heard in our
house before, rent the air between laughter and laughter like the
cawing of crows" (Age 98). The author. has not only testimony to
transmit but also the power of laughter, the power of life over death.
Wiesel makes this point clearly in the closing lines of The Testament. The
stenographer Zupanev, Paltiel's reader and witness, says,
And suddenly it happens: I am laughing, I am laughing at last. ... It's idiotic,
even unjust, but it is the dead, the dead poets who will force men like me and
all the others to laugh. I tell your father and I repeat it to him. Even though he is
no longer living and no gravedigger will ever lower him into the ground
because the ground is cursed and so is heaven. Never mind. I shall carry him,
your big child of a father. I shall carry him a day, a year, ten years, for I must hear
him laugh as well. [346]
In these images are gathered together the father and child that would
be resurrected; in order to bring about their resurrection as well as his
own, the witness must laugh until he hears the dead laugh with him.
Of course, this is madness: it is th~ mad, metaphysical laughter
that bridges one world with another, this world with the world that was
and with the world to come. One recalls a dialogic exchange from
Wiesel's One Generation After: "But ... why are you laughing? So that
you may remember my laughter as well as the look in my eyes. You lie. You
laugh because you are going mad. Perfect. Remember my madness" (48).
Laughter is the means by which madness turns back on itself, back to
life. Wiesel addresses this issue in A Begger in Jerusalem, where he
relates an exchange between Moshe the Madman and the prophet
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Elijah. Says Moshe, "/My weapons? Not tears, not prayers, but laugh-
ter, only laughter. Admit then that laughter too can provoke mira-
cles.'To which the prophet is said to have answered: lIn our day,
Moshe, laughter itself is a miracle, the most astonishing miracle of all' "
(33). Laughter miraculously provokes laughter and invokes a truth that
laughs itself free of a lie. This is the liberation effected by the madman
in his capacity as prophet and messenger. Yoram Kaniuk makes this
point in Adam Resurrected. An important moment in Adam's resurrec-
tion comes when he, who had made his living as a clown, takes on the
role of messenger for those who go out to seek God in the desert: "He,
he is the prophet, he the messenger. It is hard to believe. He wants to
believe just the opposite, that he must return and smack the truth in
their faces like stones from a sling shot: that no, He will not show up,
it's a lie, a joke, their seriousness was Adam's jest" (298). The Hebrew
text does not precisely state "He will not show up" but 10 yitgalah, that
is, "He will not be revealed"; the noun translated as "joke" is ts'hok
(258), which means "laughter." Laughter is the revelation of the one
who will not be revealed.
A modem midrash: Yitzhak was resurrected not when the angel
stayed the knife in his father's hand but when he was able to descend
Mount Moriah in the midst of his name, laughter. Resurrection con-
cerns not only the dead but the living as well, for "death may invade a
creature though life has not yet departed" (Wiesel, Town 98). Thus the
laughter that fuses neither/nor with both/and is the laughter that resur-
rects the living, as we see in a passage from Wiesel's The Oath: "With my
laughter I drive the living to life, the dead to oblivion. With my laughter
I bring together earth and sea, he~ and redemption, enigma and light,
my self and its shell" (86). Driving the living to life, the self returns to
life, resurrected by the laughter that joins body and soul; laughter is the
balm applied to the wound of the split self. The man who can laugh is,
in his laughter, precisely who he is. Through his laughter he makes
others become who they are by making them laugh. "When he laughs,
he laughs," it is said of Signor Torquato in Silvano Arieti's The Parnas.
"You can hear him a mile away. And he makes everybody laugh" (82).
Far more than a sense of humor is at work here: there is a sense of the
eternal, of what is heard from beyond the scope of hearing, "a mile
away." The laughter that overcomes the splitting of the self belongs not
to the physical but" like the self, to the metaphysical. For it arises in a
contradiction of the law of contradiction, making A into not A. It is a
bursting forth of life where there should be only death.
A passage from lIse Aichingers Herod's Children rises up through
an outcry that bespeaks an age when "God had fallen into the hands of
Herod" (124). Aichinger writes:
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You keep only what you give away. Give them what they take from you, for they
grow poorer thereby. Give them your toys, your coats, your lives. Give every-
thing away. He who takes loses. Laugh when they tear the clothes from your
bodies and your caps from your heads. Laugh at the surfeited, at the contented
who have lost hunger and restlessness-man's most precious gifts. Give away
your last piece of bread to guard yourself from hunger; give away your last bit of
property and remain restless. Throw the gleam in your face to the dark, to
strengthen it. [U6]
The Gennan text follows the phrase "give everything away" with um es
zu behalten, "in order to keep it"; "when they tear ... the caps from
your heads" is followed by denn man behalt nur das, was man hergibt (122),
reiterating that "you keep only what you give away. " The insistence on
this truth is an insistence on laughter, for what is offered up is retained
not merely in the act of offering but also in the laughter that is offered
up with it. "It's very important to give," writes Andre Schwarz-Bart,
"when you have nothing" (402), because that is how the self becomes
more than nothing; that is how the lost self regains itself. What remains
to be offered up when one has nothing to offer is laughter, meta-
physical laughter. Laughter begins not where tears leave off; rather, like
faith, it begins where thought leaves off. In laughter lie the beginnings
of the novel, of the word uttered between the laughter.
In A Beggar in Jerusalem Wiesel writes,
Somewhere in this world, Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav used to say, there is a
certain city which encompasses all other cities in the world. And in that city
there is a street which contains all other streets in the city. And on that street
there stands a house which dominates all other houses on the street. And that
house has a room which comprises all other rooms in the house. And in that
room lives a man in whom all other men recognize themselves. And that man is
laughing. That's all he ever does, ever did. He roars with laughter when seen
by others, but also when alone. So I think of Katriel: could he be that man? I
never heard him laugh, but that proves nothing. Laughter may be learned, may
be acquired. Moshe, Moshe the Drunkard, the madman, Moshe will confirm
this in his booming voice. When did he arrive? I didn't notice. But listen to him
roar:
"Come on! What are you waiting for? You're not here to attend a funeral!
Laugh, for heaven's sake, laugh! Let yourselves go! Don't hold back! Laugh!
Louder!" [30-31]
We can see why Wiesel has asserted that for the task of response he has
undertaken he needs the madman (Patterson, In Dialogue 48). The
madman teaches him how to laugh, and laughter, metaphysical laugh-
ter, is the soil in which the seed of response is sown. "To laugh is to
reap," says Neher. "Laughter is words" (236). This insight calls to mind
130 THE SHRIEK OF SILENCE
Bakhtin's claim that "'it is in the word that laughter manifests itself most
variously" (Dialogic 236-37). The word places laughter in a space that is
between self and other, where each may offer it to the other in an act of
response.
The Project of Response
Response implies relation. The project of response is an effort to
resurrect the word from the ashes of words, to raise the dialogic word
of relation, through which the self can work its resurrection. The
responsive word, then, arises from a position of being for-the-other,
from a position of difference, as Levinas describes it, that "turns into
non-indifference, precisely into my responsibility'~ (Otherwise 166).
Wiesel insists that "absence of fire, absence of passion, leads to indif-
ference and resignation-in other words, to death" (Somewhere 128).
The process of resurrection is a process of generating the nonin-
difference of relation, where the dialogic response summons a re-
sponse, as Lazarus was summoned from the grave. In Wiesel's The Oath
a silence is broken in order to save a life, to return a life to life: "Speak,
the old man thinks. The best way. Make him speak. Speak to him. As
long as we keep speaking, he is in my power. One does not commit
suicide in the middle of a sentence. One does not commit suicide while
speaking or listening" (22). What we see in this relation of character to
character also distinguishes the relation of author to character. The
author speaks and makes the character speak so that the character may
come to life and thus return the author to life. Each constitutes a portion
of the testimony that goes into the literary response to the event; both
are required for the transformation of difference into nonindifference,
thus making the survivor into a witness.
In Blood from the Sky Piotr Rawicz declares that lithe only thing that
matters, that will matter, is the integrity of the witness. Be witnesses"
(27). The act of response is an act of bearing witness; the summons to
which the author responds is a summons to become a witness. He who
is resurrected is resurrected as a witness, and through the witness he
bears the man is born to life. In Phoenix over the Galilee Ka-tzetnik asks
where the words go when the paper is turned to ashes (170). Reflecting
on this image, we realize not only where the words go but also whence
they arise. The dead father, the dead mother, the dead child summon
the witness; the words they use go into the witness's own mouth as he
responds to their call. liThe life of the world," Bakhtin maintains, Ilis
contained in its transfer from one mouth to another" (Problems 202).
Thus Ka-tzetnik cries out, IIIn each one's eyes was the command: Tell
it!" (Phoenix 60). From each one's eyes, the Hebrew text reads, comes
the call to take the oath, the shvuah (54), a word that also means
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"testament." Fulfilling the vow, the man becomes one with the word
placed in his mouth by the other, thus drawing the word out of exile
and making his return to life. In Star of Ashes Ka-tzetnik answers, "I
vow on your ash embraced in my arms to be a voice unto you, and
unto the Ka-Tzet now voiceless and consumed; I will not cease to tell
of you even unto the last whisper of my breath. So help me God,
amen" (191). The Hebrew word for "breath" is n'shiymah (191), which is
a congnate of n'shamah, meaning "soul," or "spirit," or "life." Calling
forth the last shred of the soul, the vow to become a voice, the vow to
respond, calls the author back into life. Becoming a voice unto the
voiceless, he is commanded and called forth by his own voice in the
act of response.
Inasmuch as the act of response is an act of testimony, it is also an
act of prayer; the prayer is itself the redeemer sent out of love, the
teshuvah that is both response and redemption. "The important thing,"
Lustig has written, "wasn't who or what you pray to or for, but just
the fact of praying" (Darkness 48). This feature of the literary response_to
the Shoah lends that response its transformational power; it makes the
phenomenology of the novel a phenomenology of resurrection. "The
command is stated by the mouth of him it commands," says Levinas
(Otherwise 147). The one commanded is commanded to rise up and live.
The act of writing that distinguishes the process we call the Holocaust
novel, then, is itself a process of rebirth. In The Periodic Table Primo Levi
declares, "It was exalting to search and find, or create, the right word
. . . to dredge up events from my memory and describe them with the
greatest rigor and the least clutter. Paradoxically, my baggage of atro-
cious memories became a wealth, a seed; it seemed to me that by
writing, I was growing like a plant" (153). The Italian word translated as
"I was growing," crescere (158), suggests an image of rising up, as
though the blank of the page were the soil from which the soul would
rise. "Perishing and death," Bakhtin writes, "are perceived as sowing"
(Dialogic 207). The thing that germinates the seed is the turning back,
within the novel, on the process of creation as a process of the self's re-
creation.
Levi gives this event of the novel and within the novel an even
greater phenomenological accent toward the end of The Periodic Table:
It is my brain, the brain of the me who is writing; and the cell in question, and
within it the atom in question, is in charge of my writing, in a gigantic min-
uscule game which nobody has yet described. It is that which at this instant,
issuing out of a labyrinthine tangle of yeses and nos, makes my hand run along
a certain path on the page, mark it with these volutes that are signs: a double
snap, up and down, between two levels of energy, guides this hand of mine to
impress on the page this dot, here, this one. [232-33]
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The scientist transfonns matter into energy; the artist transfonns mat-
ter into spirit, the inanimate into the animate, mute silence into elo-
quent word. The dead self, the split self, is one reduced to the
chemicals of the periodic table; the resurrected self is the self as matter
transfonned into the self as spirit. Out of the ashes of the dead, life
awakens upon the utterance of a responsive word. In the Holocaust
novel this word is a name, one by which the author names his character
in a memory of himself. This phenomenological movement occurs, for
example, in Ka-tzetnik's Phoenix over the Galilee when his character
becomes an author: "The tentacles of terror coiled around him. And to
save himself his hand shot out in reflex for the pen, as, at that moment,
the first words screamed themselves out of him onto the page" (66). He
writes his name: Harry Preleshnik.
Transforming his outcry into response, the author seeks a resurrec-
tion of himself through the resurrection of his character. As the name
Harry Preleshnik screams itself onto the page, the author rises up from
the page to become who he is. "I shoot up from the launch-pile of
skeletons," Ka-tzetnik relates in a vision from Shivitti, "into the tem-
pest of my own cry of Passion" (104). That cry has the power to raise the
man only insofar as the man would raise the pile of skeletons. "It is
the call and response to one's fellow," argues Neher, "which produces
the miracle. As in the Bible, the Job of the twentieth century is finally
sent back to his neighbor" (222). The resurrection of the self lies in this
relation to the other; the project of response is a project of offering the
self to the other in a salvation of both. It happens between Ka-tzetnik
and his character as the character rises up with his name, and it
happens between character and character as Harry returns his wife,
Galilea, to life: "Harry had rolled away the heavy stone at the mouth of
her soul, and the thoughts dammed up within had burst forth, clear
and flowing" (235). His response opens the mouth of her soul; her
response resurrects him, so that she may declare, "Beloved, I shall put
a new pen in your hands" (238). Thus we see why Galilea is called
Geulah, which, as Alan Yutler has pointed out, means "redemption"
(16). Harry's relation to Galilea expresses the author's relation to Harry,
the character modeled after the author himself. Because the project of
the novel is a project of response, the author needs this other image of
himself, this image of himself as other, in order to become other.
Indeed, there can be no resurrection of the self without the self's
becoming other.
Only through being for-the-other can the dead self return to life.
Hence the author is for-the-character, and the character is for-another,
and each relationship amplifies the other. "We can lay our hands only
upon the other," Bakhtin has asserted. "Only him can we embrace"
(Estetika 39). Only through embrace can the self be resurrected. In The
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Gates of the Forest Wiesel writes, "Two embracing bodies. Mystery
dwells in their union; it is enough that a man and a woman give
themselves to each other for God to confer his powers upon them and
for the world to be brought once more out of chaos" (214-15). In The
Testament Wiesel's character Paltiel writes, "Two persons embrace and
the chasm in their lives is lit up" (120). Before the creation of the sun,
moon, and stars, God called forth the· light: the light of relation, the
light of the word itself, which summons the dialogic relation before a
word has been spoken. The creation of such light is the project of
response, and it is most eloquent in the movement and in the moment
of embrace. The mystery that dwells in this union is the mystery of the
creation, by which the world is drawn out of chaos and the self is raised
from the dead. It is through response-and, more important, through
responsibility-that the chasm that splits the self is spanned, thus
healing the self, as it becomes for-the-other in the act of embrace.
In Wiesel's The Oath Moshe articulates the broader implications of
this responsibility: "In order to realize himself, man must fuse all levels
of being into one; every man is all men. Every man can and must carry
creation of his shoulders; every unit is responsible for the whole" (197).
The pursuit of this responsibility is the key to the project of response,
to the struggle for a return to life through the responsive word. "Before
the face," Levinas has said, "I do not simply remain there contemplat-
ing it, I respond to it" (Ethics 88). In that response, he goes on to argue,
"the glory of the Infinite reveals itself through what it is capable of
doing in the witness" (Ethics 109). In the dialogic relation between self
and other, this third presence works the resurrection. "The Word [of
response] is everything," Wiesel writes in Twilight. "Through the Word
we elevate ourselves or debase ourselves. It is refuge for the man in
exile, and exile for the righteous. How would you pray without it? How
would we live without it? Don't underestimate the Word, my friend.
Don't fight the Word. Let it possess you and in return you will receive
life's most generous offering: the impulse that brings man closer to
God" (98). The translation omits an important line from the French text:
"Quand tu es en danger, elle t'enveloppe; quand tu reves, elle te
protege du cauchemar" (121); "when you are in danger, it wraps itself
around you; when you dream, it protects you from nightmares." The
novelist is faced with an awakening from the most terrible of night-
mares, and he sets out on the most dangerous of paths in his move-
ment toward resurrection. The responsive word, the word of dialogic
relation, is both the way and the light that illuminates the way.
The project of response does not consummate the resurrection of
the self, but it does initiate a movement critical to that resurrection, the
movement of remembrance. Thus, Wiesel has said, "'Zachor v'shamor
b'dibar echad. . . .' We are told, 'Remember and observe' were given in
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one word. Just all these days were created for one day alone, the
Sabbath, all other words were created for one word alone, 'Remem-
ber''' (Dimensions 5). This includes, above all, the responsive word. It
includes every word that goes into the Holocaust novel. "Remember-
ing," Amery says. "That is the cue" (57).
The Movement of Remembrance
"Those who lived would have to remember," Rawicz maintains. "They
would have to stop others from forgetting" (149). This have to arises
when response and responsibility make difference into nonindiffer-
ence. It is the "unimpeachable assignation" of which Levinas speaks,
addressing the relation between self and other: "A fraternity that
cannot be abrogated, an unimpeachable assignation, proximity is an
impossibility to move away without the torsion of a complex, without
'alienation' or fault" (Otherwise 87). Because this assignation to remem-
ber born of responsibility makes it impossible to move away, the
movement of remembrance is a movement of return, a teshuvah that is
both a response and a return. "Rebirth, resurrection, or reawakening,"
Derrida has claimed, "always appropriate to themselves, in their fugi-
tive immediacy, the plentitude of presence returning to itself. The
return to the presence of the origin is produced after each catastrophe"
(310). Ka-tzetnik's Phoenix over the Galilee, as the title itself suggests, is a
novel about resurrection; as such, it is a novel about return-the return
of the word from exile, of the man from death. According to Sidra
DeKoven Ezrahi, moreover, "Wiesel has defined his writing as an act of
commemoration. It is also an act of resurrection" (120).
Because the Holocaust novel undertakes a process of re-creation
rather than creation, it is an act of return. To be sure, the theme of
return abounds in the Holocaust novel; the theme not only belongs to
the content of the novel but also reveals something about the process of
the novel's coming into being. liMy ambition," says Gregor in Wiesel's
The Gates ofthe Forest, "isn't to define myself by victory or defeat, but by
my determination to return to the source" (213). This determination to
return not only distinguishes the movement of remembrance but, as
the character indicates, is also definitively tied to the life-and there-
fore to the resurrection-of the self. A discourse of response and
remembrance, the dialogic discourse of the Holocaust novel is also a
discourse of return. The movement of return in the novel is a return to
prayer, for in prayer alone does the word return from exile. Aharon
Appelfeld makes this point in For Every Sin through the character who
is determined to return to his own source, to his hometown of Buda-
pest. He explains why: liMy forefathers came from there. I want to
learn how to pray from them. I have a need for prayer. Do you under-
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stand me?" (125). Thus the man would seek a resurrection of the self in
a resurrection of the word of the father. The return to the source is not
only a physical return to the place of one's birth (although this motif is
common in the Holocaust novel), but it is also a metaphysical return to
the father, a resurrection of the dead father.
In Appelfeld's To the Land of the Cattails a woman named Toni sets
out with her son Rudi to return to her mother and father. "It's good
we've come back," she says to her son. "I am very content that we've
returned. A person must, in the end, return" (9). The connection of this
return with a resurrection of the self is established at the outset of the
novel: "Wonder of wonders: she had the power to renew herself, . . .
to begin anew" (5). Resurrection is a re-surrection, not a beginning but
a beginning again, just as remembrance is a re-membrance. In Tzili: The
Story ofaLife Appelfeld articulates the bond between· remembrance and
return through a character giving a funeral oration for a suicide victim.
"He spoke about memory," the author relates, "the long memory of the
Jewish people, the eternal life of the tribe, and this historic necessity of
the return to the motherland" (161). The Hebrew word for "mother-
land" here is moledet (72), a word that also means "fatherland" and
"birthplace," the source of one's life. Rebirth occurs in this return to the
birthplace, and memory here is memory of the way back, invoked at
the graveside as the site from which the return is initiated. Yet the
turning back in the movement of return is not a movement backward
but a movement forward. Thus when Danny asks Manny in Lustig's
Darkness Casts No Shadow why he is continually looking back, Manny
declares that it is because he is moving forward, to a new life (109). The
life that lies ahead is to be reached in a movement of return.
Lustig examines this truth more thoroughly in the story titled "The
Return" in Night and Hope. Realizing that the false self, the forged self,
he had tried to become meant the death of his self and soul, the main
character, Hynek Tausig, longs to return to life by returning to the self
he is, to himself as a Jew among Jews: "He was possesed by the single
overpowering wish: to get in among them. To be one of that yellow-
branded herd" (34). The Czech word translated as "branded" is
oznaCkovaneho (22), the root of which is znak or "sign." In this case the
sign of the yellow star is a sign of death, but in the movement of return
the sign is inverted, returned to its originl meaning, where the Magen
David is the sign of life. Death, then, is turned into life. When Tausig is
about to cross over the fence to join those who bear the sign, he thinks,
"For you it means only a few steps and for me-just now it means
everything that is called life" (36). Returning to the Jews, "he was born
anew this moment" (42). Only by joining those marked for death can
Tausig be born anew into life; only by dying can he be resurrected.
Wiesel writes, "The problem is not: to be or not to be. But rather: to be
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and not to be. What it comes down to is that man lives while dying, that
he represents death to the living" (Accident 81). Just as no man lives
alone, so is no man resurrected alone. The remembrance of the other
that brings about the resurrection of the self resurrects the other within
the self.
Hence Ka-tzetnik's cries out in Shivitti: "They and the others are
buried within me, and continue living each his own life within me" (18).
Bakhtin remarked that "in all the cemeteries there are only others"
(Todorov 151). If Levinas is correct in his claim that "subjectivity is the
other in the same" (Otherwise 25), then the resurrection of the self
entails the resurrection of the other who lies in the cemetery. In the
movement of ,remembrance the memory of the other invades the
memory of the self. Thus in An Estate of Memory Ilona Karmel writes,
"'Dead,' said the nameless faces, 'Dead,' the voices that had no face;
and more were coming, were winding around her-she was the spool,
they the thread; she the pit, they the enormous fruit" (386). In the event
of the Holocaust novel the living do not raise the dead, but the dead
raise the living. This is why the children in Aichinger's Herod's Children
cry out, "Our ~ead aren't dead!" (48). This is what underlies Yehuda
Amichai's statement in Not ofThis Time, Not ofThis Place: "The living do
not go to the dead-it is the dead who come back and dwell with the
living" (262). In all the cemeteries there are only others, but the dead of
the Holocaust were robbed of their cemeteries, their ashes cast upon
the wind and scattered throughout the air we breathe, invading us
with every breath we take, permeating the spirit that dwells in the
breath and the word that vibrates on the breath. They are also scattered
across the pages of the Holocaust novel. The remembrance of the dead
is a remembrance not of the past but of the other before whom we
stand. Andre Neher wrote, "The final letter of the Hebrew alphabet is
tav, which indicates the second person of the future· tense and thus a
direction of the man who is summoned toward an infinitely open
future" (228). The voice that summons the man from his tomb calls him
into this open-ended future.
In what might at first appear to be a contradiction of Amichai's
statement cited above, Wiesel writes, "Our dead take with them to the
hereafter not only clothes and food, but also the future of their decen-
dants" (Accident 113). 'The present of which Amichai speaks, however,
is tied to the future that Wiesel invokes. Dwelling with the living in the
present, the dead draw the living into the future. The silence of the
dead is the silence of what Neher calls "the radiations of the future."
Among the dimensions of time, he explains, "the future alone is
completely silent, in its plentitude but also in its remarkable am-
bivalence" (168-69). This silence is the silence of "a still latent, unuttered
future Word," as Bakhtin puts it (Problems 90), the silence of the word
Resurrection of the Self 137
that would bring about the resurrection of the self. "If I could remem-
ber, I'd be saved," Gregor reflects in Wiesel's The Gates of the Forest. "But
memory is somehow closed" (169). The memory that would redeem
and resurrect the self is a memory of the future. The connection
between resurrection and remembrance lies in the connection between
remembrance and the future. Gouri writes, "An abyss opens between
remembering and remembered, and that's where the rivers rush, that's
where the year's seasons are, and that's where dark gray snow-covered
cities are-cities, marble and gold from the sun. Kindled violet. And
that's where the right of the wanderers is to defy silence, to dream, and
go on" (83). The rivers and the seasons rush toward the future. The
abyss between remembering and remembered is the memory of the
future.
Wiesel's main character in Dawn asks his friend Gad, "You want my
future? What will you do with it?" Gad replies, "I'll make it into an
outcry" (20). The movement of remembrance makes the future into an
outcry, into a shriek of that silence that distinguishes the future. With-
out this outcry born of the memory of the future, there can be no
resurrection of the self. For this is the cry of the self's coming into being,
of its rebirth, the cry of the novel itself as it emerges from the silence.
Thus A. Anatoli, for example, insists that he did not write his novel Babi
Yar in order to recall the past (328); thus he includes in his novel a
"Chapter from the Future" (378f£). This orientation is what makes his
"document in the form of a novel" something other than a document;
this is what makes his movement of remembrance a movement for-
ward. Similarly, chapter 3 of The Whole Land Brimstone by Anna Langfus
is titled "In Pursuit of Tomorrow," a phrase that characterizes the
pursuit of the novel itself. Indeed, the closing lines of the novel open up
that horizon to disclose the abyss from which the self might be resur-
rected: "I was still in the dark, lying on the trunk. And I told myself
that, up above, one of those countless days that I still had to live
through must already be dawning" (318). Alongside the image of the
woman lying in the dark, as in a tomb, we have the light that is yet to
be, the radiation of the future from which the novel emerges. In the
French text the suggestion of resurrection is more potent, since the
word "dawning" here is a rendition of se lever (311), "to rise up." The
thing that raises up the light of tomorrow from the darkness of the self
is the movement of remembrance. "What I am is only what I will be
without me," Jabes has written (57). The act of memory enacts this
"will be."
One of the most explicit statements concerning memory as mem-
ory of the future is found in Amichai's Not ofThis Time, Not ofThis Place,
where Joel asserts, "Things are beginning to move. One thing im-
pinges on another. The confusion is assuming form. And I was over-
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come with a strange sense of remembering things that were about to
happen" (91-92). The word IIthing," which appears several times in this
passage, is a translation of davar (140), a Hebrew term that also means
IIword." Memory here is memory of words about to be uttered, the
unuttered future word about to be drawn out of the silence of exile.
From the standpoint of the memory of the future, lithe present
passes," as Rosenzweig has noted, IInot because the past prods it on
but because the future snatches it toward itself" (Star 328). Thus human
being, Ortega y Gasset says, IIconsists not so much in what it is as in
what it is going to be and, therefore, in that which is not yet" (43). The
movement of remembrance that issues from the literary response to
the Holocaust takes the human being from the silence of the ashes to
the silence of the yet-to-be. This is the silence from which, in the act of
remembrance, the word is about to burst forth, about to speak, about
to summon the self to life. The resurrection that is yet to be, then,
begins with the establishment of a new silence over against that silence
with which the novelist initially collides.
Confronting the Yet-ta-Be
Bakhtin writes that "the definition given to me lies not in the categories
of temporal being but in the categories of the not-yet-existing, in the
categories of purpose and meaning, in the meaningful future, which is
at odds with anything I have at hand in the past or present. To be myself
for myself means yet becoming myself (to cease becoming myself . ..
means spiritual death)" (Estetika 109). Bakhtin goes on to explain what
characterizes this life rooted in what is yet to be: III live in the depths of
myself through faith and hope in the ongoing possibility of the inner
miracle of a new birth" (Estetika 112). This is what belongs to the yet-to-
be: a new birth, a resurrection of the self. In The Dialogic Imagination
Bakhtin describes this new birth as a metamorphosis: "The idea of
metamorphosis retains enough energy . . . to comprehend the entire
life-long destiny of a man, at all its critical turning points. Here lies its
significance for the genre of the novel" (114). In the event of the
Holocaust novel both author and character are brought to the threshold
of the turning point, where past and future, death-and resurrection,
word and silence meet. The novelistic word is not only formed, then,
"in an atmosphere of the already spoken," as Bakhtin puts it, but is also
IIdetermined by that which has not been said but which is needed"
(Dialogic 280). On the edge of what is needed, silence invades'the word
and transfigures the man. What is forever needed is the resurrection of
the self.
In Touch the Wat~ Touch the Wind Amos Oz takes his main character
to the brink of this metamorphosis with the character's return to the
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land of Israel: "The time came for a new, almost idyllic reincarnation, a
kind of virgin birth. Pomeranz had finally prepared himself for work-
ing on the land" (70). This is a return to the source, to the mother, to the
womb of the soul from which the man might be born again. Indeed,
the Hebrew word for "reincarnation," gilgul (76), is laden with sug-
gestive connotations. It is the key term, for example, in the phrase gilgul
m'hilot, the "rolling of the dead" under their graves on their way to
Israel for the resurrection; it is not the resurrection, but a movement
toward the resurrection about to be enacted. The meeting of word and
silence in this movement comes out in an exchange between two of
Pomeranz's students in Israel: "The air is different in his room," says
one. "As if he's always expecting a visitor," replies the other. "And that
silence. Even when he talks to you, it's as if he's talking in silence" (78).
The expectation of the visitor orients the silence in the man's words
toward the yet-to-be. The one who is yet to come is the one who may
work the resurrection. In Blood from the Sky Rawicz asks whether "our
only real betrayal is the one we commit against silence" (295). If this is
the case, then the betrayal of silence is a betrayal of the one yet to come,
a betrayal of what has been given but is yet to be received.
In Wiesel's A Beggar in Jerusalem Katriel declares, "There is the
silence which preceded creation; and the one which accompanied
the revelation at Mount Sinai. The first contains chaos and solitude, the
second suggests presence, fervor, plentitude. I like the second. I like
silence to have a history and be transmitted by it" (108). Commenting
on the silence of Mount Sinai, Wiesel has said, "There are certain
silences between word and word. How was this silence transmitted?
This is the silence I have tried to put in my work, and I have tried to link
it to that silence, the silence of Sinai" (Against Silence 1:273). Each year
the Jews celebrate the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai on the sixth of
Sivan-the giving, not the receiving, for it is yet to be received. In this
yet-to-be lies the silence of Sinai. It is the silence of "perfect together-
ness" that Rosenzweig describes: "In eternity the spoken word fades
away into the silence of perfect togetherness-for union occurs in
silence only; the word unites, but those who are united fall silent....
The word itself must take man to the point of learning how to share
silence. His preparation begins with learning to hear" (Star 308-9). At
Sinai the word emerges through the silence that arises between word
and word in a dialogic interaction. The task of the author is to generate
a dialogic response to that interaction and thus become part of both the
word and the silence. The act of response as a hearing is the key to
receiving what was given, and the movement of remembrance is the
key to its transmission. Response, however, engenders the need to
respond, and ever again the human being is returned to the task in the
movement of return. "For ultimately the choice is a limited one,"
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Wiesel points out. "We can answer God's silence with human words-
or respond to God's words with human silence. But there too the road
is not without obstacles: What if the silence of one is the language of the
other?" (Somewhere 200). The author, a translator of silence, must trans-
late the silence that preceded the creation into the silence of Sinai, using
words that are filled with the silence of the yet-to-be. Out of this silence
emerges the resurrection of the self upon the coming of the visitor
forever expected.
Yet like the next breath that is to follow upon the breath we draw,
the awaited coming is not so much the coming of a personage as the
coming of an event, a stretching forth of the soul toward the othey in a
redemption and resurrection of the self. We are speaking, of course,
about the messianic event that comprises the yet-to-be of spiritual life.
"Such is the disquieting beauty of the messianic adventure," says
Paltiel in Wiesel's The Testament. "Only man, for whose sake the Mes-
siah is expected, is capable and worthy of making his advent possible.
What man? Any man. Whosoever desires may seize the keys that open
the gates of the celestial palace and thus bring power to the prisoner.
The Messiah, you see, is a mystery between man and himself" (72).
The not-yet-existing, to recall Bakhtin's phrase, lies between man and
himself-the thing sought, not the thing found. "The great thing,"
insists David Aboulesia in The Testament, "is not to be the Messiah but
to seek him" (163). For to seek the Messiah is to seek the relation
between self and other that brings life to both. "What is the Messiah,"
Moshe asks in Wiesel's The Oath, "if not man transcending his solitude
in order to make his fellow-man less solitary? To tum a single human
being back toward life is to prevent the destruction of the world, says
the Talmud" (90-91). The resurrection of the self does not, cannot, occur
in isolation; ratherp it is an event that is yet to transpire in the between of
relation.
Confronting this yet-to-be, one realizes that what is actualized is
never what is sought. Lazarus must die and rise again; even Jesus must
come again. Just as a word uttered is the dead flesh of meaning, so the
relation already established must be regenerated. Here lies the tension
between the hope and faith in a new birth. This is what "separates
every Jewish generation," as Rosenzweig has observed, "into those
whose faith is strong enough to give themselves up to an illusion, and
those whose hope is so strong that they do not allow themselves to be
deluded. The former are the better, the latter the stronger. The former
bleed as victims on the altar of the eternity of the people, the latter are
the priests who perform the service at the altar. And this goes on until
the day when all will be reversed, when the belief of the believers will
become truth" (Glatzer 350). On this altar of eternity the dying and
rebirth in the resurrection of the self take place. The yet-to-be does not
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belong to the future, which will be actualized, but to the eternal, which
both transcends and cuts through time. The eternity of the truth lies in
the potentiality of the faith. The movement of remembrance, then, is a
movement of faith that imparts an element of the eternal to what is
remembered. "As long as you know how to remember," writes Lustig,
"when people remember something that's happened, it becomes eter-
nal" (Diamonds 162). Once again the character articulates the task of the
author-knowing how to remember, how to re-member, re-surrect,
the self.
In Lustig's Diamond of the Night an old man confronts the eternal
aspect of the yet-to-be in a passage where the pronoun he can refer not
only to the character but to the author as well: "He could feel that to live
and to die meant an eternity made up of people who were and the
people who are yet to be, that eternity which is only now joining life
with everything beyond life. He knew now what it was. The dead are
the best in what they give to the world at this moment. Because nothing
is worth more than life" (174). The process of the creation of the novel is
a process of joining life with everything beyond life; it is a process of
receiving at this moment what the dead give to life. In the event of the
novel's creation what is beyond and yet to be is couched in the present,
in the novelist's becoming present upon the utterance of the word as it
is forming but yet unformed-like the prayer at the end of Wiesel's The
Gates of the Forest: "His voice trembled, timid, like that of the orphan
suddenly aware of the relationship between death and eternity, be-
tween eternity and the word. He prayed for the soul of his father and
also for that of God. He prayed for the soul of his childhood and, above
all, for the soul of his old comrade, Leib the Lion, who, during his life,
had incarnated what is immortal in man" (225-26). In these lines that
come at the open-ended closure of the novel, the author gives voice to
all that goes into its creation. Upon the utterance of the prayer Gregor is
returned to himself, resurrected from all that had split the self. For a
moment that is filled with eternity, we see the word returned from
exile, the self returned to the father, the child returned to the self. We
see what was merge with what is yet to be in an affirmation of all that is
immortal in man.
An important phenomenological feature of what is voiced in this
prayer from The Gates of the Forest is absent from the translation, but it
appears in the French text. For the phrase "for that of God" Wiesel
writes, por celle de Dieu dont l'ame se fait priere (236), that is, "for the soul
of God who leads the so~l to prayer." Here one is reminded of Bubel's
statement that "men believe they pray to God, but this is not so, for the
prayer itself is divinity" (Legend 27). Paul Tillich has declared, "It is God
Himself who prays through us, when we pray to Him" (New Being 137).
The resurrection of the self bears not only the resurrection of the other
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but also the redemption of God. Thus God brings the redemptive
prayer to the lips of the one who longs for redemption, in an effort to
seek His own redemption. In Wiesel's The Testament a friend asks
Paltiel, who is in a hospital, what he wants: II/Redemption,' I said. And
I hastened to add, 'In this place I have the right to demand and receive
everything; and what I demand is redemption."So do I,' said my
companion sadly. '50 do I. And so does He'" (316). In Twilight Wiesel
states that "divine redemption depends on human redemption" (100),
but the reverse is also true. Setting right the time out of joint requires
the reestablishment of the relation between time and eternity, between
the human being and the Eternal One. The author's expression of the
permutation of time is an effort to regain a relation to the eternal, to
open up a place where the Eternal One can enter time, as He longs to
do. liThe glorious resurrection of the dead is commencing," .writes
Gouri. "Time is amazed" (108). The event of the Holocaust novel is the
commencement of the resurrection of the self-and of God-that is
eternally yet to be. It is the voicing ofa prayer that, though it is finished,
is never fulfilled.
In Paroles d'etranger Wiesel posits a relation between literature and
prayer: "Both prayer and literature impart to and confer upon everyday
words another sense; both appeal to that which is most personal in
man, to the most elevated of his needs" (166). Need is by definition
what is not yet, and the most elevated of needs is the need for resurrec-
tion and redemption, both human and divine. It is in prayer-and the
prayerlike aspects of the novel-that the silence of what is needed
makes itself heard. Wiesel writes, "Through prayer man is engaged in
an eternal dialogue with God. Thanks to prayer, to its intoxicating and
turbulent accents, God becomes present. Better: God becomes pres-
ence. And everything becomes possible and meaningful: here the
Supreme Judge, here the Father of humanity, leaves His celestial
throne to live and move among His human creatures. And, in tum,
here the soul transported by its prayer leaves its abode and rises to
heaven. The substance of language, and the language of silence-that
is what prayer is" (Paroles 171-72). That is what the Holocaust novel must
become in its efforts to draw the resurrection of the self out of the
silence of the yet-to-be. Like prayer, the novel creates an opening for
the human ascent and divine descent, a portal through which time and
eternity, word and silence, now and yet-to-be can merge. For "it is from
the Other," to use Lacan's expression, "that the subject receives even
the message he emits" (Eerits 305). It is for the Other, for the Bakhtinian
"over-I," that the self undertakes the labor of rebirth.
One can thus ask whether the novel, like a prayer, is itself divine. If
the event of the novel is part of God's endeavor to find redemption, can
the novel be viewed as an utterance of God? To reply either yes or no to
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this question would be misleading. The answer is both yes and no, or
rather, it is a no that is and a yes that is yet to be, an affirmation silently
utte~edwhen the last word of the novel falls silent. Recall, for example,
the final note from Verdi's Requiem as Josef Bor describes it in The Terezin
Requiem. Verdi, says the main character, "had a master's grasp of what a
prayer for the dead should be: there somewhere in eternity, where the
last note of the Requiem falls silent, there even you, as dead men, set
free from torment and hardship, there even you shall find liberty"
(88-89). Thus the character tells us what the novel itself is trying to be.
Because the resurrection of the self belongs to the eternity of the yet-to-
be, the ultimate task of the novelist is not to speak but to fall silent. But
you cannot be saved, as Aichinger puts it, "if you don't fall in the
water" (32). You cannot be resurrected if you do not die away; you
cannot fall silent-and in so falling rise up-if you do not speak. Hence
the novel is a no that harbors a yes, a refusal that promises an affirma-
tion, a going under that moves toward a rising up, in a repeated
confrontation of now with what is yet to be. Lacan writes, "There
where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an
extinction that is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, 'I' can come
into being and disappear from what I say" (Ecrits 3(0). So it is with the
discourse of the novel.
Thus we find in many novels the positing of a resurrection of the
self without its fulfillment. In the opening pages of Landscape in Con-
crete by Jakov Lind, for instance, Gauthier Bachmann indicates that he
had always fantasized about being buried and then rising up from the
grave (13-14). Bachmann's fantasy by definition cannot be actuality. In
Ka-tzetnik's Phoenix over the Galilee we see that even if the man should
rise, it is only so that he can fall and rise again. It is said of Harry
Preleshnik that "he would always be vomited forth-even as Ausch-
witz and the river and the bomb had vomited him forth" (167). In
Karmel's An Estate of Memory Aurelia survives death to give birth, not
only to her child but also to herself (121). And, of course, one cannot
forget the title character in Mr. Sammler's Planet by Saul Bellow: "What
besides the spirit should a man care for who has come back from the
grave? However, and mysteriously enough, it happened, as Sammler
observed, that one was always, and so powerfully, so persuasively,
drawn back to human conditions" (109). Resurrection, as something
both yet to be and forever repeated, is a matter concerning this world
and this life. The project of response involves the response of a human I
to a human Thou; the return that comes in the movement of re-
membrance is a return to human relation under human conditions. For
in the realm of this relation, in the between of this relation, the spirit
itself rises rom the dead-repeatedly.
I.B. Singer makes this point in Enemies: A Love Story: "Herman saw
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in Tamara's return a symbol of his mystical beliefs. Whenever he was
with her, he re-experienced the miracle of resurrection" (122). In this
relation between man and wife we have the highest expression of the
highest relation. Here, in Buber's words, "the lines of relationships
intersect in the eternal You. Every single You is a glimpse of that.
Through every single You the basic word addresses the eternal You" (1
and Thou 123). Through the human word returned from exile the
human being is returned to life. With that resurrection of the human
comes the resurrection of the spirit.
Spirit in its human manifestation is man's response to his You. Man speaks in
many tongues-tongues of language, of art, of action-but the spirit is one; it
is response to the You that appears from the mystery and addresses us from the
mystery. Spirit is word. . . . Spirit is not in the I but between I and You. It is not
like the blood that circulates in you but like the air in which you breathe. Man
lives in the spirit when he is able to respond to his You. He is able to do that
when he enters into this relation with his whole being. [Buber, I and Thou 89]
Entering into this relation is the whole purpose of the Holocaust novel,
as the author seeks a resurrection of the self that is no sooner realized
than it must be repeated. "The more I respond the more I am responsi-
ble," Levinas points out. "The more I approach the neighbor with
whom I am encharged, the further away I am" (Otherwise 98). The task
increases with its accomplishment.
7
The Implication
of the Reader
In The Dialogic Imagination Mikhail Bakhtin argues that the novel "and
the world represented in it enter the real world and enirch it, and the
real world enters the work and its world as part of the process of its
creation, as well as part of its subsequent life, in a continual renewing of
the work through the creative perception of listeners and readers"
(254). This statement describes what we have called a phenomenolog-
ical approach to the novel as an event. Examining what occurs in the
process of the novel's creation, we deal not only with author and
character but with the reader as well. Even before the novel is read,
even if it is never read, even as it is written, the reader comes into play
in the midst of its creation. All of the difficulties we have addressed-
exile, death, and resurrection-not only involve the author in relation
to the character but also lay claim to the reader in relation to both. The
reader is not a passive observer but an active participant in the process
of the novel's creation; the reader encounters the text as a living human
voice. In the struggle for understanding, the reader's "understand-
ing," as Bakhtin has shown, "bears an actively responsive character"
(Estetika 246). Hence, Bakhtin goes on to argue, "the event in the life of
the text-that is, its genuine essence-develops along the boundary
between two consciousnesses, two subjects" (Estetika 285). The conscious-
ness within one subject is tied to that subject's consciousness of the
other. The one, therefore, is implicated by the other. In the framework
of a phenomenology of the Holocaust novel, we as readers are ul-
timately thrown back on ourselves in our investigation of these texts.
Confronting this event that is a re-creation, we confront the re-creation
of ourselves through our responsibe participation in the event.
My voice, then, must take part in that dialogic utterance that
endeavors to return the word from exile. The death of father and child
that splits the soul of the author also sends cracks through my own
being. At the boundary between myself and this other I stand on the
threshold of my own needful resurrection, where, in my act of re-
sponse, I am cast into the categories of the yet-to-be. Just as the author
must become for-the-other in the utterance, so must I become for-the-
author in my response. Indeed, a number of these authors summon
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their readers in a direct address: Piotr Rawicz in Blood from the Sky (146),
Primo Levi in The Periodic Table (224), and A. Anatoli in Babi Yar (150). In
these instances the readers are positioned within the text, posited by
the author in much the same way as a character might be situated in the
text. Already the readers are both here and there, chosen before they
choose; already the task of establishing a presence before the text
requires a movement into the text and back again. This implication of
the reader also arises indirectly through character-to-character rela-
tions, where one character struggles to invoke a response, a reading,
from another character. In Ka-tzetnik's Phoenix over the Galilee, for
instance, Galilea longs for Harry lito see her words just as she could see
them, even if she could not yet get out the sounds" (217). Seeing her
words, Harry is the one who would roll back lithe heavy stone at the
mouth of her soul" (235). Thus receiving what is offered, the reader
becomes an essential participant in the author's resurrection, just as the
author poses the problem of resurrection for the reader.
In The Testament Elie Wiesel structures his entire novel around a
relation between an author and a reader, between Paltiel and Zupanev.
Significantly, Zupanev is not only a reader but also a stenographer, so
that his reading of Paltiel consists of a responsive rewriting of Paltiel, a
process by which Zupanev is himself transformed into a witness
whose testimony invokes yet another reader, Paltiel's son Grisha. "I
must implant in you his memory and mine/" says the stenographer to
the child. III must, my boy" (346). Here we see the merging of word,
memory, and human being in the act of reading. Bakhtin insists, liThe
text never appears as a dead thing; beginning with any text/ we always
arrive ... at the human voice, which is to say we come up against the
human being" (Dialogic 252-53). The joining of word with word within
the text implicates the joining of the reader's word with the text itself,
by which the soul of the one enters into a relation with the soul of the
·other. "To join two words/" Wiesel writes in The Fifth Son, "requires as
much power as to join two beings" (174). To join two words is to reunite
word and meaning in the space between them, and to reunite word
and meaning is to resurrect the self through a relation to another. Says
Menachem in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall, "What binds one word
to another is no less mysterious than what binds one human being to
another" (147). The mystery abides in the between, and it is in the realm
of this between that the act of reading takes place, that the event of the
novel occurs. "I require a You to become," Buber writes (1 and Thou 62).
So does the author require a reader for the novel to come into being.
The event of the novel in its phenomenological aspects, then, is an
event of encounter. "The aim of every book, of every tale/" Wiesel has
said, "is to initiate as many encounters on as many levels as possible:
between writer and reader, speaker and listener, fact and fiction,
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imagination and reality, past and present" (Against Silence 1:310).
"Every encounter quickens the steps of the Redeemer; let two beings
become one and . . . creation will have meaning" (Wiesel, Souls 33).
The reader, therefore, is implicated in the exile of the word, the death of
the father, and the death of the child; the reader is also a split self in
need of redemption. There can be no redemption in isolation, no
resurrection of the self without the resurrection of the other. To be
transformed into a witness, then, is to be cast into a position of
responsibility. That position is characterized by the presence of a third
party whom the reader affirms in responding to the text. In this
relation, too, the reader is implicated. Thus the act of reading is an "act
of consciousness motivated by the presence of a third party alongside
the neighbor approached. A third party is also approached; and the
relationship between the neighbor and the third party cannot be indif-
ferent to me when I approach. . . . To be on the ground of the significa-
tion of an approach is to be with another for or against a third party"
(Levinas, Otherwise 16). In the case at hand the IIneighbor" is the author,
and the "approach" is the process of responsive reading. The reader
may reject or accept but cannot refuse the third party, since from this
third position the truth of the reader's relation is called into question.
Amost Lustig has said that "between the lines of human thought
there was always a space in which one could read differently" (Night
172). That between-space is inhabited by the third party, and it is by
virtue of this Third that the reader is implicated: the reader also has a
reader. The third party, the reader's reader, therefore, is the one in
whose presence and through whose presence the reader is trans-
formed into a witness. The third party implicates the reader as irre-
placeable and therefore as responsible. There is no standing before the
text without standing for something, answering with one's whole
being for one's being.
Reader into Witness
The epigraph to the "Mter-Word and Fore-Word" of Ka-tzetnik's
Shivitti is a citation of Jeremiah 32:44. "And subscribe the deeds, and
seal them. And call witnesses (105). The deeds are subscribed, in-
scribed, and sealed upon the soul of the reader. Engaging the voice of
the author, the reader receives the author's testimony in a transfer of
the word not from mouth to ear but from mouth to mouth. The mouth-
to-mouth transfer transforms the reader into a witness. Indeed, such
an interchange distinguishes the process of becoming a self in relation
to another, a reader in relation to the author. "Subjectivity is the other in
the same. The other in the same determinative of subjectivity is the
restlessness of the same disturbed by the other" (Levinas, Otherwise
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25). Becoming a witness, the reader becomes one human being impli-
cated by what befalls another; this is the restlessness of which Levinas
speaks. This invasion of the self by the other finds expression in many
Holocaust novels, where the character-to-character relation bespeaks
the relation between author and reader. Ka-tzetnik, for example, might
well be addressing the reader when he writes, IIAll bodies are now-
your body, just as the death of anyone body is now-the death of your
own" (Star 70). In this statement the physical and metaphysical inter-
twine; the disturbance of the same by the other is just such a con-
fluence of opposites, of death and life, body and soul.
The author testifying on behalf of the dead transmits to the reader
the souls of the dead. Assessing such a text is not a matter of explicating
form and content in a strictly aesthetic sense but of bearing witness to
those voices that would not be consumed. Thus the text itself debunks
those critical isms that constitute an attitude of flight, as when Bach-
mann flees from the German installation that signifies death in Jakov
Lind's Landscape in Concrete. Suddenly, he "stopped to sniff at the air or
listen to silent voices-as Schnotz had done. As if the dead man's soul
had gone into him" (48). So the silent voices conveyed by the author
enter the voice of the reader, who now must either bear witness to that
received or betray the one summoning. There is still more at work in
the restlessness of the reader, however. Paltiel, in Wiesel's The Testa-
ment, speaking of his dead mother and father, declares, "I was taking
my family with me; my life would become their tomb" (293). Thus
Paltiel becomes a witness, his life bespeaking those voices that have
fallen silent; thus Paltiel implicates the reader. In the process of creating
the novel the author rolls away the stone that seals the tomb signified
by the character; in the process of reading the novel the witness
becomes the vessel of what the author would release. Amost Lustig
expresses this in Diamonds of the Night through the voice of an old man
who asserts, liThe spirit of those who have already died has passed into
the lives of those who aren't born yet" (154). Hence the event of reading
is present in the event of writing.
Because the reader disturbs the author in the midst of the novel's
creation, the author is able to transmit the souls of the dead to those
who have not yet read the novel. This interidentification of the author
as witness and the reader as witness comes out quite clearly in Ana-
toli's address to the reader in Babi Yar: "You could have been me, and I
could now have been you, reading this page" (45). This expression of
subjectivity in the novel as the other in the same is set up at the novel's
outset, where Anatoli insists, "I am writing it as though I were giving
evidence under oath in the very highest court" (2). The author's stance
as witness makes the reader into a witness; taking the stand, the author
places the reader on the stand. In Yehuda Amichai's Not of This Time,
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Not ofThis Place the relation of Dr. Manheim to Joel parallels this relation
of reader to author. "Dr. Manheim is one of the important witnesses in
my life," says Joel. "He is he witness of my childhood." At this his lover
Patricia asks, "Is life for you always a trial that you must have wit-
nesses? Why, this is awful. And who is the judge?" He answers, "You"
(263). Like the reader, Dr. Manheim becomes a witness as he is in-
voked; Joel calls him forth as he writes him in. In the process of the
novel's writing, the author calls forth the reader. Just as there is a judge
for Joel, so there is a judgment of the reader's relation to the novel.
Neither the author nor the reader, then, acts alone. Each is for the other,
and both are under the eye of a third.
"Consciousness," Levinas has said, "is born as the presence of a
third party.... It is the entry of the third party, a permanent entry,
into the intimacy of the face to face" (Otherwise 160). Between author
and reader the character posits a third position insofar as the character
bears a world or a community to which author and reader must
answer. To come to consciousness is to come before a world. "No
man," Amichai writes, "dies alone or loves alone; his generation is
born with him and accompanies him in his loves and in his death"
(320). What is translated as "accompanies him" in Hebrew is nimtsa imo
b'sha'at (597), which means "is present with him in the hour of" his
death. The third presence in the relation between two implicates the
one in the face of the other. Consciousness breeds conscience. Levinas
explains, "The implication of the one in the other signifies the assigna-
tion of the one by the other. This assignation is the very signifyingness
of signification, or the psyche of the same. Through the psyche prox-
imity is my approaching of the other, the fact that the proximity of the
same and the other is never close enough. The summoned one is the
ego-me" (Otherwise 137). To read a text is to approach that text-and
in it a human soul-as something meaningful; to pursue the signifi-
cance of the text is to bear witness to what I signify. Thus I a~ called
into question by the act of questioning the text: this is the implication.
Because I question, I must answer: this is the assignation.
In my pursuit of the text, then, the text pursues me, and yet as I
approach it, it slips away. The initial silence of the eye's contact with the
first syllable of the novel is followed by "another silence," to use Haim
Gouri's phrase, one that announces "the inauguration of the critical
period" (9). The position of the critic is critical indeed; the critic is
questioned by the very act of questioning. Like Harry Preleshnik in Ka-
tzetnik's Sunrise over Hell, the critic turns "into a two-legged question
mark" (96), a siyman-sh'elah, as the Hebrew texts reads (92), a "sign of
question" uttered and yet to be answered, a sign of a certain absence.
In the midst of the writing of the novel, the reader is present by
implication, that is, by absence. Transformed into a witness, the reader
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must make that absence into a presence. The question that marks the
reader, then, is the question that Tzili puts to an absent friend in
Aharon Appelfeld's Tzili: The Story ofa Life: II 'Where are you and why
don't you speak to me?' she would ask in despair. Nothing stirred in
the silence, and but for her own voice no other voice was heard" (119).
Like her author, the character speaks from the silence of abandonment
or exile; as she addresses her absent interlocutor, so the author ad-
dreses a reader implicated by absence. Similarly, in To the Land of the
Cattails Appelfeld confronts his reader with another character who
seeks a sign of response. Rudi, in search of his mother, asks, "'Where
are you? Give me a sign, and I'll drive that way. Without a sign, I can't
reach you.' No sign was given. More than anything he set out so as not
to stay in one place" (127). Under the seal of assignation the reader
becomes a witness who must in tum become the sign that the author
seeks through the character.
The witness must become "a sign made to another, a sign of this
giving of signs, that is, of this non-indifference, a sign of this impos-
sibility of slipping away and being replaced, of this identity, this
uniqueness: here I am" (Levinas, Otherwise 145). Thus the two ques-
tions posed by Tzili come to the same thing. Shifting from the role of
reader to the position of witness, the human being moves from a
relation of difference to one of nonindifference. This is the movement
of approach that cannot be abrogated. The reader does not decide to
become a witness; rather, the novel chooses the reader before the
reader can make a choice. For the novel itelf emerges as' the already-
chosen. "Before they call, I will answer"; Levinas cites Isaiah 65:24.
/lThis obedience prior to all representation, this allegiance before any
oath, this responsibility prior to commitment, is precisely the other in
the same, inspiration and prophecy, the passing itself of the Infinite"
(Othenoise 150). As the novel is inspired, so it inspires and thus lays
claim to the reader; the witness transforms the listener into a witness.
What Levinas expresses in the rather convoluted language of the
philosopher Arele suggests more poetically, more hauntingly, in I.B.
Singer's Shosha. "We are running away," he says, "and Mount Sinai
runs after us. This chase has made us sick and mad" (255). Here we
have not only the inspiration but also the assignation of the reader
made into a witness. One recalls Levinas's insistence that the assigna-
tion is "unimpeachable," that it is /Ian impossibility to move away
without the torsion of a complex" (Otherwise 87). This assignation, of
course, is a primary feature of the Jewish condition, as well as a Jewish
feature of the Holocaust novel; Singer's metaphor of Sinai is not arbi-
trary. As Wiesel has said, "There comes a time when one cannot be a
man without assuming the Jewish condition" (Beggar 77); to be trans-
formed into a witness prior to any choosing of that transformation is to
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assume the Jewish condition. To read the Holocaust novel is to assume
the assignation of the Jewish condition. "All of us are messengers,"
Wiesel writes in A Beggar in Jerusalem, "though we may not know for
whom or to what purpose" (37). In the French text "though we may not
know" is a bit stronger; it is meme si nous ignorons (39-40), "even if we do
not know" it. The transmission of the message or of the question makes
the reader into a witness even if the reader does not realize it. "The
Berditchever once said," Wiesel tells us, "that when God gave the
Torah He gave not only the words but also the blanks between the
words. The task of man is to be a blank between words, a messenger, a
link between God and man, between man and man, between present
and past" (Against Silence 2:82). Like the author, the reader too is a link
between text and world. While the readers may decide whether or not
to testify, they do not decide whether or not to become witnesses. The
reader does not choose to be called.
In The Town beyond the Wall Wiesel's character Kalman suggests
what is entrusted to the witness: "Every man has a prayer that belongs
to him, as he has a soul that belongs to him. And just as it is difficult for
a man to find his soul, so it is difficult for him to find his prayer" (49). In
the transfer of the word from mouth to mouth the author entrusts the
witness with a kind of prayer. The author charges the witness to voice
what has already been given in a saying of "here I am." Offering the
witness his word, the author offers the witness his soul. Transformed
into a witness, the reader takes up the task of becoming a living soul by
offering up in tum that which was received. Levinas declares, "The
soul is the other in me" (Otherwise 191). To assert that the subjectivity of
the witness is the other-in-the-same is to maintain that the one made
into a witness must become a soul in the offering up of a testimonial
word. "The soul is spirit unrealized for itself," Bakhtin has observed; it
is "reflected in the loving consciousness of another (person, God)"
(Estetika 98). Inasmuch as consciousness is tied to presence, the project
of bearing witness is a project of becoming present before another
through the utterance of the word with one's whole being and in an
offering up of one's whole being. That which is received must be
returned, and this applies not only to the message transmitted but also
to the phenomenological and existential event that transpires in its
utterance.
What Martin Buber says of the human being's encounter with a
living situation, therefore, also applies to the reader's relation to the
text: "In spite of all similarities every living situation has, like a new-
born child, a new face, that has never been before and will never come
again. It demands of you a reaction which cannot be prepare before-
hand. It demands nothing of what is past. It demands presence,
responsibility; it demands you" (Between 114). Viewed as an event of
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discourse, the novel is just such a situation; the fact that a human voice
calls out from the novel makes it a living situation. Thus it has a human
face; the face speaks. It falls to the witness to step before the counte-
nance and answer when summoned. For the critic this means leaving
behind all the isms, all the methods, that might eclipse the voice; fixed
formulas and ready answers betray the outcry of the text and drain the
soul of the witnes~. In Ladislav Fuks's Mr. Theodore Mundstock the title
character struggles to hold on to life through a method that "properly
prepared for everything in a logically planned manner" (120). Ul-
timately, however, the method for holding on to his life results in the
loss of life, and he realizes "that perhaps there were things you could
not prepare for" (221). Chief among those things is answering the
summons to be present.
As Buber suggests, presence consists of response and respon-
sibility. "Here," he says in I and Thou, "the You appeared to man out of a
deeper mystery, addressed him out of the dark, and he responded
with his life. Here the word has become life" (92). Like the Creator
Himself, the author calls out from the midst of his creation and puts a
question to his reader: Where are you? I alone can answer, "Here I am."
Through my word, my response, my presence is established before the
text. "I am I," Levinas puts it, "in the sole measure that I am responsi-
ble, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but
no one can substitute himself for me" (Ethics 101). The reader trans-
formed into a witness becomes an I who must answer to a Thou, an I
responsible for a Thou.
Response and Responsibility
In "Art and Responsibility," the first piece he ever·published, Bakhtin
wrote: "What can guarantee the inner bonding of the elements of
personality? Only the wholeness of responsibility. With my life I must
answer for what I have experienced and understood in art. . . . Art and
life are not one and the same, but they must become one within me, in
the wholeness of my responsibility" (Estetika 5-6). Coming before the
text entails first a splitting of the self. The reader takes up the task of
response as one 'Yho must yet undergo an "inner bonding" and
therefore as one who is in error, who must become whole. The whole-
ness of which Bakhtin speaks is generated by drawing the voice we
encounter into our own voice, our own life. Thus in the first instance
the reader reads the text as if the reader's own voice were speaking; in
t~e first instance the reader is never here but is cast out there, split from
self. The project of response, however, is not to mimic but to incorpo-
rate the voice of the text into one's own voice, thus increasing one's
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own life. Responsibility, then, means being thrown back on oneself
through this encounter with the other; the capacity to respond is a
capacity to be a self. In the words of Levinas, "Subjectivity in itself is
being thrown back on oneself. Concretely: accused of what the others
do or suffer, or responsible for what they do or suffer. The uniqueness
of the self is the very fact of bearing the fault of another" (Otherwise 112).
In the act of response, then, the reader becomes all the more able to
respond, all the more responsible. For the act of response itself bears
witness to the need to respond, so that "the debt increases in the
measure that it is paid" (Levinas, Otherwise 12). To be placed in a
position of responsibility is to incur a debt that can never be dis-
charged.
Thus in the implication of the reader, the witness is also the
accused; I come before the text indebted to the voice that cries out from
the text. The witness Ibear in my response to the other implicates me in
my being for-the-other. Levinas writes: "Constituting itself in the very
movement wherein being responsible for the other devolves on it,
subjectivity goes to the point of substitution for the other. It assumes
the condition-or the uncondition-of hostage. Subjectivity as such is
initially hostage; it answers to the point of expiating for others" (Ethics
100). The novelist, indeed, confirms the philosopher's insight. To the
extent that Grisha, for example, is among his father's readers in
Wiesel's The Testament, he is a poet "not like his father" but "in place of
his father" (17). The condition of hostage that characterizes this sub-
stitution becomes more evident when we discover that Grisha's mother
recited his father's poetry to him as he was growing up. One of those
poems reads, "But the hungry child, I The thirsty stranger, I The
frightened old man, / All ask for me" (38). The last line in the French
text is c'est moi qu'ils reclament (26), or "it is I to whom they lay claim."
Hence I am the one in their debt. This is what lies behind Vtktor
Frankl's insistence that "man should not ask what the meaning of his
life is, but rather he must recognize that it is he who is asked" (111). We
cannot encounter the death of the father in the Holocaust novel without
being implicated in that death; we cannot collide with the death of the
child without incurring responsibility for that death.
Recall, for instance, the old man in Ka-tzetnik's House of Dolls.
When his forehead is branded and bleeding with the word Jude, that
word calls me by name. When in Wiesel's Night that child is hanged
and a prisoner asks, "Where is God?" (70), I am the one who must
answer. But no matter how deeply I recognize my answerability, I can
neither go to the gallows for him or take him down from there. This
exasperating connection between character and reader is illustrated by
a relation between two characters in Ilona Karmel's An Estate ofMemory,
Barbara and an infant child. "The child would not be gone; hunger
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made him present, hunger joined them together, until above the boy's
wheezing she could hear its cry demanding what she did not have to
give" (237). Something is demanded that the r~ader does not have to
give. Thus the reader owes a great debt, one that surrounds an impor-
tant aspect of the tension between word and silence. Buber has said,
"Only silence toward the You, the silence of all tongues, the taciturn
waiting in the unformed, undifferentiated, prelinguistic word leaves
the You free and stands together with it in reserve where the spirit does
not manifest itself but is. All response binds the You into the It-world"
(1 and Thou 89). The reader responds to the text, being unable to sustain
such a dizzying silence. The novel opens up an abyss; the reader stares
into it until it stares back, until the reader must speak or go mad. When
the shriek of silence becomes too much to bear, the reader becomes a
critic who responds with words and not with life. The novelist, of
course, is also aware of this existential difficulty.
In Herod's Children one of lIse Aichinger's characters laments,
"Paper is stony ground. I've written down too much. My whole life I've
written down too much. Everything I noticed I set down, and every-
thing I set down has fallen over. Nothing did I let grow; nothing did I
pass over in silence. Nothing ever occurred to me that I didn't try to
stop. First I caught butterflies and nailed them to a board, and later
everything else" (182-83). The German verb translate as "set down" is
feststellen (177), which means not only "to declare" or "to establish" but
also "to secure" or "to lock in." The task of the reader is to become
present before the text in an act of response; yet when the responsive
word is committed to the page, the imprint eclipses the presence that
the reader would establish. The great danger, the great debt, however,
lies not so much in response as in explanation. Freely translated, the
lament of Aichinger's character amounts to the complaint with which
Saul Bellow begins Mr. Sammler's Planet: "Intellectual man had become
an explaining creature" (7). At the end of the novel Bellow's title
character returns to the same issue: "Life when it had no charm was
entirely question-and-answer. The thing worked both ways. Also, the
questions were bad. Also, the answers were horrible. This poverty of
soul, its abstract state, you could see in faces on the street. And he too
had a touch of the same disease-the disease of the single self explain-
ing what was what and who was who" (256). Response is precisely the
opposite of the explanation and the explication that Aichinger and
Bellow describe. As Bakhtin has noted, "To see and understand an
author's work is to see and understand another, alien consciousness
and its world, that is, another subject ('Du'). In explication there is only
one consciousness, one subject; in understanding there are two con-
sciousnesses, two subjects. There can be no dialogical relationship to
an object; therefore explication is void of dialogical features. Under-
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standing is always, to some degree, dialogical" (Estetika 289). Dialogic
response is tied to responsibility to the extent that it sustains rather
than settles the question of presence; explanation is a flight from
responsibility. Its effort to nail down meaning amounts to a crucifixion
of the word.
In One Generation After Wiesel writes, "The Jew is in perpetual
motion. He is characterized as much by his quest as by his faith, his
silence as much as his outcry. He defines himself more by what
troubles him than by what reassures him.... To me, the Jew and his
questioning are one" (214). Likewise, the presence the reader must
establish before the text is a state of motion; the response that expresses
the reader's responsibility is made of quest and question., For the
readers implicated by the novel, to answer is to ask, turning back on
themselves ever again the question that implicates them: Where are
you? Explanation brings human beings to a halt, locking them into the
emptiness of stasis; the movement of response, on the other hand, is
sustained by a refusal to explain. Thus, taking understanding to mean
explanation, Wiesel enjoins his reader, "Let us, therefore, not make an
effort to understand, but rather to lower our eyes and not understand.
Every rational explanation would be more esoteric than if it were
mystical. Not to understand the dead is a way of paying them an
ancient debt; it is the only way to ask their pardon" (Legends 234). We
find in Anatoli a novelist who explicitly avows this refusal. In Babi Yar
he writes, "I know, of course, that this has been carefully analyzed by
experts in all the' -isms.' ... Everything has been examined, proved
and all is clear. All the same, I do not understand" (365). The reader who
encounters this statement in the novel receives an injunction about
how to go about a responsive reading of the novel.
One can see that all of the ideologies of literary theory-Freud-
ianism, Marxism, structuralism, deconstruction-amount to a betrayal
of the survivor and a desecration of the dead. Remember what Levinas
once said: "The important question of the meaning of being is not: why
is there something rather than nothing ... but: do I not kill by being?"
(Ethics 120). For the reader the question becomes Do I not kill by
explaining? In Dimensions of the Holocaust Wiesel says, "First the enemy
killed the Jews and then he made them disappear in smoke, in ashes,
so every Jew was killed twice. In every extermination center special
squads of prisoners had to unearth multitudes of corpses and then
burn them. Now he tries to kill them for the third time by depriving
them of their past, and nothing could be more heinous, more vicious
than that. I repeat, nothing is or could be as ugly, as inhuman as the
wish to deprive the dead victims of their death" (16). We must not allow
ourselves the smug supposition that these words apply only to the
revisionists. Any reader, however well intentioned, runs the risk of
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incurring this debt in the effort to respond to the outcry that rises up
from the pages of the novel.
Levinas points out, "The fear for the death of the other is certainly
at the basis of the responsibility for him" (Ethics 119). In the novel itself
the reader is implicated. In Darkness Casts No Shadow, for instance,
Lustig writes, "To kill or not to kill had gotten into man like blood in his
heart or the air he inhales and exhales" (142). Indeed, the process of
reading is rather like inhaling and exhaling; the reader receives the
word and returns it in an act of response that decides the life and death
of the one to whom the response is made. Echoing Levinas, Lustig has
written that "killing is the key to explaining man and life" (Diamonds
84). It is also the key to responding to texts. If this should appear to be
an exaggeration, we can recall an insight from Primo Levi's If Not Now,
When?: "Of course Mendel wasn't his keeper, and still less had he shed
Leonid's blood. He hadn't killed him in the field. And yet the itch
persisted: maybe this is really how it is, maybe each of us is Cain to
some Abel, and slays him in the field without knowing it, through the
things he does to him, the things he says to him, and the things he
should say to him and doesn't" (83-84). One will recall that Wiesel
regards this murder as a suicide. "Every murder is a suicide," he
declares. "Cain killed Cain in Abel" (Messengers 61). Not only are the
life and death of the other at stake in the effort to respond, but the life
and death of oneself also hang in the balance.
If life is to overcome death in the reader's response to the text, then
the reader must abandon all security, all the protective measures, that
distinguish the conventional categories and pat answers of literary
explication. The reader must pursue responsibility to the point of
profound vulnerability, to the vulnerability of the victim. "He who is
not among the victims," as Wiesel says in The Gates of the Forest, "is with
the executioners" (166). Sitting in the armchair comfort of our studies,
this strikes us at first glance as all too easily said. Those of us who were
not there must be very careful about our presumption. We cannot
follow the woman who rushed to comfort the condemned child at the
cost of her own life. We dare not equate ourselves with the rebbe in
Wiesel's A Beggar in Jerusalem who in the hour of death cried to his
followers, "He demands our lives in sacrifice, which proves that He
remembers us, He has not turned His face from us. And so it is with
joy-pure, desperate, mad joy-thatwe shall say to Him: 'So be it. Thy
will be done.' Perhaps He needs our joy more than our tears, our
deaths more than our deeds" (71-72). We are called to the witness stand
to answer with our comfortable lives, and that position harbors more
fear and trembling than we may think. "Where then do the difficult
tasks arise?" Kierkegaard asks. "In the living-room and on the Shore
Road leading to the Deer Park" (Postscript 430). We may not be able to
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follow Abraham or Isaac to Moriah, but each takes us with him as he
descends from the mountain to return to life. In this we can see why
"the Temple was built on Moriah. Not on Sinai" (Wiesel, Messengers
97). The victims' loss of security and assurance strips us of our own
guarantees.
Thus in the collisions with the character, the reader, as one who
must respond, is forced into the subjectivity that Levinas describes:
"The subjectivity of a subject is vulnerability, exposure to affection,
sensibility, a passivity more passive still than any passivity, an irre-
cuperable time, an unassemblable diachrony of patience, an exposed-
ness always to be exposed the more, an exposure to expressing, and
thus to saying, thus to giving" (Otherwise 50). The saying of the author
is an offering up of the soul in a mad struggle to heal the soul. Receiving
that offering, the reader is implicated as the one who must now give,
who must now respond. Levinas goes on to argue, "In the exposure to
wounds and outrage, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the
oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without
being able to resign, and thus as incarnated in order to offer itself, to
suffer and to give" (Otherwise 105). In The Last of the Just Andre Schwarz-
Bart breaks off his narrative to address and therefore implicate his
reader, saying, "I am so weary that my pen can no longer write. 'Man,
strip off thy garments, cover thy head with ashes, run into the streets
and dance in thy madness'" (417). Indeed, assuming the vulnerability
characteristic of responsibility requires this stripping of oneself, and in
the eyes of a smug and complacent world it can only pass for madness.
Michel Foucault wrote: "By the madness which interrupts it, a
work of art opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without
answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where the world is
forced to question itself. What is necessarily a profanation in the work
of art returns to that point, and, in the time of that work swamped in
madness, the world is made aware of its guilt" (Madness 288). As Moshe
the Madman once put it, "These days honest men can do only one
thing: go mad! Spit on logic, intelligence, sacrosanct reason! That's
what you have to do, that's the way to stay human, to keep your
wholeness!" (Wiesel, Town 20). The wholeness of responsibility in-
voked by Bakhtin is the wholeness of being human; the wholeness of
the human subject lies in the subjection to wounds. Articulating a
position that not only distinguishes the witness but also implicates the
reader, Jean Amery writes, "On my forearm I bear the Auschwitz
number; it reads more briefly than the Pentateuch or the Talmud and
yet provides more thorough information. It is also more binding than
basic formulas of Jewish existence. If to myself and the world, includ-
ing the religious and nationally minded Jews, who do not regard me as
one of their own, I say: I am a Jew, then I mean by that those realities
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and possibilities that are summed up in the Auschwitz number" (94).
Even though darkness may cast no shadow, the Auschwitz number
casts its shadow over all who would claim to be human after Ausch-
witz.
In To the Land of the Cattails Aharon Appelfeld's character Tina
makes a point similar to Amery's: "I never took special pride in my
Jewish origins. I'm not certain that the Jews are better than other
nations. On the contrary, they have certain visible flaws that I condemn
in no uncertain terms, but if someone is murdered because he is a Jew,
then I proclaim myself Jewish in every respect. Am I not right?" (69).
The hungry child, the thirsty stranger, the frightened old man-they
all cry out from the pages of the Holocaust novel and call my name. In
my responsibility, in my vulnerability, I must assume that hunger, that
thirst, that fear and answer for it. As a witness, I offer my response not
just as a giving of signs; rather the response itself "becomes a sign, turns
into an allegiance" (Levinas, Otherwise 49). Situated before the voice of
the other that comes to me through the text, whatever I am lies in what I
am for that other. As a relation of responsibility, the relation of reader to
text is a relation of I to Thou, of I-for-Thou. "The contraction and fusion
into a whole being," writes Buber, "can never be accomplished by me,
can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become;
becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter" (1 and Thou 62). From
the existential, phenomenological standpoint here adopted, respon-
sibility does not simply mean I am responsible for myself but that I am
responsible for you. In the midst of the dialogic encounter between
author and reader, "I understand you" means "I am here for you."
Thus, in the words of Bakhtin, "understanding fills out the text: it
is active and takes on a creative character. Creative understanding
continues creativity" (Estetika 346). The event of creating the novel
entails the creation of the reader, and the event of reading the novel
entails its continued creation. So it is from the beginning of creation.
"When he opened his eyes," says Wiesel in The Oath, "Adam did not
ask God: Who are you? He asked: Who am I?" (19). But in Messengers of
God Wiesel writes, "In the beginning, man is alone. Alone as God is
alone. As he opens his eyes he does not ask: Who am I? He asks: Who
are you?" (3). This is not, in truth, a contradiction. Buber writes, "The
primal event pointed out by the images of the Bible does not lie under
the principle of contradiction: A and not-A are here strangely con-
cerned with one another" (Between 78). In the relation of I and Thou, of
reader and author, we are concerned with such a primal event, as
Wiesel implies when he invokes Adam's creation. The questions "Who
am I?" and "Who are you?" are of a piece. In the relation to the author
the reader cannot decide one question without also deciding the other.
Because the novel is an event of creation, a summoning of one respon-
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sive voice by another, the one who answers, "Here I am/" posits
responsibility for the other; responding to the novel the reader be-
comes responsible for the novel.
Wiesel sets up this relation in The Oath early on when he states, "In
the final stage of every equation, the key is responsibility. Whoever
says'}' creates the 'You./ ... The'}' signifies both solitude and the
rejection of solitude" (17). The event of the novel is the event of this
interanimation of author and reader; the novel rises up in a realm
between the two/ in the realm of the between that distinguishes re-
sponse and responsibility. The implication of the reader lies in the
positing of this space, in the positioning of the reader along the edges
of this space, where the wholeness of being is rooted in being for-the-
other. This constitution of the self by its capacity to be for-the-other is
expressed in the novel through certain character-t9-character relation-
ships. Encountering such relations within the novel, the reader is
implicated in relation to the novel. In Ka-tzetnik's Atrocity Hayim Idl
realizes that "taking care of the Rabbi had given him strength. He
protected the Rabbi, and because of that he was himself protected"
(256). The Hebrew word for "protected" here is shamar (200)/ which
implies watching over, looking after, caring for something very pre-
cious that has been entrusted. Hayim Idl chooses to protect the rebbe,
but he cannot choose his responsibility for the rebbe. "With his body/"
we read, "he kept the Rabbi from being trampled. And for that he was
not himself asphyxiated" (256). The breath he draws arises from his
enabling the rebbe to breathe. Similarly, the word that the reader
receives lies in the offering of a responsive word. As in the case of the
character, the life of the reader is nurtured by nurturing the life that
cries out from the novel.
We see, then, how the relation between characters may articulate
the relation between author and reader. In The Whole Land Brimstone by
Anna Langfus, the main character's husband says to her, "If I exist, it is
because you still believe I do" (144). In this simple statement we hear
the author's plea to the reader, we see what is entrusted to the reader,
and we realize what is at stake in the reader's response. Typifying this
plight of the author in relation to the reader is a man from Wiesel's
childhood who also turns up in his tales, Moshe the Beadle. In One
Generation After Wiesel writes,
Few came back. One who did was Moshe the Beadle. He was unrecognizable.
. . . He now wore the mysterious face of a messenger pursued by those whose
message he carried. . . . He told and told again tales so heinous as to make
your skin crawl. . . . Shot, all of them. In broad daylight. He too had been shot,
falling only a fraction of a second before it would have been too late. Protected
by those who followed, he alone had survived. Why? So that he could come
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back to his town and tell the tale.... But his audience, weary and naive,
would not, could not believe. [28-29]
The reader's debt to the author is a debt of belief, and belief comes only
in the act of response. In responding, the reader, too, becomes a
messenger, with a face changed by the message it speaks. Failing to
respond, fleeing to cookbook methods of textual analysis, the reader
casts another handful of dirt onto the graves of those who cry out from
beyond the grave.
"If you'd had more experience," says Leon to Ruth in Aichinger's
Herod's Children, "you'd know that in front of every stage there's a
sighing darkness that wants to be comforted" (120). The stage is the
stage of dialogic encounter; the darkness is the darkness of that mas-
sive grave known as the Kingdom of Night; the sighing-or "moan-
ing," from the German verb seufzen (116)-is the utterance of the
messenger who summons us; and the comfort is what is called for in
the reader's response. The nature of that response is not, must not be,
confined to writing books or giving lectures. The reader must comfort
that sigh by comforting other people. Colliding with the child who was
hanged on the gallows of Buna must add depth to my embrace of my
children. Encountering the persecuted must lead me to react to per-
secution. Anytime the truth is threatened, anytime things mean more
than people, anytime technology eclipses humanity-I must speak up.
It is not enough to weep over the testimony that comes to me from the
distant shores of the novel. It is not enough to analyze form and
content, language and silence, word and meaning. Beyond lamenta-
tion and analysis, I am implicated in my capacity for affirmation,
precisely when I have lost all basis for affirmation. As Wiesel has said,
"Man is not defined by what denies him, but by that which affirms
him" (Accident 71). If in deciding something about the novel I decide
something about myself, then whatever is decided is determined by
the depth and the passion of my affirmation.
The Affirming Flame
The closing stanza of W.H. Auden's "September I, 1939," reads,
Defenceless under the night
Our world in stupor lies;
Yet, dotted everywhere,
Ironic points of light
Flash out wherever the Just
Exchange their messages:
May I, composed like them
Of Eros and of dust,
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Beleaguered by the same
Negation and despair,
Show an affirming flame.
[537].
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In these lines is announced the task common to author and reader. To
read these Holocaust authors is to burn with them. Wiesel tells a tale
about a poet who was asked what he would fetch from his house if it
were on fire. The poet answered, "The fire, naturally." Says Wiesel,
"We steal the fire, but our fire does not destroy. Our fire burns and
bums and burns-and we burn forever" (Against Silence 1:318). In the
openness of the vulnerability that characterizes responsibility the
reader must become fuel for the flame of affirmation-over against the
flames of darkness and negation that rose into the Auschwitz sky.
Andre Neher asserts, "Every dialogue, then, implies an aggression, a
renunciation, a death to oneself, and an absolute silence, which are
attitudes preliminary to opening up, to communication, to dialogue, to
life-within-dialogue, and to love" (48).
The novel and the response to it arise in a realm between author
and reader. When these events occur amid the flame of affirmation,
they are steeped in love; the act of response is an act of love. In 1and
Thou Buber notes, "Feelings one 'has'; love occurs. Feelings dwell in
man, but man dwells in his love. This is no metaphor but actuality: love
does not cling to an I, as if the You were merely its 'content' or object; it
is between I and You" (66). One is reminded of a line from Appelfeld's
For Every Sin: "Anyone who was in the camp deserves a lot of love.
Without love, there can be no existence" (139). There is no life, no
human presence, outside of that presence that is love; affirmation is an
embrace of what is most precious, most dear, of what there is to love. As
much as the survivor deserves love, the reader as one made into a
witness needs love for the survivor; the witness lives by love for the
dead father, the dead child, and the exiled word. For in its struggle for
redemption, the novel implicates the readers in their own need for
redemption, and there can be no redemption, without love. "Do you
know why God demands that you love him?" writes Wiesel in The Gates
of the Forest. "He doesn't need your love, he can do without it, but you
can't.... Your love, rather than his, can save you" (224). There is no
response with the wholeness of one's life apart from this passionate
affirmation of life; there is no affirmation of life without this love.
Elsewhere in The Gates of the Forest Wiesel relates an exchange
between Gregor and Gavriel. Says Gregor, "You used to live them [your
tales] by giving them your breath, out of which they made love and
prayer" (208). When the reader's response to the tale is one of affirma-
tion, it is made into love and prayer. "When you love your friend as you
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love yourself," Wiesel has pointed out, "God is the third partner. The
only way to love God is to love Him through mankind" (Against Silence
2:262). Love is tied to prayer, and prayer to love. When the readers
responds with their whole beings-as the author has responded-that
response takes on certain characteristics of prayer. Recall Katriel's
insight from Wiesel's A Beggar in Jerusalem: "Do you know that it is
given to us to enrich a legend simply by listening to it? It belongs as
much to the listener as to the teller. You listen to a tale, and all of a
sudden it is no longer the same tale" (107). The tale is heard and thus
deepened through the listener's responsive word, the wholeness of
which lies in its union with the life of the listener. To the extent that the
word is whole, one with its meaning and with the one who utters it, it
is akin to prayer. The readers are implicated, therefore, according to
their capacity for prayer, for pursuing the truth of the word uttered and
to which they respond-to the very end.
"Who doesn't go to the end," writes Wiesel in The Gates ofthe Forest,
"can only know a truth that is partial and mutilated" (155). Yet, he goes
on to declare, "in taking a single word by assault it is possible to
discover the secret of creation, the center where all threads come
together" (166). The whole point of this phenomenological approach to
the event of the novel's creation has been to take the novelistic word by
assault to determine what it might reveal about the life that brings it
into being. We have struggled to follow the novelist into the word, into
the saying of creation that pronounces it to be good. The word then, is
to be returned from exile by joining it with that place where human
presence is reestablished through its relation to the place. "Sometimes
it happens," we read in Wiesel's The Town beyond the Wall, "that we
travel for a long time without knowing that we have made the long
journey solely to pronounce a certain word, a certain phrase, in a
certain place. The meeting of the place and the word is a rare accom-
plishment" (118). The place-or the "space," l'espace (129)-of which
Wiesel speaks is the between-space of dialogic encounter between I
and Thou. In the case at hand it is the space between author and reader.
Through the novelistic word the author opens up the space; in a
dialogic response the reader turned witness introduces the flame of
affirmation to that place. When, in this encounter, the word is returned
from exile-rejoined, if only for a moment, with its meaning-truth
happens. With the emergence of truth a Third, the One who is truth,
also emerges in the between-space.
"Only as the You becomes present does presence come into
being," Buber has said (1 and Thou 63). Presence is precisely the pres-
ence of the Third. This Third is the One who is signified by the flame of
affirmation that transforms the witness into a sign. "The glory of the
Infinite," Levinas has said, "reveals itself through what it is capable of
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doing in the witness" (Ethics 109). Bakhtin insists, IIEvery dialogue
proceeds as though against the background of a responsive under-
standing of a Third who is invisibly present, standing above all the
participants in the dialogue" (Estetika 306). Reading is a dialogic en-
counter between self and other, between reader and author, and this
encounter also has its responsive Reader, its Other. liThe Other with a
big '0'" Lacan states, lIis the scene of the Word insofar as the scene of
the Word is always in third position between two subjects. This is only
in order to introduce the dimension of Truth" (Language 269). If love for
another is a presence between I and Thou, then this Third, this Other,
is He whose presence is constituted and affirmed by that love that is
affirmation.
Lacan acknowledges as much when he says, "I can only just prove
to the Other that he exists, not, of course, with the proofs for the
existence of God, with which over the centuries he has been killed off,
but by loving him" (Eerits 317). The one whose reading is not ruled by
this love and affirmation of the truth, whose reading arises out of
academic curiosity or aesthetic appreciation, whose reading is gov-
erned by the fashion and fad of literary theory, betrays truth, life, and
all there is to love. In short, that one becomes an accomplice to the
murder of the word, of the father, of mother and child-and of God. In
the Torah we have what is known as the aron ha-edut, the Ark of
Testimony (see, for example, Exodus 40:3); in that Ark abides the word
of God, the presence of God. Where testimony is, there God is too. For
the reader transformed into a witness, the affirming flame is the ark of
testimony, even-or especially-when that testimony takes the form
of a question. As Wiesel has observed, IIIn Hebrew the word for
'question' is she'elah, and the alef lamed of God's name are part of the
fabric of that word. Therefore God is in the question" (Against Silence
3:297). The Third is invisibly present because He is present as a ques-
tion, one that is couched in a certain silence; the Third is invisibly
present because, in the question that distinguishes the dialogic en-
counter, He is silently present.
LB. Singer closes his novel Shosha with just such a question, as
Arele and Haiml sit in the darkness of an Israeli night and await an
answer that will not come (277). In "White Rabbit," from Lustig's
Diamonds of the Night, the man named Thomas forever addresses a
woman inside a mental ward from outside her window, knowing that
she cannot hear him (67); he speaks, for there is Another who may
hear, silently and invisibly. In the story liThe Last Days of the Fire"
from the same volume Lustig creates a character, an old man named
Emil Cohen, who also implicates the position of the reader in relation to
the text: "He no longer asked himself which was more important,
forgiving or hope, and which to choose. We're dying, just like we've
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always died. . . . Why are things that way? Dying, dying, dying, and
yet that long echo of past life. What price must a person pay just to
survive? But he knew he'd never get an answer. Nobody ever had....
Yet at the same time, he knew that such an answer does exist inside
every person, even if it dies with him, and that, in a way, it never dies"
(173). We recall Pedro's remark in Wiesel's Twilight: "What is important
for man is to feel not only the existence of an answer, but the presence
of one who knows the answer. When I seek that presence, I am seeking
God" (197-98). 50 we see what is lost in the internal splitting of the self
and what is to be gained in the external relation to the other. He who
dwells above, in the third position, dwells within.
If the universality of the 5hoah lies in its uniqueness, then what
threatens the author also implicates the reader. The reader too is in
need of resurrection and redemption; the reader too must redeem the
truth, standing before the Third, who is the truth, as one who is in
error. "Here I am" harbors the questions "Where am I?" and "Where
are You?" Thus question and answer merge to continually resurrect the
question that raises human beings.toward God, from within and from
beyond. "Man raises himself toward God by the question he asks
Him," says Moshe in Wiesel's Night. "That is the true dialogue. Man
questions God and God answers. But we don't understand His an-
swers. We can't understand them. Because they come from the depths
of the soul, and they stay there until death. You will find the true
answers, Eliezer, only within yourself!" (16). The French word ren-
dered as "stay" is demeurent (17), which connotes "live" or "dwell,"
implying that the questions are alive, animate, and animating. "Do you
know what the eternity of God is?" asks a teacher in Wiesel's Legends of
Our Time. "It is we. By dancing on fire, by facing suffering and death,
man creates the eternity of his creator" (159). It is not just that the Third
is there, within me and before me; rather, He comes to life as my
testimony comes to bear, as the affinnation that returns me to life
ignites. The goal of redemption, as the Gaon of Vilna once put it, is the
redemption of truth (cited by Wiesel, public lecture, Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, Nashville, 4 March 1990). If God is truth, then God too must be
redeemed; and if truth is not something I know but something I must
become, then the life of God is at stake in my capacity to come to life.
"God too must be lived," says a beggar in Wiesel's The Oath (129).
As God is lived, so does God live. He must be lived because that is the
only way the soul can live in truth; it is the only way the self can live in
its relation to the other and to the Third. The life of the reader, there-
fore, is at stake in the response to the author, in the responsibility for
the lives of those encountered in the text and beyond the text. For in the
dialogic interaction with the novel, the reader engages the soul, from
the depths of which comes an answer in the fonn of a question. In
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Herod's Children Aichinger's character declares, "Those who are sure
they are, are not. Only those who doubt themselves, only those who
have suffered, may land. For the shores of God are aflame over a dark
ocean, and those who land bum. And the shores of God grow, for the
burning gleams from afar; and the shores of God shrink, for the
corpses of the stunted sprout from the darkness" (68). In the words of
Wiesel, "He who says today that he is at peace with himself and with
God is estranged from both" (Against Silence 1:145). God is a consuming
fire (see Deuteronomy 4:24), and the one who is not consumed by that
fire, by the flame of affirmation, has no life.
It has often been argued that one cannot ignore God when dealing
with the Holocaust. Wiesel states it perhaps most poetically in Ani
Maamin:
Ani maamin, ani maamin.
God possible-
And impossible.
God present? How can you?
God absent? How can you?
How can man
Commit such evil?
Without you?
Or with you?
Ani maamin?
How is one to believe?
How is one not to believe? (24)
We may embrace or refuse God, but we cannot ignore Him. Just as God
haunts the literary response to the event, so is He involved in the
reader's own response. "The sun and the moon and the stars are not
enough for enlightenment," says Silvano Arieti. "To overcome the
horizon of darkness the Divine Presence is necessary" (105). What is
the point of our endeavor, if not to overcome the horizon of darkness
that surrounds us? In the first utterance of creation, "Let there be light"
(Genesis 1:3), we have the whole purpose of creation, both universal
and particular, at all its levels. Just as the Jewish man wraps himself in
the light of God each time he dons his tallith, so is every human being
called to become a flaming light. The novels of the Holocaust are
beacons that shine forth from the Kingdom of Night, points of light that
the incomprehensible darkness cannot comprehend. As such, the
voices implicate those of us who move in darkness "not of woods only
and the shade of trees" (Frost 95). In this implication author, character,
and reader merge. In The Parnas Arieti writes, "This we know, that the
seven lights that carassed the body of the pamas of Pisa still shine for
both the reader and the writer of these pages" (144). The character here
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lies beaten to death, a victim of bestial darkness. The author and reader
are gathered at his body's side to bear witness and become one with the
light of the menorah that signifies the divine presence of the Third.
Mikhail Bakhtin has insisted that "wherever alibi becomes a prere-
quisite for creation and expression there can be no responsibility, no
seriousness, no significance. A special responsibility is required....
But this responsibility can be founded only on a profound belief in a
higher truth, . . . the belief that another, higher being responds to my
special responsibility, that I do not act in a utter void. Apart from this
belief there can be only empty pretense" (Estetika 179). So we are called
to emerge from the darkness, as did the first light, even before we hear
the summons. For the summons is not first heard and then answered.
"He who ceases to make a response ceases to hear the Word," Buber
has pointed out (Between 45). The attitude of waiting for the word to
come only underscores our deafness. "God is not mute!" the Pardo
tells us in The Parnas. "Each crime bespeaks His lament, 'How far you
are from Me!' The greater the crime, the greater is God's reminder of
how much is within the realm of man's choice and grasp. But we must
choose to hear Him. We do not hear" (71). We do not hear because we
do not answer. Rebbe Barukh of Medzebozh once said to his grandson,
"God too is unhappy; He is hiding and man is not looking for Him. Do
you understand, Yehiel? God is hiding and man is not even searching
for Him" (Wiesel, Somewhere 89). Thus God hides in the silence be-
tween the words of the Holocaust novel, abiding in the place of the
word's exile. We who read are not looking for Him. Hence we are
implicated.
Wiesel says that God IIdoes not want to be talked about. He wants
to be listened to, to be heard. He talks and He listens but not when
people speak about Him to others. When I speak about God, my only
listener should be God" (Against Silence 3:223). Yet, dwelling in a third
position between author and reader, God listens to the readers re-
sponse to the word and the silence. He listens and talks, and to the
extent that we are able to instill our response with the affirming flame
of prayer, we may hear. That is when the word truly returns from exile:
it returns not in its pronouncement but in its being heard:
The love whose incandescence is awaited in the fires of suffering is not that of
God but of man: the man of the first word, whom God seeks out, indicates, lays
hold of ("I am the Lord Thy God"), the man who is always a second person,
who is called upon, who is never alone in his self, whose solitude can be only a
mirage and illusion, and who inevitably meets with his Seeker, in embrace or in
injury, on the way or by the roadside, as a shepherd or as a wolf, as God or as
Satan. The sufferings of love are those of the man who says "Yes" to this word,
when it is no longer spoken but is heard across the silence. [Neher 197]
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Such is the yea-saying that bums in that response that does not fall prey
to the execration disguised as explication, to the anamorphosis dis-
guised as analysis.
'lEach story," says Frank in Lustig's Darkness Casts No Shadow, Uhas
three versions. The first one you tell me. The second one I tell you, and
the third no one knows" (123). The reader's response to the Holocaust
novel is a second telling of the tale; indeed, the tale is not received until
it is transmitted. What has occurred in the pages of this book, what has
been rendered as a phenomenology of the Holocaust novel, simply
amounts to a retelling of the tale encountered; it is the tale of its offering
and its reception, of its authoring and its reading. Yet, as Lustig
suggests, the tale has a third version that belongs to the One who
abides in a third position above the tales written and the tales read. To
Him belongs the truth of the tale, to which our lives are dedicated and
by which our lives are consecrated. We come to the end of this reading
only to return to it in a return to life, in that embrace of our children that
is the silent telling of the true tale. Thus in The Testament Wiesel ends his
tale of Paltiel Kossover with Paltiel's silent bequest of a tale of silence to
his child Grisha: 'II shall tell Grisha what I have never yet revealed to
anyone; I shall tell him ..." (336).
Epilogue
A great and strong wind rent the mountains, and broke in pieces the
rocks before the Lord, but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the
wind an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the.earthquake; and after
the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a
still small voice.
-1 Kings 19:11-12
As he lay dying, Franz Rosenzweig said: "And now it comes, the point
of all points, which the Lord has truly revealed to me in my sleep: the
point of all points for which there ..." (Glatzer 174). Thus in the hour
of his death the man was blessed with the revelation of what cannot be
conveyed, a revelation of what we the living shall have to do without.
As Elie Wiesel has written, "The image of God cannot be transmitted; it
can be carried away only in death" (Beggar 200). So the point at which
we arrive is not the closure of "the point of all points" but the open-
endedness that casts us into the valley of decision. There our sleep does
not bring the solace of what was revealed to the great thinker; rather,
like Job, we are left to cry out, "Thou dost scare me with dreams and
terrify me with visions" ijob 7:14). If, however, we have not reached an
end, perhaps we have at least arrived at a means for making our way
through the rumbling of the shriek of silence. If we have not settled
anything, perhaps we have at least been properly unsettled.
In Ethics and Infinity Emmanuel Levinas writes, "To escape the
'there is' one must not be posed but deposed.... This deposition of
sovereignty by the ego is the social relationship with the Other.... I
distrust the compromised word 'love,' but the responsibility for the
Other, being-for-the-other, seemed to me . . . to stop the anonymous
and senseless rumbling of being" (52). For author, character, and
reader, this responsibility opens up the human being to the "still small
voice," the kol demamah dakah, the "thin voice of silence" through which
word may rejoin meaning to overcome the shriek of silence. Amost
Lustig insists that "no one writer but a collection of writers is needed to
create a whole picture of what happened during the Holocaust" (in
Knopp 310). Similarly, no one voice but a chorus of voices-the voices
of authors, characters, and readers-is needed to make heard the thin
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voice of silence. These voices fashion the Ark ofTestimony in which the
word resides.
Arriving at such a view of the art and our relation to it brings us to a
means or a method, one opposed to the idolatries of form and structure
and even content that currently rule aesthetics. What we have is an
aesthetic much like that which is found in the portrayal of the first artist
to appear in the Torah. Bezalel, whose name means·"in the shadow of
God," was chosen to do the artwork for the Tabernacle and the Ark of
Testimony as the children of Israel made their way through the wilder-
ness. Bezalel was chosen because he was filled "with the Spirit of God,
with ability, with intelligence, with knowledge, and with all craftsman-
ship" (Exodus 35:31). Nachmanides points out that Bezalel was en-
trusted with the task of creating the vessel of the word because he
"knew how to combine the letters with which heaven and earth were
created" (543). While the artists we have considered, even in their
combined art, may not bear the wisdom and the ability of Bezalel, they
are nonetheless commissioned with a similar task: to fashion a place
where the word can dwell in the midst of the wilderness. Participating
in that creation through our response and responsibility, we must
become the place of that dwelling.
What we come to, then, is not just an aesthetic of art but, more
important and more profound, an aesthetic of the soul. Indeed,
Bakhtin maintains that "the problem of the soul is an aesthetic prob-
lem" (Estetika 89). Such a position makes the Holocaust novel a phe-
nomenological and existential problem, one that turns our
investigation back on itself. As we fathom the novel, so do we penetrate
ourselves in a movement toward that place where within and above are
transformed into synonyms. Here we must fashion our own ark of
testimony, in the silence of a prayer that is the substance of language
and the language of silence, inviolate and beyond the enclaves of exile.
Works Cited
Primary Sources
Aichinger, Dse. Herod's Children. Trans. Cornelia Schaeffer. New York: Athe-
neum, 1964. (Die grOssere Hoffnung. Amsterdam: Bermann Fischer Verlag,
1948.)
Amichai, Yehuda. Not of This Time, Not of This Place. Trans. Shlomo Katz. New
York: Harper, 1968. (Lo m'akhshiv, 10 m'khan. Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1986.)
Anatoli, A. Babi Yar. Trans. David Floyd. New York: Pocket, 1971. (Babi Yar.
Frankfurt am Main: Possev Verlag, 1970.)
Appelfeld, Abaron. The Age of Wonders. Trans. Dalya Bilu. Boston: Godine,
1981. (Tor hapeliot. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1978.)
--. Badenheim 1939. Trans. Dalya Bilu. New York: Washington Square, 1980.
(Badenheim, 'ir nofesh. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1979).
--. For Every Sin. Trans. Jeffrey M. Green. New York: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1989.
--. The Retreat. Trans. Dalya Bilu. New York: Dutton, 1984.
--. To the Land of the Cattails. Trans. Jeffrey M. Green. New York: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1986.
--. Tzili: The Story of a Life. Trans. Dalya Bilu. New York: Penguin, 1984.
(Haktunot v' hapasim. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1983.)
Arieti, Silvano. The Parnas. New York: Basic, 1979.
Bellow, Saul. Mr. Sammler's Planet. New York: Penguin, 1977.
Bor, Josef. The Terezin Requiem. Trans. Edith Pargeter. New.York: 'Avon, 1963.
(Terezinske rekviem. Prague: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1963.)
Bryks, Rachmil. Kiddush Hashem. Trans. S. Morris Engel. New York: Behrman
House, 1977. (Avif kidush hashem. New York: Rachmiel Bruks Book Commit-
tee, 1952.)
Fuks, Ladislav. Mr. Theodore Mundstock. Trans. Iris Urwin. New York: Ballan-
tine, 1969. (Pan Theodor Mundstock. Prague: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel,
1963.)
Gary, Romain. The Dance of Genghis Cohn. New York: World, 1968.
Gouri, Haim. The Chocolate Deal. Trans. Seymour Simckes. New York: Holt,
1968. (Iskat hashokolad. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1965.)
Kaniuk, Yoram. Adam Resurrected. Trans. Seymour Simckes. New York: Athe-
neum,1971. (Adam ben kelev. Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1969.)
Karmel, Dona. An Estate ofMemory. Hertfordshire, Eng.: Panther, 1973.
Ka-tzetnik 135633. Atrocity. Trans. Nina De-Nur. New York: Kensington, 1977.
(Pipel. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1988.)
Works Cited 171
--. House of Dolls. Trans. Moshe M. Kohn. New York: Pyramid, 1958. (Beit
habubot. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1987.)
--. Phoenix over the Galilee. Trans. Nina De-Nur. New York: Harper, 1969.
(Kahol m'e!er. Tel Aviv: Am Dved, 1966.)
--. Star of Ashes. Trans. Nina De-Nur. Tel Aviv: Hamenora, 1971. (Kokhev
ha'efer. Tel Aviv: Hamenora, 1971.)
--. Sunrise over Hell. Trans. Nina De-Nur. London: Allen, 1977. (Sala-
mandrah. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1987.)
Kosinski, Jerzy. The Painted Bird. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton, 1975.
Langfus, Anna. The Whole Land Brimstone. Trans. Peter Wiles. New York:
Pantheon, 1962. (Le sel et Ie soufre. Paris: Gallimard, 1960.)
Levi, Primo. If Not Now, When? Trans. William Weaver. New York: Simon, 1985.
(Se non ora, quando? Torino: Giudio Einaudi, 1982.)
--. The Periodic Table. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Schocken,
1985. (II sistema periodico. Torino: Guidio Einaudi, 1975.)
Lind, Jakov. Landscape in Concrete. Trans. Ralph Manheim. New York: Pocket,
1968. (Landschaft in Beton. Neuwied am Rhein: Hennann Luchterhand,
1963.)
Lustig, Amost. Darkness Casts No Shadow. Trans. Jeanne Nemcova. New York:
Avon, 1978. (Tma nemd stine In Demanty noci, 83-135. Prague: Mlada Fronta,
1958.
--. Diamonds of the Night. Trans. Jeanne Nemcova. Washington, D.C.:
Inscape, 1978. (Demanty noci. Prague: Mlada Fronta, 1958.)
--. Dita Saxova. Trans. Jeanne Nemcova. New York: Harper, 1979. (Dita
Saxovd. Prague: Mlada Fronta, 1969.)
--. Night and Hope. Trans. George Theiner. New York: Avon, 1976. (Noc a
nadeje. Prague: Nose vojsko, 1959.)
--. A Prayer for Katerina Horovitzova. Trans. Jeanne Nemcova. New York:
Harper, 1973. (Modlitba pro Katefinu Horovitzovou. Prague: Ceskoslovensky
spisovatel, 1964.)
Oz, Amos. Touch the Wate~ Touch the Wind. Trans. Nicholas de Lange. New York:
Harcourt, 1974. (I.:ga'at b'mayim, l'ga'at b'ruah. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1973.)
Rawicz, Piotr. Blood from the Sky. Trans. Peter Wiles. New York: Harcourt, 1964.
(Le sang du ciel. Paris: Gallimard, 1961.)
Schwarz-Bart, Andre. The Last of the Just. Trans. Stephen Becker. New York:
Bantam, 1961. (Le dernier des justes. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1959.)
Singer, Isaac Bashevis. Enemies: A Love Story. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1972.
--. Shosha. Trans. Joseph Singer and I.B. Singer. New York: Farrar, 1978.
Wiesel, Elie. The Accident. Trans. Ann Borchardt. New York: Avon, 1962. (Le
Jour. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1961.)
--. A Beggar in Jerusalem. Trans. Lily Edelman and Elie Wiesel. New
York: Random, 1970. (Le mendiant de Jerusalem. Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1968.)
--. Dawn. Trans. Frances Frenaye. New York: Hill and Wang, 1961. (I.:Aube.
Paris: Editions du Seuit, 1960.)
--. The Fifth Son. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Summit, 1985. (Le
cinquieme fils. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1983.)
172 Works Cited
--. The Gates of the Forest. Trans. Frances Frenaye. New York: Holt, 1966.
(Les portes de la foret. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964.)
--. Night. Trans. Stella Rodway. New York: Hill and Wang, 1961. (La Nuit.
Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1958.)
---. The Oath. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Avon, 1973. (Le serment de
KolvilIag. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1973.)
--. The Testament. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Summit, 1981. (Le
testament d'un poete juif assassine. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980.)
--. The Town beyond the Wall. Trans. Stephen Becker. New York: Avon, 1964.
(La ville de la chance. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962.)
--. Twilight. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Summit, 1988. (Lecre"uscule,
au loin. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1987.)
Secondary Sources
Adorno, T.W. "Engagement." In Natur zur Literatur III, 109-35. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965.
Alexander, Edward. The Resonance of Dust: Essays on Holocaust Literature and
Jewish Fate. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1979.
Amery, Jean. At the Mind's Limits: Comtemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and
Its Realities. Trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld. Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1980.
Appelfeld, Aharon. Essays in the First Person. Jerusalem: Zionist Library, 1979.
Auden, W.H. "September1, 1939." In The Major Poets: English. and American, ed.
Charles M. Coffin, 534-37. New York: Harcourt, 1969.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael
Holquist. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981.
--. Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva. Moscow: Art, 1979.
--. Esthetique et theorie du roman. Trans. Daria Olivier. Paris: Gallimard,
1978.
--. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Trans. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis:
Dniv. of Minnesota Press, 1984.
--. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helen Isiasky. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1968.
Bergson, Henri, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Trans. Ashley Audra
and Cloudsley Brereton. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1954.
Brown, Norman O. Love's Body. New York: Vintage, 1966.
Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. New York:
Macmillan, 1965.
--. Daniel: Dialogues on Realization. Trans. Maurice Friedman. New York:
Holt, 1964.
---. I and Thou. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Scribner's, 1970.
--. The Legend of the Baal-Shem. Trans. Maurice Friedman. New York:
Schocken, 1969.
--. Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters. Trans. Olga Marx. New York:
Schocken, 1947.
Works Cited 173
Burke, Kenneth. The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology. Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1970.
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. Trans. Justin O'Brien.
New York: Vintage, 1955.
--. The Rebel. Trans. Anthony Bower. New York: Vintage, 1956.
Clark, Katerina, and Michael Holquist. Mikhail Bakhtin. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1984.
Dante. The Inferno. Trans. John Ciardi. New York: New American Library, 1954.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Bal-
timore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976.
Descartes, Rene. Selections. Ed. Ralph M. Eaton. Trans. E.S. Haldane and
G.R.T. Ross. New York: Scribner's, 1955.
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov. Trans. Constance Garnett. New
York: New American Library, 1980.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Selected Writings. Ed. William H. Gilman. New York:
New American Library, 1965.
Ezrahi, Sidra DeKoven. By Words Alone: The Holocaust in Literature. Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980.
Fine, Ellen S. lithe Search for Identity: Post Holocaust French Literature." In
Remembering for the Future: Theme II, 1472-80. Oxford: Pergamon, 1988.
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language.
Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1972.
---. Madness and Civilization. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Pantheon,
1965.
--. The Order of Things. New York: Vintage, 1973.
Frankl, Victor E. Man's Search for Meaning. Trans. Use Lasch. Rev. ed. Boston:
Beacon, 1962.
Frost, Robert. Robert Frost's Poems. New York: Washington Square, 1965.
Glatzer, Nahum, ed. Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought. 2d ed. New York:
Schocken, 1961.
Govrin, Nurit. liTo Express the Inexpressible: The Holocaust Literature of
Aharon Appelfeld." In Remembering for the Future: Theme II, 1580-94. Oxford:
Pergamon, 1988.
Halperin, Irving. Messengers from the Dead: Literature of the Holocaust. Phila-
delphia: Westminster, 1970.
Jabes, Edmond. The Book of Yukel and Return to the Book. Trans. Rosemarie
Waldrop. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1977.
Ka-tzetnik 135633. Shivitti. Trans. Eliyah N. De-Nur and Lisa Herman. New
York: Harper, 1989.
Kazantzakis, Nikos. The Rock Garden. Trans. Richard Howard and Kimon Friar.
New York: Simon, 1963.
Kierkegaard, Sereno Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Trans. David F. Swenson
and Walter Lowrie. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941.
---. Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death. Trans. Walter Lowrie.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968.
---. Training in Christianity. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1944.
174 Works Cited
Kitov, Eliyahu. The Book of Our Heritage. 3 vols. Trans. Nathan Bulman. New
York: Feldheim, 1973.
Knopp, Josephine. "Holocaust Literature IT: Novels and Short Stories." In
Encountering the Holocaust: An Interdisciplinary Suroey, ed. Byron L. Sherwin
and Susan G. Ament, 267-315. Chicago: Impact, 1979.
Kosinski, Jerzy. Notes of the Author on the Painted Bird. New York: Scientia-
Factum, 1965.
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977.
--. The Language of the Selfi Trans. Anthony WIlden. Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1968.
Langer, Lawrence. The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1975.
Levi, Primo. If This Is a Man. Trans. Stuart Wolf. New York: Orion, 1959.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity. Trans. Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh,
Pa.: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1985.
--. Otherwise Than Being; or, Beyond Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1981.
--. "Signature." Research in Phenomenology 8 (1978): 175-89.
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. Communist Manifesto. Authorized English
trans. Chicago: Kerr, 1982.
Mintz, Alan. Hurban: Responses to Catastrophe in Hebrew Literature. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1984.
Nachmanides. Commentary on the Torah. Vol. 2. Trans. Charles B. Chavel. New
York: Shilo, 1973.
Neher, Andre. The Exile of the Word: From the Silence of the Bible to the Silence of
Auschwitz. Trans. David Maisel. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,
1981.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. Some Lessons in Metaphysics. Trans. Mildred Adams. New
York: Norton, 1969.
Pascal, Blaise. Pensees. Trans. A.J. Krailsheimer. New York: Penguin, 1966.
Patterson, David. The Affirming Flame: Religion, Language, Literature. Norman:
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1988.
--. In Dialogue and Dilemma with Elie Wiesel. Wakefield, N.H.: Longwood
Academic, 1991.
--. Literature and Spirit: Essays on Bakhtin and His Contemporaries. Lexington:
Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988.
Perlina, Nina. "Bakhtin and Buber: Problems of Dialogic Imagination." Studies
in Twentieth Century Literature 9 (Fall 1984): 13-28.
Plato. Phaedo. Trans. R. Hackforth. New York: Bobbs, 1955.
Ricoeur, Paul. The Symbolism of Evil. Trans. Emerson Buchanan. Boston:
Beacon, 1967.
Rosenfeld, Alvin. A Double Dying: Reflections on Holocaust Literature. Bloom-
ington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1980.
Rosenzweig, Franz. The Star of Redemption. Trans. William H. Hallo. Boston:
Beacon, 1972.
Roskies, Davd G. Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe in Modern
Jewish Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984.
Works Cited 175
Sachs, Nelly. 0 the Chimneys: Selected Poems. Trans. Michael Hamburger et al.
New York: Farrar, 1967.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York:
Simon, 1978.
--. No Exit and Other Plays. Trans. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Vintage, 1956.
Shestov, Lev. Afiny i Ierusalim. Paris: YMCA, 1951.
Sicher, Efriam. "'Making Good Again' :Literary and Moral Reparation after the
Holocaust." In Remembering for the Future: Theme II, 1540-48. Oxford: Per-
gamon, 1988.
Tillich, Paul. The Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper, 1957.
--. The Eternal Now. New York: Scribner's, 1956.
--. The New Being. New York: Scribner's, 1955.
Todorov, Tzvetan. Mikhail Bakhtine: Le principe dialogique. Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 1981.
Unamuno, Miguel de. Tragic Sense ofLife. Trans. J.E. Crawford Fitch. New York:
Dover, 1954.
Voloshinov, V.N. Marksizm i filosofiya yazyka. 2d ed. Leningrad: Surf, 1930.
Wardi, Charlotte. Le genocide dans la fiction romanesque. Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1986.
Wiesel, Elie. Against Silence: The Voice and Vision of Elie Wiesel. 3 vols. ed. Irving
Abrahamson. New York: Holocaust Library, 1985.
---. Ani Maamin. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Random, 1973.
---. Dimensions of the Holocaust. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press,
1977.
---. Five Biblical Portraits. Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ of Notre Dame Press,
1981.
---. A Jew Today. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Random, 1978.
--. The Jews of Silence. Trans. Neal Kozodoy. New York: Holt, 1966.
--. Legends of Our Time. New York: Avon, 1968.
---. Messengers of God. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Random, 1976.
---. One Generation After. Trans. Lily Edelman and Elie Wiesel. New York:
Pocket, 1970.
---. Paroles d'etranger. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982.
---and Albert Friedlander. The Six Days of Destruction. Oxford: Pergamon,
1988.
---. Somewhere a Master. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Summit, 1982.
---. Souls on Fire. Trans. Marion Wiesel. New York: Vintage, 1973.
Young, James E. Writing and Rwriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Con-
sequences of Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1988.
Yudkin, Leon I. Escape into Siege: A Survey of Israeli Literature Today. London:
Routledge, 1974.
Yutler, Alan J. The Holocaust in Hebrew Literature: From Genocide to Rebirth. Port
Washington, N.Y.: Associated Faculty Press, 1983.
20har: The Book of Splendor. Ed. Gershom Scholem. New York: Schocken, 1963.
This page intentionally left blank
Index
Abel, 75, 156
Abraham, 27, 157
Absalom, 75
absence, 4, 5, 14, 21, 30-31, 41-42, 76,
126, 149-50
Adam, 60, 95, 158
Adorno, T. W., 81
affirmation, 4, 71, 76, 95, 125, 141,
143, 160-67
Aichinger, lIse, 39, 80, 91, 92, 93,
~97, 121, 128-29, 136, 143, 154, 160,
165
Alexander, Edward, 7, 62
Amery, Jean, 10, 47, 67, 78, 101, 112,
115, 134, 157-58
Amichai, Yehuda, 40, 65, 71, 80, 82,
92-93, 94, 95, 111, 119, 136, 137-38,
148-49
Anatoli, A., 51, 85, 103, 137, 146, 148,
155
Appelfeld, Aharon, 6, 11, 23, 43-44,
SO, 98, 108; Tzili: The Story of a Life,
2, 44, 56, 79, 118, 135, 150;
Badenheim 1939, 31, 38, 41, 43, 80,
110; The Age of Wonders, 53, 63-64,
66-67, 74, 85, 101, 127; The Retreat,
43, 63; To the lJlnd of the Cattails, 94,
135, 150, 158; For Every Sin, 97, 118,
134-35, 161
Arieti, Silvano, 96, 104, 120, 128,
165-66, 167
Auden, W. H., 160
Auschwitz, 3, 4, 10, 19, 20, 37, 38,
39, 40, 49, 67, 94, 123-24, 157-58, 161
Baal Shem Tov, 90
Babi Yar, 85, 98
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21,
22-28, 33, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 54, 56,
5~60,63,64,66,ro,n,~,9~9~
98, 99-100, 101, 105, 109-10, 111,
112-13, 114-15, 118, 121, 124, 125, 126,
130, 131, 132, 136, 138, 140, 145, 146,
151, 152, 154-55, 157, 158, 163, 166,
169
Barukh of Medzebozh, 166
Bellow, Saul, 52, 56, 65, 91, 120-21,
143, 154
Bergson, Henri, 125
between-space, 5, 13-14, 15, 47, 50,
101, 121, 130, 140, 146, 147, 159, 162
Bezalel, 169
body, the, 112-15, 121, 126, 148
Bor, Josef, 32, 143
Brown, Norman 0.,55,125-26
Bryks, Rachmil, 56, 80, 94
Buber, Martin, 1, 14-16, 17, 18, 22, 48,
57, 73, 74, 79, 81, 86, 108-09, 119,
141, 144, 146, 151, 152, 154, 158, 161,
162, 166
Burke, Kenneth, 4
Cain, 34, 75-76, 156
Camus, Albert, 47-48, 68-69, 75,
124-25
Cargas, Harry James, 59, 76
circumcision, 62-63, 106-07
Clark, Katerina, 22, 25
Cohen, Hermann, 22
Dante, 29, 55, 84
darkness, 38-39, 77, 106, 160, 165,
165-66
David, 75, 95
death, 32-35, 46, 49, 66, 69, 72, 81,
90, 95, 115-16, 123, 125, 127, 128,
130, 135-36
De-Nur, Yehiel. See Ka-tzetnik 135633
178
Derrida, Jacques, 134
Descartes, Rene, 112
dialogic encounter. See dialogic
relation
dialogic relation,S, 6, 14-15, 22-23,
26, 51, 110, 116-17, 124, 130, 133,
154-55, 158, 160, 162, 163. See also
human relation
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 77, 86
double, motif of, 108-10
Ecclesiastes, 76
Elijah, 128
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 96
Ezekiel, 75
Ezrahi, Sidra DeKoven, 8, 109, 134
faith, 4, 76, 83, 94, 140-41
Fine, Ellen, 105
Foucault, Michel, 25, 30, 112, lIS, 116,
118, 157
Frankl, Viktor, 153
Friedlander, Albert, 38
Frost, Robert, 165
Fuks, Ladislav, 43, 97, 152
future, the, 26, 27, 58, 81-82, 99-100,
136-43
Gaon of Vtlna, 164
Gary, Romain, 24
God, 3, 4, 14, 19, 20, 21, 27, 31-32,
M,~,C,~,5~5~5~65,~-%,
89-90, 94, 96, 119-20, 133, 140,
141-42, 163-65
Gouri, Haim, 2, 41, 96, 101-02, 108,
109, 118, 127, 137, 149
Govrin, Nurit, 63
Halperin, Irving, 6
Heine, Heinrich, 46
Holquist, Michael, 22, 25
human relation, 47-53, 108-09, Ill,
113-14, 130, 132, 133, 140, 143-44,
146. See also dialogic relation
identity, 105-12, 116-17. See also soul;
subjectivity
Isaac, 54, 128, 157
Index
Jabes, Edmond, 81, 98, 102, 104, 106,
137
Jacob, 22, 68
Jeremiah, 119-20
Jesus, 95, 140
Job, 132, 168
Kafka, Franz, 34
Kaniuk, Yoram, 52, 62, 65, 80, 83,
95-96, 97, 103, 110, 113, 120, 128
Karmel, Ilona, 79, SO, 90, 93, 96, 116,
136, 143, 153-54
Ka-tzetnik 135633, 6, II, 23, 32, 38,
40, SO, 84, 88, 100, 102-03, lOS, 132,
136, 147, 148; Star of Ashes, 2, 75, 98,
113, lIS, 123, 131; Sunrise over Hell,
31, 39, 49, 52, 74-75, 87-88, 107, 114,
123-24, 149; Atrocity, 37-38, 39-40,
65, 73, 88, 94, 97, 99, 124, 159;
House of Dolls, 49-50, 66, 88-89, 94,
153; Phoenix over the Galilee, 94, 96,
103, 104, 107, 130-31, 132, 134, 143,
146
~zantzakis, Nikos, 89
Kierkegaard, Soren, II, 12, 13, 49, 60,
100, 121, 156
Knopp, Josephine, 7
Kosinski, Jerzy, 5, 36-37
Lacan, Jacques, 59-60, 64, 99, 100,
105-06, 110-11, 124, 1~, 143, 163
Langer, Lawrence, 6, 37, 70
Langfus, Anna, 41-42, 65, 67, 74, 85,
106, 137, 159
language, 6, 9, 10-11, 13, 23-24, 29,
31-32, 45, ~, 50-51, 60, 91, 102, 103,
108, 112, 126, 1~
laughter, 24-25, 39, 125-30
Law, the, 64-66
Lazarus, 130, 140
Levi, Primo, 10, 23, 47, 55, 99, 108; If
Not Nuw, When? 40-41, 64, 92, 110,
117, 156; The Periodic Table, 93, 104,
107-08, 131-32, 146
Levinas, Emmanuel, 16-19, 20, 21,
22,~,~,n,4O,~,~,50,~,60,
73, 76, 78-79, 85-86, 89, 94, 99, 101,
109, Ill, 113, 130, 131, tn, 134, 136,
Index
144, 147-48, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153,
155, 156, 157, 162-63, 168
Levi Yitzhak of Berditchev, 78, 151
Lind, Jakov, 24, 34, 42, 118, 143, 148
love, 21-22, 78-79, 125-26, 127, 131,
161-63, 166
Lustig, Amost, 6, 7-8, 11, 50, 59, 76,
80, 95, 131, 147, 156, 168; A Prayer
for Katerina Horovitzova, 3, 36, 46,
SO, 81, 121; Darkness Casts No
Shadow, 29, 45, 61, 67-68, 103, lOS,
109, 114, 115, 135, 156, 167; Diamonds
of the Night, 46, 61, 65, 67, 87, 99,
121, 141, 148, 163-64; Dita Saxova,
46-47, SO-51, 81, 114; Night and Hope,
81-82, 87, 90, 106-07, 117, 135
madness, 25, 112-21, 126, 127-28, 157
Maggid of Dubno, 92
Maggid of Mezeritch, 3
Maimonides,l19
Marx, Karl, 62
memory, 27, 42, 84, 89, 119, 133-38,
140-41, 143, 146
Menahem-Mendl of Kotzk, 43
Menahem-Mendl of Vitebsk, 4
Messiah, 48, 49, 92, 95-96, 112, 140
Mintz, Alan, 9-10, 63
Moses, 50, 64
mother, the, 78-84, 88, 97, 115
Nachmanides, 169
Nachman of Bratzlav, 129
Neher, Andre, 4, 19-22, 24, 25, 27,
32-33, 40, 55, 76, 91, 92, 123, 129,
132, 136, 161, 166
nothingness, 10, 19-20, 31, 40, 41,
64-65, 69, 99, 115
Oedipus, 12
Ortega y G~set, Jose, 105, 138
other, the, 10-11,13,14,16-19,21,23,25,
47,48,57,72-73,79,86,97,103,104,
105-06, 109-10, 113-14, 117-18, 120,
121, 130, 132-33, 136, 140, 145, 147-48,
149,150,151,152-53,158-59,168
Other, the. See Lacan, Jacques
Oz, Amos, 1, 42, 74, 106, Ill, 138-39
179
Paraclete, 95
Pascal, Blaise, 10, 34, 91
Pentateuch. See Torah
Peter, 66
Plato, 112
prayer, 36, 44, 56, 57, 58, 70-72, 92,
131, 134, 141-42, 161-62, 166
presence,S, 14-15, 16, 21-22, 29, 35,
41-43, 45, 99, 103, 104, 118, 119, 126,
134, 141, 142, 149-50, 151, 152, 155,
162. See also responsibility
Rawicz, Piotr, 7, 11, 23, 45, 47, 62-63,
67, 80, 83-84, 103, 107, 130, 134, 139,
146
rebellion, 54, 67-73
redemption, 4, 6, 9, 12-13, 17, 21, 29,
51, 78, 90, 131, 132, 137, 142, 147,
161, 164. See also movement of
return; salvation
responsibility, 16-18, 21, 25-26, 28,
33, 50, 57, 73, 85-87, 94, 111, 130,
133, 144, 147, 150, 151-60, 161, 164,
166, 168-69. See also presence
return, movement of, 4, 45, 86-87,
96, 98, 131, 134-35, 138-39, 143-44.
See also redemption; salvation
Ricoeur, Paul, 100
Rokeah, Eleazar, 89
Rosenfeld, Alvin, 4, 8-9, 14, 126
Rosenzweig, Franz, 12-14, 16, 17, 22,
29,32,40,43,47,120,138,139,140,
168
Roskies, David, 10
Ruth, 95
Sachs, Nelly, 3
salvation, 92-97, 137. See also
redemption; return, movement of
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 57, 98, 108, 114
Schwartz-Bart, Andre, 70-71, 129, 157
Shekhina, 84, 120
Shestov, Lev, 69
Sinai, 38, 139-40, ISO
Singer, LB., 61; Enemies: A Love Story,
32, 43, 52, 57, 66, 79, 99, 143-44;
Shosha, 59, 60, 61, 71, 80-81, 93, 117,
120, 150, 163
180
Sisyphus, 124
soul, the, 7, 8, 21, 18, 50, 78-79,
84-85, 86, 96, 100, 109, 112-13, 121,
126, 135, 142, 146, 148, 151, 157, 164,
169. See also identity; subjectivity
space, 40-47, 101, 113, 119
spirit, 13, 15-16, 18, 52, 105, 136,
143-44, 151
subjectivity, 16, 17, 60, 79, 94, 100,
113, 136, 147, 148, 151, 153, 157. See
also identity; soul
Talmud, 48, 140, 157
Third, the, 15, 18-19, 110-12, 120, 147,
149, 162-64, 166, 167
Tillich, Paul, 29, 56, 92, 141
time, 13, 14, 38, 39, 40-47, 49, 101,
113, 126, 141, 142
Todorov, Tzvetan, 20, 54, 73
Torah, 64, 139, 151, 157, 163, 169
truth, 11-12, 13-14, 20, 24, 25-26, 49,
59-60, 73, 100, 106, 110-11, 116-17,
119, 125, 128, 141, 147, 162, 163, 164
Unamuno, Miguel de, 30, 46, 58
Verdi, Giuseppe, 143
Voloshinov, V. N., 52, 63
Wardi, Charlotte, 10-11
Wiesel, Elie, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 18,
19, 20, 22, 23, 24-25, 28, 29, 36, 38,
Index
40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 51-52, 52-53, 54,
59,68,72,76,77,78,80,81,82,83,
85, 89, 98, 105, 112, 119, 123, 125,
127, 129, 130, 133-34, 139-40, 142,
146-47, 150-51, 155, 156, 158, 159-60,
161-62, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168; The
Town beyond the Wall, 27, 30, 35, 36,
44-45, 47-48, 71-72, 73, 75, 76,
86-87, 91, 96, 103, 109, 115, 125, 146,
151, 157, 162; A Beggar in Jerusalem,
30, 38, 58, 76, 98, 109, 127-28, 129,
139, 151, 156, 162; The Testament, 33,
35, 36, 44-45, 48, 51, 55-56, 57-58,
61-62, 73, 87, 93, 94-95, 103, 104,
105, 111, 117, 119, 127, 133, 140, 142,
146, 148, 153, 167; Dawn, 34, 36,
79-80, 137; The Gates of the Forest,
35-36, 38, 48, 68, 73, 109, 119, 126,
127, 132-33, 134, 137, 141, 156, 161,
162; Night, 38, 67, 69-70, 72, 73, 90,
115, 153, 164; The Oath, 49, 54, 92,
109, 128, 130, 133, 140, 158-59, 164;
Twilight, 58-59, 70, 73, 75-76, 103,
104, 109, 112, 116, 119, 126, 133, 142,
164; The Fifth Son, 60, 84, 103, 146;
The Accident, 98-99, 126, 135-36, 160
witness, 94, 95, 130-31, 146, 147-52,
153, 156, 157, 158, 161, 163
Yad Vashem, 77-78
Young, James, 11
Yudkin, Leon, 6
Yutler, Alan, 9, 132
Other Books by David Patterson
The Affirming Flame: Religion, Language, Literature
In Dialogue and Dilemma with Elie Wiesel
Faith and Philosophy
Literature and Spirit: Essays on Bakhtin and His Contemporaries
The Way of the Child (a novel)
Translations
Confession, by Leo Tolstoy
Diary of a Superfluous Man, by Ivan Turgenev
The Forged Coupon, by Leo Tolstoy
Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, by Fyodor Dostoyevsky
